


DURTIS P. AYERS III
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


THE ROLE OF THE ARMY
IN THE OXFORD, MISSISSIPPI, INCIDENT

1962 - 1963

HISTORIES DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

24 JUNE 1965



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by

PAUL J. SCHEIPS

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PREFACE

This is a historical report on the Army's role in the integration of The University of Mississippi, 1962-1963. Important aspects covered include precedents for the use of the Army in civil disturbances, planning for possible military intervention, intervention in the riot of 30 September - 1 October 1962, early redeployment of major troop units, and operations thereafter through the withdrawal of July 1963.

Although there is a great quantity of documentary and other material bearing on the subject of this report, the report is based primarily upon Army records, particularly those of the Oxford action officer, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, as arranged and supplemented for historical purposes by the undersigned. Unless otherwise specified, the serial documents and the files cited are to be found among these records -- the Records of the Oxford, Mississippi, Operation -- of which there is an inventory in the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C.

Appendix A, containing Oxford lessons and recommendations, and Appendix B, containing General Abrams' thoughts on the subject of the Army's future role in civil rights troubles, are included, respectively, as a useful reference source and as the considered recommendations of the personal representative of the Chief of Staff.

Paul J. Scheips
OCMH, D/A
1965



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CHAPTER I

OXFORD PRECEDENTS AND AUTHORITY

Historical Precedents. -- Instances of United States Army intervention in civil disturbances go back to the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794. Since that time various Presidents, under Constitutional and statutory authority, have used the Army in a number of disturbances, and have produced a considerable body of precedent about which much has been written.¹ The most notable cases in recent years were those of the Army's intervention in Little Rock, Arkansas, and Oxford, Mississippi, in 1957-1958 and 1962-1963, respectively. The former was a case involving racial integration of Little Rock's Central High School,² which provoked an interesting discussion of the legality of using troops on that occasion.³ The latter of these cases, with which this monograph deals, concerned the integration of The University of Mississippi by the admission of a Negro student, James H. Meredith.⁴

Montgomery Troubles. -- In 1961, President Kennedy's first year in office, racial difficulties in Montgomery, Alabama, led to the development of plans for military intervention in support of Federal marshals in Montgomery. On that occasion, however, Federal troops did not have to be used, but the planning was a useful preparation for the intervention in Oxford the following year.⁵

Meredith Case. -- On 25 June 1962, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, hearing the case of Meredith v. Fair, found by a two-to-one decision that Meredith had been denied admission

to The University of Mississippi because he was a Negro. It thereupon ordered the district court of original jurisdiction to enjoin the University and other officials from refusing to admit Meredith. By a series of orders, however, one of the Appeals judges sought to stay the Circuit Court's judgment pending Supreme Court action on the original defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. At that juncture, Associate Justice Hugo L. Black, acting for the Supreme Court as the justice assigned to the Fifth Circuit, vacated the stays, and on 13 September 1962 District Court Judge Sidney C. Mize issued a sweeping injunction to guarantee Meredith's admission to the University and his attendance there without discrimination.

Meanwhile, in Washington, the Government had anticipated this judicial result and both the Departments of Justice and the Army had given thought to possible intervention because of the expected opposition of Mississippi authorities, which conceivably might require the use of troops.

Policy and Army Implementation. -- If troops were needed, the means for implementing the pertinent law and precedent could be found in various directives and guides, as well as in a basic plan. To begin with, it was Department of Defense policy at the time of the Little Rock affair, the Montgomery crisis, and the Oxford troubles, that the Department of the Army had "the primary responsibility for coordinating the planning and rendering of military assistance to civil authorities in domestic emergencies." Under that policy, laid down in a Department of Defense directive on "Responsibilities for Civil Defense and Other Domestic

Emergencies," the Departments of the Navy and the Air Force would render such assistance, "consistent with . . . their primary mission," as the Army commander in the Zone of the Interior might require.⁷

Basic in implementing the Army's responsibility in civil disturbances was the section on that subject in the Army Strategic Capabilities Plan, as revised 17 August 1961, which made it plain that martial rule or martial law could not be proclaimed without the express direction of the President, and which assigned to the Commanding General, U.S. Continental Army Command, certain basic responsibilities. He would "plan for and conduct CONUS Army operations in domestic emergencies resulting from civil disturbances"; he would "coordinate and control the planning and participation of Navy and Air Force field agencies" in such disturbances; he would perform liaison and coordination functions with such Federal officials as the local agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Federal marshal, and the United States Attorney; and he would establish the necessary liaison with state and local authorities. Despite the Little Rock experience and the planning for Montgomery, the civil disturbances part of the Capabilities Plan seems to have been carried over from an earlier edition without revision. Thus despite its lack of revision, the Plan's grant of operational control to the Commanding General, CONARC, was countermanded in the case of Oxford and command of troops in the target area was shifted to the Army's Washington headquarters, as in the case of Little Rock and in the planning for Montgomery. The Capabilities Plan also assigned certain appropriate responsibilities to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Defense Command, and to the heads of the technical staff and other staff agencies.

Plans for operations in civil disturbances would be kept rigidly confidential "in all public or quasi-public relationships," and there would be no public references to "race riots" or "domestic violence." Plans would provide for dispatching public information personnel with the troops and for their "expeditious assistance" to reporters on the scene. Armies in the Zone of the Interior would not use agents to collect information until the use of troops became probable and not until authorized by the Commanding General, CONARC. Counterintelligence agents would not function in domestic disturbances "within the investigative jurisdiction of civil authority" without specific directives from the Commander in Chief.

In any actual military intervention by Federal troops, "necessity" would determine the extent of the commander's authority. Military actions would be "to support or reinstate and sustain" civilian authority. Ordinarily the Army would "exercise police powers previously inoperative in the affected area, restore and maintain order, maintain . . . distribution, transportation and communications and inaugurate such relief measures as the situation demands." Furthermore, the military commander would "cooperate to the fullest" with state and local officials unless such cooperation interfered with his mission. While "subject to no authority but that of his military superior" the commander would "bear in mind that the suppression of violence, when accomplished without bloodshed, is a worthy military achievement." Consequently, he would

"employ only such force as is necessary to accomplish his mission." Training would be conducted to assure "effective action" for such times as troops might have to be used.

In the references of the Capabilities Plan to the desirability of suppressing violence without bloodshed, to "necessity" as determining a commander's authority, and to the employment of only such force as might be necessary in a given instance, is seen the concept of the use of minimum force, which was and remains basic to Army operations in domestic disturbances; indeed, it is basic to the entire problem of law enforcement and is thus seen in the normal progression from enforcement by simply the prestige of the court, to enforcement by injunctive relief, to enforcement by civil officers (policemen or marshals), to the use of military force as a last resort. It is also seen particularly in military enforcement in the graduated methods or degrees of force used according to circumstances.

Finally, Federal troops used in civil disturbances would "be under the command of, and directly responsible to, their military superior." With a governors' consent, or that of some other appropriate official, an Army commander in the Zone of the Interior, or an officer designated by him, might exercise "operational or directional control" over state forces not in the Federal service. It would be a responsibility of the Commanding General, CONARC, to "obtain, wherever possible, prior written agreements . . . to assure full cooperation" of state forces in a given area should Federal troops intervene therein.

In force at the time of Little Rock and the succeeding emergency in Montgomery were Army Regulations on "Emergency Employment of Army

Resources: Domestic Disturbances." Later, on 19 July 1961, after the Montgomery emergency was over, the Army published a new edition of these regulations, changing the subtitle to "Civil Disturbances," bringing the citations to the United States Code therein up to date, and reorganizing the material somewhat, but without making any substantive changes.

Considerable attention seems to have been given to the Army's field manual on civil disturbances after Little Rock, for the 1952 edition, entitled Civil Disturbances, was completely rewritten and almost doubled in size when it appeared in a new edition in 1958. The fact that the new edition included material on disaster relief, which explains its title, Civil Disturbances and Disaster Relief, by no means accounts for the manual's increase in size, which resulted from a very substantial addition of material on riot operations. A change of 25 February 1960 provided for, among other things, substitution of the term "irritant agent" for the terms "riot control agents" and "riot control gas(es), or derivations from the latter." Earlier, in 1955, the Army had published a subject schedule on "Riot Control" to help instructors provide uniform training, which was still in force as late as mid-1963. On 31 May 1960 Army headquarters published a training circular on the "Use of Agent CS in Training and Riot Control."

Such were the basic policy, planning, and training guides implementing the precedents and authority for using troops in civil disturbances. There was not, however, even after the Little Rock and Montgomery crises, a detailed plan for coping with another disturbance. Therefore, when the Oxford troubles loomed in early September 1962,

planning had to be done hastily, but the recent experiences in Little Rock and in Montgomery were, as might be expected, of considerable value in planning for a possible new operation. Thus the Army was not entirely unprepared for the Oxford crisis into which it was thrust.

Chapter I -- Footnotes

1. See the U.S. Constitution, Art I, Sec 8; Art. II, Secs 2,3; and Art IV, Sec 4. For statutory authority. see 10 USC (1958 ed.; Supp. IV, 1959-62), Secs 332-34. For historical accounts, see Robert C. Coakley, (C) "Interim Operational Report on Operation ARKANSAS" (MS, OCMH, 2-3.7 AB.F / 1958 7), pp. 1-2 and the references cited there, together with the following: Edward S. Corwin, The President, Office and Powers, 1787-1948 (3d ed.; New York: 1948), pp. 160-65; Daniel H. Pollitt, "Presidential Use of Troops to Execute the Laws: A Brief History," The North Carolina Law Review, XXXVI (Feb 1958), 117-41; and Marlin S. Reichley, "Federal Military Intervention in Civil Disturbances" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown University, Washington, D. C., Apr 1939). Historically interesting are a number of articles in the Army and Navy Journal, 1877-78; The United Services, 1879; and the Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, 1883-84, 1887, 1889, some of which are descriptive of the labor riots in 1877 and others of which are theoretical. The recent article by John W. Killigrew, "The Army and the Bonus Incident," Military Affairs, XXVI (Summer 1962), 59-65, which grew out of a dissertation, leaves much to be desired. On the controversy over the legality of using troops in Little Rock in 1957, see n. 3, below.

2. See Coakley, op. cit., for an official historical report of this operation, and the following non-official accounts: Dale and L'Moore Alford, The Case of the Sleeping People (Finally Awakened by Little Rock School Frustrations) / Little Rock? c 1959 7; Hannah Arendt, "Reflections on Little Rock," Dissent, VI (Winter, 1959), 45ff; the same author's "Reply to Critics," ibid. (Spring 1959), 179-81; Daisy (Gaston) Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock: A Memoir (New York, c 1962); Virgil T. Blossom, It HAS Happened Here (New York, c 1959), which was published serially as "The Untold Story of Little Rock," The Saturday Evening Post, CCXXXI, in six parts, May - June 1959, with photographs; Robert R. Brown, Bigger Than Little Rock (Greenwich, Conn., 1958); and Corinne Silverman, The Little Rock Story ("The Inter-University Case Program," Case No. 41 / Rev; University, Ala, 1959 7).

3. Alfred J. Schweppe, "Use of Federal Troops in Little Rock Was Illegal," U.S. News & World Report, 1 Nov 1957, pp. 121-23; the same writer's "Enforcement of Federal Court Decrees: A Recurrence to Fundamental Principles," American Bar Association Journal / ABAJ 7, XLIV (Feb 1958), 113-16, 187-90, 192; Jack B. Schmetterer, "A Reply to Mr. Schweppe: Military Enforcement of Court Decrees," ibid., XLIV (Aug 1958), 727-30; John C. Stennis, "The Multiplying Evils of Bad Law," Mississippi Law Journal, XXIX (Aug 1958), 430-43; Robert H. Elliott, Jr., and Richard I. Singer, "Constitutional Law -- Executive Powers -- Use of Troops to Enforce Federal Laws," Michigan Law Review, LVI (Dec 1957), 249-72; "Enforcement of Court Orders," 2 Race Rel. L. Rep. 437, 1077-79;

1094-1102; ibid., IV, 447-51; H.W.C. Furman, "Restrictions upon Use of the Army Imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act," Military Law Review, VII (Jan 1960), 85-129; Pollitt, "Presidential Use of Troops to Execute the Laws: A Brief History," loc. cit.; the same writer's "A Dissenting View: The Executive Enforcement of Judicial Decrees," ABAL, XLV (Jun 1959), 600-603, 603; various letters on the legality of using troops, ibid. (Nov 1958), pp. 1024, 1030, 1140, 1142; Charles J. Bloch, States' Rights: The Law of the Land (Atlanta, c 1958), pp. 326 ff; Opinion of Att. Gen. Herbert Brownell, Jr., 7 Nov 1957 (Released 29 Dec 1958), XLI, Op. No. 67; JAGA 1959/1999 (20 Feb 1959); Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (New York, 1962), pp. 31, 91; and William M. Blatt, "The National Guard --- Command Relationship of the President and Governor," The United States Air Force JAG Bulletin, V (Mar-Apr 1963), 5-31. See Corwin, op. cit., pp. 160ff, for an analysis of "Military Power in Law Enforcement" in the period before Little Rock.

4. For biographical information on Meredith, see the following especially useful materials: 7 Race Rel. L. Rep., 71-72, 425, 433-34 (1962); James H. Meredith, "I'll Know Victory or Defeat," The Saturday Evening Post, CCXXXV (10 Nov 1962), 14; Meet the Press, America's Press Conference of the Air (Washington, 1963), the transcript of an NBC panel interview with Meredith on 26 May 1963; "Battler in Mississippi: James Howard Meredith," The New York Times, 21 Sep 1962; and "The History of the Meredith Case," The University of Mississippi 7, The University of Mississippi and the Meredith Case (Processed; University, Miss., 1962), pp. 1-13.

5. On the Montgomery troubles of 1961 and the planning for possible military intervention, see Tristram Coffin, "The Department of Justice," Holiday, XXXIII (Mar 1963), 144-45, 179-80; U.S. Comm. on Civil Rights, Freedom to the Free, Century of Emancipation, 1863-1963 (Washington, 1963), p. 179; Facts on File (1961), pp. 177, 185-86; teleg (cy), Robert F. Kennedy, Att. Gen., to members of the Ala. Congressional delegation, 23 May 1961, incl/w Guthman to Scheips, 28 Oct 1963; and (S) Alert of Troops, Birmingham, Ala. --- Freedom Riders, a file containing official Army documentation.

6. On Meredith v. Fair, see The University of Mississippi and the Meredith Case, pp. 1-10, and cf. 6 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1028-32 (1961) and ibid., VII, 70-80, 423-40, 739-65 (1962). An interesting discussion of the legal aspects of Justice Black's ruling in the case is in Arthur Krock, "The Due Process Factor in the Meredith Case," The New York Times, 2 Oct 1962, p. 36; and the same writer's "Contrasting Concepts of Due Process," ibid., 9 Oct 1962.

7. DOD Directive No. 3025.1, 14 Jul 1956, Sec. V-G, p. 3.

8. See (TS) ASCP-FY 61 (U), (U) Annex H, App. 4, Tab C, w/Incl 1 ("Protection of Federal Property"), pp. 201-206, 207, a cy of which is in (S) "Planning Papers for the Employment of Armed Forces in Civil Disturbances (Compiled Prior to Oxford, Mississippi, Operations)," Annex D (hereafter cited as Pre-Planning Papers).

9. Cf. AR 500-50, "Emergency Employment of Army Resources: Domestic Disturbances," 22 Mar 1956, with AR 500-50, "Emergency Employment of Army Resources," 19 Jul 1961. For regulations in force at the time of the Oxford troubles on calling the National Guard into the service of the U.S., see AR 135-300, 26 Jul 1961, par 32. This was the third issue since AR 130-10, 19 Oct 1950 (with C 1, 27 Dec 1950), which controlled at the time of Little Rock.

10. Cf. DA, Civil Disturbances (DA, FM 19-15 / Washington, April 1952 7) with DA, Civil Disturbances and Disasters (DA FM 19-15 / Washington, Sept. 1958 7), including C 1, 25 Feb. 1960. C 2 to the latter edition, issued 21 Feb 1963, during the Oxford operation, laid it down, among other things, that the term "riot control agent(s)" would henceforth be used in place of the terms "riot control gas(es)" and "irritant gas," etc. Also see D/A TC 3-9, "Use of Agent CS in Training and Riot Control," 31 May 1960. DA Army Subj. Scd. 19-6, "Riot Control," 28 Dec. 1955, is mentioned in Coakley, op. cit., p. 2. It was still in force as recently as the summer of 1963. For a list of official training references on the subject, including training film and film strips, see FM 19-15, Sept. 1958, pp. 147-50. For a privately published work, see Sterling A. Wood, Riot Control (3d ed.; Harrisburg, 1952).

CHAPTER II

PLANNING AND THE TENT CITY

Planning by Staff Agencies. -- As early as 8 September 1962, two days before Justice Black vacated the stays of the Circuit Court judge, Maj. Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., Director of Operations, ODCSOPS, conferred with Secretary of the Army Cyrus R. Vance and came away with the knowledge that the Army might become involved in the Meredith case by providing a tent camp and other logistical support for Federal marshals in the Oxford area, or by providing military support for the marshals in their enforcement of the Federal judicial process in the case, or in both ways. In order to permit early planning by the Office of the Chief of Information, Abrams, immediately after the conference, called in an Army information officer. Maj. Gen. Charles G. Dodge, the Chief of Information, would be informed upon his return to Washington on 11 September.¹ Meanwhile the Commanding General, CONARC, also had to be informed.

When Governor Ross Barnett invoked the doctrine of interposition and urged jail for himself and other officials rather than submission following the Federal District Court's enjoinder of the University on 13 September, the Federal Government took note of his defiance. Either immediately afterward or in anticipation of Barnett's interposition, there was a conference on 13 September of Department of Justice officials with Secretary Vance, General Abrams, and others.²

Present at the meeting, besides Vance and Abrams, who described it in a memorandum on 14 September, were Undersecretary of the Army Stephen Ailes, Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall; Assistant Deputy Attorney General William A. Geoghegan; Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, Maj. Gen. J. K. Hester; and an aide to Secretary Vance, Col. James L. Baldwin. Marshall described the problem, explaining that The University of Mississippi was under court orders to admit Meredith, who would attempt to register on 20 September, the day before classes were scheduled to begin. Taking a pessimistic view, Marshall explained that the Department of Justice anticipated considerable public disorder, that Mississippi state police would interfere with Meredith's enrolment, and that the Governor's orders to all state officials to resist the enrolment (as set forth in his address on interposition) would be carried out.

Geoghegan, of Justice, then revealed the plans that Justice had decided upon to counter expected Mississippi efforts to prevent Meredith's enrolment. Initially, Justice planned to have 190 deputy Federal marshals at the Naval Air Station at Memphis (actually at Millington, Tennessee, seventeen or eighteen miles from Memphis) with a reserve of about 100 men. They would have their own radios and cars, and would obtain helicopters from charter companies. At the beginning the operation would be based at the Air Station, but if it were prolonged Justice would want a base closer to Oxford. Suggested as a closer base was the Holly Springs National Forest. For such a base the Army would provide a complete tent camp for 300 men.

At this point the discussion turned, with Assistant Attorney General Marshall introducing the subject, to the contingency that Justice's efforts at civil enforcement might not prevail and that armed force might have to be used. In reply, Secretary Vance stressed the far-reaching implications of resort to armed force and urged that all other solutions be fully explored before troops were committed. The discussion then turned to such technical matters as a Presidential proclamation, instructions to the Secretary of Defense, and call-up of the National Guard. In case they should be needed, Justice had already drawn up the necessary documents.

Secretary Vance agreed to provide a tent camp if required, and he authorized Army planning for it. He also authorized Army planning for the use of troops, should they be needed, but stated that they would not be moved without his personal approval. Geoghegan thought that there should be direct communication with the Federal marshal's office in Oxford. Vance and Marshall agreed that the two departments would communicate through General Abrams for Army and Geoghegan for Justice. General Hester, speaking for the Air Force, offered the aid of his service and said he would inform the Secretary of the Air Force.

The ODCSOPS would now be responsible for preparing two plans, one for the tent camp, or tent city, as it was called, and related logistical support, and one for possible use of Army elements in military intervention in active support of the marshals. General Abrams, who had become assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations in Civil Affairs in June 1962, became for this operation the personal representative of the

Chief of Staff. This was the same responsibility that General Earle G. Wheeler, who became Chief of Staff in 1962, had had in Operation ARKANSAS. General Abrams continued to serve in that capacity for several months even though on 15 October 1962 he became the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations for Army Requirements and Programs. As the Chief's representative, Abrams had the day-to-day operational responsibility in the succeeding months, although the principal burden of work fell upon the project or action officer, Lt. Col. Gordon C. Jung.

Probably immediately after the Justice-Army meeting on 13 September, or in any case late in the afternoon of that day, Col. Donald W. Shive, chief of the General Operations Division in Abrams' Directorate, presumably learned of the situation from General Abrams' deputy, Col. Walter S. Schlotzhauer, Jr., the assistant director of operations, and at that point brought Lt. Col. Jung into the operation. Either then or the next day he verbally assigned Jung to the operation as the ODCSOPS project or action officer. As General Abrams' action officer in this operation, Col. Jung maintained close relations with the General, especially in the earlier phases of the operation. These were direct relations often in disregard of the niceties of military channels, and they were maintained, because of General Abrams' continuing responsibility and by his wishes, even after Abrams left the Operations Directorate. Indeed, Jung served as the ODCSOPS action officer throughout the period from his selection for that responsibility at the beginning of active planning to the end of active military participation.

Very soon after Col. Shive first took the matter up with Jung, they sought out the "Check List" that had been prepared after the Little Rock experience. It was in a loose-leaf notebook that became the original "Black Book" of the Mississippi operation. Reflecting principally the Little Rock affair, this notebook was a starting point for the planning that now had to be done. Col. Schlotzhauer at the same time alerted The Judge Advocate General and made inquiries by telephone concerning Reserve and Active Army units in the vicinity of Oxford, particularly concerning the location of the posts and major units that might be involved.

Beginning at eight o'clock the following morning, 14 September, General Abrams conferred with legal, information, and signal officers, while subordinates looked into the matter of useable Army installations in Mississippi, using the Engineer's station inventory list. Col. Shive, obtained information on the Naval Air Station at Millington, Tennessee (MNAS), about seventeen miles northeast of Memphis, which then entered into the military planning as a staging area for the Oxford operation. Millington's location, it should be added, especially recommended it because it had the virtues of being both close to Oxford and outside of Mississippi. Col. Jung drafted messages to the Commanding General, CONARC, in order to get detailed planning under way, and had them ready by eight o'clock that evening.⁵

General Abrams, on 13 September, apparently gave instructions that the Office of the Chief of Information should go ahead with its planning, and that, although the planning was a very sensitive matter, another officer could be brought in. General Dodge than selected as

this officer the chief of his plans branch. During the week that followed the OCINFO prepared two information annexes, each of them including guidance for dealing with both public and troop information, and revealing in their content the important role that the information function must necessarily play. The annexes, both dated 20 September 1962, as sent to the Commanding General, CONARC, were similar, with the one for the tent camp, however, reflecting the Army's limited role in such an operation. Under the latter there would be an information officer with the understanding that public information would be controlled by the senior Department of Justice official on the scene. In response to queries and in troop orientation the Army's role in the tent camp would be explained as simply providing logistical support for the Federal marshals.

The other annex ("Information Annex [Contingency]"), for use in the event of actual military intervention, provided for a field information section of six officers, three of whom would be from Washington, and seven enlisted men, whose office would be connected by a direct telephone line with the OCINFO in Washington. Proposed releases would be cleared through the Departments of the Army and Defense. The guidance supplied for troop orientation provided for an initial comprehensive and detailed orientation and daily orientation thereafter, apparently as long as required. It reflected the importance the Attorney General placed upon "orienting troops as to their role in upholding the law, and the necessity for a rule of law," which he voiced in the presence of Army representatives. As the OCINFO saw it, "restraint and firmness were the key criteria in the execution of duties."

The comprehensive orientation to be given troops prior to their actual commitment would include, "as a minimum," such topics as the following: the background of the situation resulting in orders to the Army; the instructions that Army personnel must not argue the case, but must stick to their mission of enforcing Federal judicial process and of maintaining the peace; the avoidance of "contact with the civilian populace in general and students in particular when not required in the performance of duty"; the reference to the press officer of inquiries from reporters; the protection of public property; and the protection of "all law-abiding citizens in their persons and property." Orientation material was sent to the CONARC and troop units on 29 September, but how much attention troop commanders paid to this orientation program is not clear, although when used it was found "superior in every respect."

There was a high-level meeting on information policies on 29 September in which representatives of the Departments of the Army and of Defense met with Mr. Edwin O. Guthman, a special assistant for public information, Department of Justice. Information plans, policies, and responsibilities were clarified, including the policy that all public statements proposed by the military departments would be cleared with the Department of Justice, which would have responsibility for the release of information. This meeting led to the incorporation of some minor changes in the information plan.

The Army's planning for possible intervention was to be guarded so closely, when planning began on 14 September, that the matter was not to be discussed openly and military personnel (with limited exceptions)

were not to go to Mississippi while planning was under way. When General Abrams brought the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (OACSI) into the operation almost two weeks later, on 26 September, he urged "that every precaution must be taken to conceal the Army's interest in" the matter. The ODCSLOG, indeed, held its knowledge of the operation on a limited basis from notification on 14 September until mid-afternoon of 1 October, by which time it was public knowledge.⁷

On 14 September Col. Bland West, chief of the Military Affairs Division, OTJAG, briefed General Abrams on the regulations concerning the Army's role in civil disturbances and on related matters. Thereafter he served as Abrams' legal advisor during the operation. The Judge Advocate General also designated Maj. I. Granville Rouillard, a West Pointer with a Harvard law degree, as the point of contact, or the action officer, in his office. Thereafter during the planning the OTJAG worked, "virtually on a day-to-day basis," with various staff agencies, including the Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense. It drafted various documents that might be needed and furnished legal advice, as, for example, that actual violence was not a necessary prerequisite for a Presidential proclamation. Throughout Saturday evening, 29 September 1962, Col. West was in General Abrams' office and was ready to fly out to Memphis with him the following morning.⁸

General Abrams' immediate communication needs, he informed Maj. Gen. Earle F. Cook, the Chief Signal Officer, when he brought him into the Mississippi planning on Friday, 14 September, were a direct means of communication between the Department of Justice,

Abrams' office, the Army War Room in the Pentagon, the Federal marshals at the Memphis (Millington) Naval Air Station, and the marshals in Oxford, Mississippi. General Cook promised to have a plan ready by 16 September, but actually had a four-phase plan drafted by eleven-thirty Friday night and had it ready for presentation the next day. This initial plan could be implemented in twenty-four hours after notification if the equipment could be staged close enough to the objective area, as in Memphis. Officers responsible for the plan's implementation would be Lt. Cols. Albert Redman, Jr., and Elwin A. Vernon and Maj. Jimmy Sutton. 9

When General Abrams cautioned the representative of the OACSI who reported to him on 26 September that the Army's role must be concealed, he was advised that concealment would hamper collection of the information desired. He replied that he understood. The chief of the Security Division, OACSI, appointed an action officer to supervise thereafter the Intelligence function in the operation. Initially the latter attempted to gather the desired information through coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington and other appropriate agencies and activities on the headquarters level. When, however, General Abrams sought the latest information at nine o'clock on the evening of 29 September, the Intelligence action officer found it necessary to establish direct communications with Intelligence personnel in the Oxford area, who had been compiling their own field log of events since about noon of 19 September. He maintained this direct contact through the remaining part of the critical period, during which daily intelligence summaries and periodic spot reports on the situation in Mississippi were made to the ODCSOPS. Intelligence rendered appropriate reports later as events made them desirable.¹⁰

The National Guard Bureau (NGB), the Office of The Provost Marshal General (OTPMG), and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) became privy to the operation by at least 27, 28, and 29 September, respectively. ¹¹ Later there would be complaints that some staff agencies were not brought into the planning at a sufficiently early date.

The Tent City. -- The detailed planning for the tent camp, or tent city, as the housekeeping facility for the marshals was called, and for the task forces for use in possible military intervention, proceeded simultaneously. Army Headquarters launched the planning with two messages dispatched to the CONARC one after the other on 15 September, which was about as soon as they could be drafted and approved. Both messages emphasized the sensitivity of the proposed operation and instructed the CONARC to keep the nature and purpose of the operation "on a strict 'need to know' basis" and not to disseminate it below the levels of the CONARC and the Army Strike Command, except that Maj. Gen. George A. Carver, the initially designated task force commander, was to be informed. It was soon evident, however, that this was too restricted a view. A cover story was to be prepared by the CONARC for planning at lower levels.

On 20 September, according to the officially brief information provided the CONARC, 300 Federal marshals were "scheduled to . . . enforce a Federal Court order allowing a Negro student to register [at] and attend the University of Mississippi." As a result the Army might be required to establish a tent city in the Holly Springs National Forest

near the University to furnish administrative and logistical support for the marshals. Accordingly, a plan should be developed for submission as soon as possible to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, which would provide for a unit to administer the required support. The tent city force would be prepared, beginning on 20 September, to move and establish the tent city on twenty-four hours' notice. The CONARC would determine its transportation. Tentage, mess equipment, cots and complete bedding, showers, latrines, and electric lighting would be required. The support would be of a housekeeping-type only and would not include arms, ammunition, and transportation. There could be limited reconnaissance in civilian dress. The Department of the Army would provide operational communications between the tent city and the Departments of Justice and of the Army in Washington. The CONARC would arrange for the use of the National Forest, which was chosen because it was Federal property and because of its proximity to Oxford and the University.

General Abrams and his deputy, Col. Schlotzhauer, discussed the Oxford planning at the CONARC headquarters on the afternoon of 17 September with Gen. Herbert B. Powell, Commanding General, CONARC; Lt. Gen. Louis W. Truman, the Deputy Commanding General for Reserve Forces; Maj. Gen. David H. Buchanan, Chief of Staff; and other officers of the CONARC staff. One of the things apparently agreed to at that time was the use of Exercise HIGH HEELS II/SPADE FORK, already in progress, as the cover for Oxford. Presumably several days earlier, during this exercise, the cover story would run, critical problems arose as a result of natural disasters and

subsequent civil disorder with mob violence. Under this cover messages would be dispatched alerting forces in both the Third and Fourth Army areas for both the tent city and the task forces. This was apparently incorporated into the planning at a meeting the following day attended by the Commanding General, 2d Infantry Division, and the Chief of Staff and other officers of the Third Army, in which "the entire operation was discussed in detail."

A number of questions came up at the 17 September meeting concerning one or the other or both of the two plans that threw considerable light on the complexities involved. It was decided that although units could not move to intermediate staging areas prior to Department of the Army orders, the tent city might have a forty-eight-hour rather than a twenty-four-hour alert. The commander of the tent city would be responsible through the normal chain of command to the Commanding General, Third Army, and the CONARC (but in this as in other matters there would be a later change), and the tactical commander, or task force commander, would have no responsibility for the tent city, even with operational troops in the vicinity. Initially, at least, the operation would have to be accomplished from funds on hand, and the CONARC would have to maintain a record of expenditures for later reimbursement. Greenwich Mean Time, known in the services as Zulu time, would be used for all correspondence in planning and execution. The Department of the Army would assume responsibility for communications between itself, the Department of Justice, the field commander, the marshal's office in Oxford, and the tent city, but the CONARC would provide administrative support for the signal personnel in

the tent city. As to keeping integrated the units selected or stripping them of Negro personnel, these units would "perform assigned missions as they now are . . . subject to final confirmation" by Washington. The CONARC would deal directly with the Army Materiel Command, through Col. Thurston T. Paul, Chief of Staff, Supply & Maintenance Command. General Powell, for planning purposes, might use his own discretion as to informing key persons in subordinate commands about the operation. In the CONARC's view a reinforced engineer battalion from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, would establish and operate the tent city, the site for which ought to be selected by the Department of Justice, which ought to arrange for the use of the site, rather than the Army. Finally, it was agreed that although Army Regulations required clearance with state police for the movement of military convoys, this policy should not be adhered to in the event of movement into Mississippi. Maj. Gen. George T. Duncan, Assistant Deputy Commanding General for Reserve Forces, CONARC, would be the officer through whom all of the CONARC's responsibilities in the matter would be managed.

13

Planning progressed so rapidly that in the late afternoon of Wednesday, 19 September, the day before Meredith was scheduled to appear in Oxford for registration, Col. Hugh F. Young, of the CONARC's Plans and Operations Division, personally delivered to Col. Schlotzhauer in Washington a short letter from Brig. Gen. Hugh M. Exton, Deputy Chief of Staff for Unit Readiness and Training, CONARC, enclosing important CONARC messages for implementing the planning directive from Army headquarters. In the letter itself the

CONARC had no recommendations to make concerning a letter of instructions for the tent city commander, which had been sent it for review, although it did recommend a change or two in the instructions for the field or tactical-force commander.

The unit which would build and operate the tent city, if necessary, would be the 70th Engineer Battalion (COMBAT), at Fort Campbell without its usual support elements. Under the cover to be used for planning it would test its operational readiness to execute unprogrammed missions. According to the concept of operations, now spelled out, tornadoes had done extensive damage in fourteen states in the South Central and Southwestern states, which were in the Second, Third, and Fourth Army areas. Several cities had been destroyed and many persons consequently were homeless. For training purposes "an actual model tent city to house 300 adult male" displaced persons (a figure raised to 350 the next day, 18 September) would be set up near Memphis, Tennessee. This could be used as a model in subsequent HIGH HEELS II/SPADE FORK exercises as well as immediately for the displaced persons from the supposed tornado areas.

The instructions sent to the Third Army emphasized that this would be "an actual operational repeat actual operational mission" and therefore constituted a change in the instructions given for HIGH HEELS previously, which had called simply for a simulated movement of "forces and/or equipment." Small arms would be taken but no crew-served weapons. There would be advance reconnaissance of the objective area, and there would be communication with the Memphis General Depot "and other appropriate military installations in [the] vicinity of Memphis for bivouac rights."

Gas masks would be taken. Public speculation should be reduced to a minimum and the reply to queries made should be that this was just another periodical test by the Department of Defense of plans for emergency operations of a civil-defense nature. The troops should be told much the same thing. If execution were ordered they would be told that operational plans to be tested would require movement to the vicinity of Memphis to set up a model refugee camp. The order to execute might be expected at any time subsequent to 20/0501Z September (1:01 a.m., EDT) and the task force should be prepared for an indefinite operation under field conditions.

14

By 17 September Washington had drafted at least two slightly different versions of a letter of instructions to the tent-city commander to guide him should he have to take the field. The CONARC finding no fault with the version sent it for review, the letter went out in EXCLUSIVE message form on 20 September. By its terms the tent-city commander would fix the boundary of his domain and not permit military personnel beyond it except "for administrative or logistical support reasons." Such support would be only military, and en route to and from the tent city there would be no vehicle stops, except for emergencies, "in civilian communities." Support for the Department of Justice personnel in the tent city would be "hotel type" only. Transportation of Justice personnel, at that stage, was neither contemplated nor authorized. There were to be no passes granted or emergency leaves authorized without specific instructions from Washington.

15

About a week now went by with little or no apparent activity concerning tent-city plans, as Meredith, with small Department of Justice escorts, sought to enrol at the University. By Thursday, 27 September, however, the situation was critical and the pace stepped up. That was the day, when, shortly after six-thirty in the early evening, Washington time, the Attorney General recalled the Meredith party because of a menacing crowd at Oxford. Within the hour Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach had asked the Army to move the tent-city task force (sometimes referred to as Task Force 70) from Fort Campbell to Memphis, where it was to remain until further instructions (which Katzenbach then thought would be given the next day), and Abrams had passed the word to the CONARC. The latter wanted to pass operational control of the tent-city force to the Department of the Army whenever it might be authorized to go on from Memphis to the Holly Springs National Forest, and the Department of the Army agreed. The CONARC also wanted to know how the commander of the tent-city convoy should act if Mississippi officials blocked his convoy on the road to Holly Springs, and seems to have received on the 28th the not-very-helpful instruction that he should not use force.

16

The tent-city force departed from Fort Campbell on the evening of 27 September, less than three hours after General Abrams learned that it should move, and, except for four maintenance vehicles and three vehicles that had mechanical failures en route, arrived in the Memphis staging area, about 200 miles away, by five o'clock the next morning without incident. It consisted of the 70th Engineer Battalion, a combat unit, without its usual support elements but with medical, signal, quartermaster, and

information detachments, mostly from the 101st Airborne Division, together with a legal officer from the same division. The force comprised seven officers and 105 enlisted men and was commanded by Maj. Ralph S. Kristoferson. The fifty-one vehicles in the convoy included ambulances, dump trucks, heavy and light trucks (with trailers) tractors, a tanker, and a sedan. Upon arrival at the Millington Naval Air Station the men were billeted in the gymnasium, according to both the press and the Army War Room Journal, although a memorandum report of a telephone conversation with Kristoferson had them with his command post on the emergency runway. While there Maj. Kristoferson learned from Col. Schlotzhauer on Saturday, 29 September, that General Abrams had assumed operational control of his little command for the Department of the Army, but that he would continue to receive logistical and administrative support from the Third Army and the CONARC. There was a possibility, Col. Schlotzhauer informed him, that he might move out that day, but as to when and where he would be informed. He also received the added instruction, either during the same or another telephone call, that he would move only on the order of the Department of the Army and not on that of the Federal marshals.

A special press dispatch described Maj. Kristoferson's force as "the first detachment of Federal troops to be ordered to any kind of duties in connection with the attempt to enroll Mr. Meredith. . . ." The Naval Air Station was closed to newsmen and the public, but from Lt. Col. Thomas A. Price, the Fort Campbell deputy commander, an enterprising reporter learned by telephone "that the engineers were armed because they had been

dispatched under a 'test exercise procedure,'" that there were no orders to send this force "any place else," and that it "could accommodate several hundred marshals." So many marshals, Price explained, might tax the facilities at the air station; therefore, the Engineers had been called in. "He said the engineers had stoves and blankets in case any one had to sleep in tents."

When the engineers arrived in Memphis they found that rumors concerning the numbers and activities of troops in the area were getting wide press coverage and that the information plan gave them no guidance as to what information they should release. This was the only fault they found with the plan. Through Cameron, the senior Department of Justice official there, they received instructions from Katzenbach that no information should be released concerning the activities of Federal marshals or troops at the Naval Air Station. Since this counsel did not seem very helpful under the circumstances, they sought guidance from Washington through the Third Army, but received no response. During its stay in Memphis the tent-city force used the orientation material in the information plan, which it regarded highly, to inform its personnel concerning their possible mission. It then brought them up to date daily. "The close-mouthed attitude of the troops was evidenced in the fact that one Memphis newspaper stated that sailors had talked to some of the Army troops . . . to ascertain their mission but were unsuccessful in obtaining anything but a polite refusal to discuss the matter."

According to the Department of Justice in Washington, there were 140 marshals in the Memphis area on Thursday night. Altogether, counting those there and on the way, there would be several hundred. "They came by automobile, Navy transport plane, and commercial airliner from all sections of the nation." Included were marshals from California 2,000 miles away and patrolmen from the Mexican border. Some reports had it that by Sunday there would be more than 300 at the Naval Air Station. These reports were modest, for on Saturday, 29 September, General Abrams informed General Exton of the CONARC that inclement weather gear was desired for 450 marshals to arrive by the time the tent city was established. Parkas, overshoes, and raincoats were desired. Significantly, Monday, 1 October, was now regarded as the day on which the great confrontation would occur on the Oxford campus. ¹⁹ It was not only that the public had reason to think this would be the case, but that the Army did. Consequently the date entered prominently into military planning.

Maj. Kristoferson informed General Abrams' office Saturday afternoon that the site selected for the tent city was about seventeen miles from Oxford in the Holly Springs National Forest. It was in an isolated stretch of bottomland on the edge of Grahams' fish camp, a favorite spot for bass and crappie fishermen on the headwaters of Sardis Lake or Reservoir. By the compass it was north, northeast of Oxford, precisely at 89° 27' W and 39° 32' N. There was one big drawback to it, however. In order to install the planned commercial communications, as the telephone company explained to the Signal Corps, fifteen miles of construction would be

required or else the company would have to use its mobile microwave equipment. Maj. Kristoferson was instructed, therefore, to look for another site. Accordingly, a helicopter team examined a site about seven miles from Oxford on a main road near a National Park Service garage. This site was rejected, however, because it would not support helicopter operations, and it was agreed that the other site would be used.

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The expected movement instructions came from Katzenbach about seven o'clock Saturday evening, EDT. He wanted Maj. Kristoferson's force at the selected site by seven o'clock the next morning. Katzenbach was advised that it would be there, but that some time would be required to erect the tent city. Within minutes Maj. Kristoferson received an order to move and planned to leave the Naval Air Station in time to arrive at the camp site around five-thirty, local time, Sunday morning. He would coordinate his movement with Louis F. Oberdorfer, Assistant Attorney General, and intended to request that Federal marshals accompany his convoy. The Signal Corps at the same time instructed the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T), whose subsidiary, Southern Bell, would be involved also, to begin moving its mobile equipment from Jackson, Mississippi, to the Oxford area. When, for some reason, the instructions were changed an hour or so later, the telephone company refused to move its equipment to Memphis as was then requested; indeed, it refused to leave Mississippi and also refused to accept a military convoy to the area of commitment. When the previous instructions were reinstated, the Signal Corps gave the telephone company the exact location so that it could

proceed directly to the site, which it expected to reach before daylight. At ten-forty, EDT, Col. Baldwin, of Secretary Vance's staff, instructed General Abrams to move Maj. Kristoferson as planned and the latter was notified immediately. ²¹ Just after midnight, 30 September, the President issued a proclamation and Executive Order 11053.

Maj. Kristoferson's force left the Millington Naval Air Station at five o'clock Sunday morning, EDT, and closed at the site in the Holly Springs National Forest at seven-twenty-five. En route it experienced no difficulty excepting some rocks thrown at the rear vehicles, although General Abrams had expressed the fear the night before, engendered by a lack of intelligence, that Kristoferson might be walking into a trap. A small airplane encircled the site about twelve times after Kristoferson's arrival.

Of greater concern, probably, was the fact that there were communications difficulties. The message from the Third Army at eleven o'clock Sunday morning, which reported Maj. Kristoferson's arrival, reported that there was no radio contact with the Millington Naval Air Station, although The New York Times reported from nearby Abbeville sometime on Sunday that "a huge communications truck with three antennae provided a direct link with . . . the air station" and that Southern Bell crews were stringing "cable to connect the site with a nearby microwave transmitter." As late as six o'clock that evening the telephone company advised the Signal Corps it was having difficulty establishing radio contact from the tent city. The Switched Circuit Automatic Network (SCAN) circuit, a commercial facility, was not in until

almost eleven o'clock and then its quality was only "fair." The teletype was not yet in; indeed, neither it nor the point-to-point circuit between the office of General Dodge, the CINFO, and the War Room in the Pentagon, to the tent city, was in until after midnight, 1 October. Covering Maj. Kristoferson's experience in its command report, the 101st Airborne Division gave the tent-city communications short shrift, declaring

that the communications available to the Engineer Battalion in the tent city area consisted of one scan line and one "Hot" line to OCINFO. No Oxford telephone was furnished and the only communication with personnel on campus was through the use of the scan line to Third USA or DA with a request that they in turn place the call commercially through their switchboard. These phones, which were not operational until late on the evening of the 30th, were the only ones available at the isolated . . . tent city.²²

Maj. Kristoferson's arrival at the camp site attracted numerous persons, including press representatives, who began arriving early Sunday morning more or less simultaneously with the troops. During the day some seventy reporters, "in addition to the local sheriff, members of the State Highway Patrol, and local citizens" arrived to see what was going on. A number of interviews were granted, but a Department of Justice representative who accompanied the troops from the Naval Air Station denied reporters access to the bivouac area itself "since it was considered inadvisable to acknowledge that any Marshals were in the area at that time. Accordingly, all interviews and photography were limited to the information and press area set up at the bivouac entrance."²³

Meanwhile, after General Abrams reached the Millington Naval Air Station at midday on Sunday, following his departure from Andrews Air Force Base that morning, he had an officer visit the tent city. Although the record does not indicate what, if anything, he had to say about communications, he found the tent city "in good shape . . . adequate," with lights, latrines, showers, and mess "O.K.," as General Abrams reported to Col. Jung by telephone at ten-fourteen Sunday night, EDT. By that time the situation in Oxford was serious, and the tent city was "working on sending 200 cots and floodlights" to the Federal marshals in Oxford.

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Footnotes to Chapter II

1. (FOUO) OCINFO After-Action Report -- Mississippi, 8 Sep 1962 - 31 Mar 1963 (Working Copy), p. 1.
2. The probable date of 13 Sep comes from a report of the meeting given by Abrams to the CSigO on 14 Sep. Abrams' memo of 14 Sep (see f. n.) must have been of this meeting. It was also on 13 Sep that the OCINFO was advised that planning would go forward. See OCINFO After-Action Report -- Mississippi, 8 Sep 1962 - 31 Mar 1963 (Working Copy), p. 1; and (FOUO) OCSigO After-Action Report on the Oxford, Mississippi Operation, 14 Sep - 31 Oct 1962, p. 1.
3. (S) Abrams memo for rcd, sub: Meeting with Secretary of the Army, Oxford Problem, 14 Sep 1962, cy in (S) Chron File, Preliminary Plans (14 - 29 Sep 1962), Tab 3. In practice the day-to-day liaison between the Departments of Justice and of the Army was conducted through Col Bland West's Military Affairs Div, OTAG, DA. DF, TJAG to CINFO, sub: Manuscript, "Operation ARKANSAS," by Robert W. Coakley, OCMH, 14 Dec 1962, Comment No. 2 (Rouillard).
4. A biographical sketch of Abrams and a copy of his service record are in the file on Commanding Generals & Other Key Personnel. Both Abrams and Jung are listed, of course, in the current Army Register.
5. This sketch of the planning steps taken in the ODCSOPS on 13-14 Sep are from pencilled notes, arranged chronologically, probably by Schlotzhauer, for the period 13-24 Sep 1962, in file on Planning Papers -- Miscellaneous (13 Sep -); from conversation with Jung, 19 Mar 1963; and from telecon with him, 24 Sep 1963.
6. OCINFO After-Action Report -- Mississippi, 8 Sep 1962 - 31 Mar 1963 (Working Copy), pp. 1-2. Abrams in a (S) memo for the rcd, sub: Oxford Problem, 15 Sep 1962, (S) Chron File, 15-28 Sep 1962, Tab 4, stated that on the 15th he "informed Col. Coates / Coats . . . representative of the Chief of Information, about the possibilities of the situation in Oxford as it pertained to the Army," but the OCINFO After-Action Report, as noted, placed on 13 Sep the granting of permission to carry the planning forward. Information annexes sent the CONARC (on 21 and 22 Sep 1962) are, respectively, in (S) Chron File, Preliminary Plans (14-29 Sep 1962), Tabs (S) 6 and (FOUO) 7. The author discussed troop information in the Oxford operation in an interview with Col Hodges in Oxford on 6 Mar 1963, and in a telecon with Lt Col L. Gordon Hill, Ch, PIO, OCINFO, DA, 5 Sep 1963. For an evaluation see (FOUO) 101st Abn Div and Ft Campbell Command Report, Operation Ole Miss, Rapid Road, 1 - 10 Oct 1962, 17 Nov 1962, Incl 5, p. 2, with (FOUO) XVIII Abn Corps and Ft Bragg Command Report, Operation Rapid Road, 1-10 Oct 1962, 6 Dec 1962.

7. (S) ODCSLOG After-Action Report on Mississippi (U), 28 Dec 1962 (LOG/F2C-22328), p. 1; (FOUO) OCSigO After-Action Report on the Oxford, Mississippi, Operation, 14 Sep - 31 Oct 1962, p. 1; and (FOUO) OACSI After-Action Report on Mississippi, 7 Jan 1963, p. 1.

8. JAGA 1962/5052, 5 Jan 1963, p. 2; telecon with Rouillard in 1963; and (S) Abrams memo for the rcd, sub: Oxford Problem, 15 Sep 1962 in Chron File, 15-28 Sep 1962, Tab 4.

9. OCSigO After-Action Report on the Oxford, Mississippi, Operation, 14 Sep - 31 Oct 1962, p. 1; and (FOUO) OCSigO After-Action Report on the Oxford, Mississippi, Operation / Initial Report 7, n.d., Tabs A and B. Abrams met with Cook on 15 Sep, but the two Signal Corps reports cited here put his first meeting with Cook on the Oxford troubles on the morning after the 13 Sep Army-Justice meeting. Cf. Abrams' memo for the rcd, sub: Oxford Problem, 15 Sep 1962, Chron File, 15-28 Sep 1962, Tab. 4.

10. See OACSI After-Action Report -- Mississippi, 7 Jan 1963, pp. 1-2; Intelligence Log of Events, in which entries were made beginning 19/1130 Sep 1962, Oxford time; and file on Intelligence Reports (30 Sep 1962 - 30 Jan 1963). Although the earliest identifiable report, *ibid.*, was dated 30 Sep, the OACSI states in the after-action report here cited, p. 1, that it filed summaries and spot reports during the period 26 Sep - 15 Oct and thereafter as necessary. In the Action Officer's Book are memos dated 27 and 28 Sep 1962 reflecting intelligence activities. The entries in the Intelligence Log combined unconfirmed rumors, information derived from news reports, and information from observations on the street that any intelligent observer could make. It may be observed that the Intelligence Corps maintained a small office in Oxford administered by its Region IV. Presumably it was engaged mainly in security interviews at the University. During the Oxford troubles this office was augmented.

11. NGB After-Action Reports -- Mississippi, 17 Dec 1962, p. 1; OTPMG Initial After-Action Report -- Mississippi, 20 Nov 1962, p. 1; and (C) ODCSPER After Action Report, Mississippi Incident, 29 Sep - 31 Oct 1962, p. 1.

12. (S) Msg, DA (by Abrams) to CGUSCONARC, 15 Sep 1962 (DA919140) contained instructions for tent-city planning; and (S) *idem* to *idem*, 15 Sep 1962 (DA919141) contained instructions for task-force planning. Abrams signed both as the Director of Operations, ODCSOPS.

13. (S) Schlotzhauer memo for the rcd, sub: Operation Oxford, Conference at CONARC, 17 Sep 1962, 18 Sep 1962; (S) msg, DA (by Abrams) to CGUSCONARC, 18 Sep 1962 (DA919180); (S) Abrams memo for the rcd, sub: Oxford Problem, 17 Sep 1962; and (S) ltr, Exton, DCofS for Unit Trng & Readiness, USCONARC, to DCSOPS, sub: Classified Operation (U), 19 Sep 1962 (ATUTR-P&O / S 7) -- all in Chron File, 15-28 Sep 1962, Tabs 8-11, respectively. See additionally 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, p. 2.

14. See (S) ltr, Exton to DCSOPS, 19 Sep 1962 (as cited in preceding n.), w/5 incls, incl 1 (ATUTR-WR 301756) dealing with the tent city. Cys of these are in Chron File, 15-28 Sep 1962, Tab 11. See (S) Schlotzhauer memo for the rcd, sub: Oxford Problems, 19 Sep 1962, ibid., Tab 13, concerning Col Young's errand and related matters. Also see the (S) unsigned and undated fact sheet on the mission assigned the CGUSCONARC by msgs DA 919140 and 919141, ibid., Tab 7.

15. (S) msg, DA (by Abrams) to CGUSCONARC (for Duncan), 20 Sep 1962 (DA919300). Drafts are with preliminary planning papers, 13-24 Sep 1962 in file on Planning Papers -- Miscellaneous (13 Sep -).

16. Schlotzhauer memo for the rcd, sub: Oxford Problem, 27 Sep 1962; and (S) Abrams memo for the rcd, sub: Actions, Night of 27 September 1962, 28 Sep 1962 (Chron File, 15-28 Sep 1962, Tabs 29 and 32, respectively). Also see pencilled notes on military planning 27-28 Sep 1962, under date of 28 Sep in file on Planning Papers -- Miscellaneous (13 Sep -); and Jung's 7 pencilled memo of Friday, 28/0800 Sep 1962 7, in file on Memoranda -- Miscellaneous Drafts & Rough Notes (Sep - Dec 1962).

17. (S) Memo for Schlotzhauer per telecon with the CONARC, 27/2126 Sep, Chron File, Preliminary Plans, 14-29 Sep 1962, Tab 13; (C) Schlotzhauer memo for the rcd, sub: Telecon between . . . Schlotzhauer . . . and Major Kristoferson . . ., 29 Sep 1962, (S) Chron File, 28 Sep - 1 Oct 1962, Tab 26; Army War Room /AWR 7 Journal, 28/0600 Sep 1962; and "Army Engineers Arrive at Base in Tennessee to Help Marshals," The New York Times, 29 Sep 1962, p. 8. The strength given, ibid. and elsewhere (see AWR Journal, 28/0245 Sep 1962, referring to an AP story) was 110, the figure given Sec/Def McNamara in briefing on 28 Sep ? 7, Chron File, 28 Sep - 1 Oct 1962, Tab 5.

18. "Army Engineers Arrive at Base in Tennessee to Help Marshals," loc. cit.; and 101st Abn Div Command Report, 1-10 Oct 1962, Incl 5, pp. 1-2, XVIII Abn Corps and Ft Bragg Command Report, 6 Dec 1962, Incl 3.

19. Hall memo for the rcd, 29 Sep 1962, Chron File, 28 Sep - 1 Oct, Tab 18; and "Army Engineers Arrive at Base in Tennessee to Help Marshals," loc. cit. Lt Col Harold M. ("Lucky") Hall, the author of the 29 Sep memo, was Exec Officer, Office, Dir of Opns, ODCSOPS.

20. OCSigo Initial After-Action Report, Tab A, p. 4; "Tent City Is Built for Marshals in Federal Forest Near Oxford" (datelined Abbeville, Miss., 30 Sep), The New York Times, 1 Oct 1962, p. 23. (map, p. 24); and AWR Journal, 30/0528 Sep 1962.

21. Schlotzhauer memo for the recd, 29 Sep 1962, in file on Memoranda -- General (28 Sep - 1 Oct /1962 7); memo in form of notes for 29 Sep chronologically arranged, probably made by Lt Col H. M. Hall, in file on Memoranda -- Miscellaneous Notes and Rough Drafts (Sep - Dec 1962); and OCSigO Initial After Action Report, Tab A, pp. 5-6.

22. AWR Journal, 30/2115 Sep 1962; msg, OGUSATHREE to DA, 13/1503Z Sep 1962, cy in Chron File, 28 Sep - 1 Oct 1962, Tab 38; memo, probably by Lt Col H. M. Hall, 29/2305, in file on Memoranda - Miscellaneous Drafts & Rough Notes (Sep - Dec 1962); "Tent City Is Built for Marshals in Federal Forest Near Oxford," loc. cit.; OCSigO Initial After-Action Report, Tab A, p. 7; and 101st Abn Div Command Report, 1-10 Oct 1962, Incl 5, p. 4, XVIII Abn Corps and Ft Bragg Command Report, 6 Dec 1962, Incl 3.

23. 101st Abn Div Command Report, 1-10 Oct 1962, Incl 5, p. 3, XVIII Abn Corps Command Report, 6 Dec 1962, Incl 3.

24. Jung memo of telecon with Abrams, 30/2212 /Sep 1962 7, in file on Memoranda -- Miscellaneous Drafts & Rough Notes (Sep - Dec 1962).

CHAPTER III

PLANNING FOR THE TACTICAL FORCES

Initial Planning. -- When, on 15 September 1962, Abrams and Army Headquarters launched active planning for military assistance to civil authorities in Oxford, should it be required, they visualized a task force that might be composed of one battle group and a military police battalion, the latter to be optional at the discretion of the Commanding General, CONARC (also CINCARSTRIKE). Crew-served weapons would not accompany troops, which would move to the target area "by air or surface transportation as necessary to provide quick response." Upon arrival in the target area, command of the task force would pass from the Commanding General, CONARC, to the Department of the Army. The latter would arrange for signal communications between the Departments of Justice and of the Army on the one hand and the field commander on the other. The proposed plan would be executed upon orders from the Secretary of the Army.

It was also on 15 September, probably, that drafting began on orders for the field commander. As a starter there were brief instructions drafted at the time of Little Rock and later during the Montgomery crisis. First, these were updated, and then a new draft was made, similar to the earlier ones and showing their influence, but designed to fit the new circumstances. Later preliminary drafting filled in the blanks of the earlier drafts, excepting those left for the executive order.

The field commander, as the various drafts revealed, would command all forces that might be used by the President following his executive order, including the National Guard, but this was changed, upon the

CONARC's recommendation, "to insure understanding," to read "except those assigned to Tent City." He would be responsible directly to the Chief of Staff. By one early draft, he would establish his headquarters in the vicinity of Oxford, Mississippi, prior to the arrival of the Regular Army forces assigned to the mission, but later this would read "initially at Memphis NAS, Tennessee." His command of the Regulars, by one draft, would become effective upon their arrival at Oxford or some other designated arrival point, but in a later version he would assume command "upon their arrival at Columbus and Memphis" or other designated point. Respecting the National Guard, if federalized, the commander would use only such units as he might require, directing the others to remain at their home stations subject to orders.

In carrying out his mission, the commander would use only the minimum force necessary. He would have direct communication with the Department of the Army by means of a direct telephone connection provided by the Chief Signal Officer from field headquarters to the Office of the Director of Operations. General Abrams would be the personal representative of the Chief of Staff. "While not in the chain of command," he could "issue orders in the name of the Chief." The Third Army would provide the necessary staff, logistical, and administrative support. A reporting system comprising telephonic spot reports every two hours, interim telephonic reports as warranted, and written reports every six hours (ending at 1700 hours local time and transmitted to reach Washington headquarters by 0400 hours the following day) would keep the latter fully informed.²

At the CONARC meeting on 17 September it was explained, as will be recalled, that there could be no movement to intermediate areas prior to specific orders from Washington; that the tent-city commander would not be subordinate to the tactical commander, a qualification that appeared explicitly in the orders subsequently issued; and that, subject to final departmental confirmation, there would be no changes in the racial composition of the units chosen for the mission. During the meeting the Strike Command sent word releasing operational control of the units chosen, which, in the CONARC's view, should be, besides the engineer battalion for the tent city, the 503d Military Police Battalion from Fort Bragg and a battle group of the 2d Infantry Division at Fort Benning. The 503d and supporting units would be committed first and the battle group next. The Tactical Air Command would support the operation.³

As a consequence of the CONARC's rapid planning, Col. Young made his personal delivery on 19 September to Col. Schlotzhauer of the letter from General Exton. This letter, it will be recalled, recommended clarifying the tactical commander's draft instructions by specifying that he would not have the tent city under his control. It also called attention to the distinction between calling and ordering the National Guard into the Federal service. Inclosed with it were copies of five important messages that the CONARC had dispatched on 17-18 September, three of them to the Third Army at Fort McPherson, Georgia, implementing the basic directives it had received from departmental headquarters on 15 September; and two of them to CINCSTRIKE

(from General Powell as CINCARSTRIKE), one of them a copy of the original message sent to the CINCSSTRIKE to inform him as to the purpose of the operation by quoting both messages sent by departmental headquarters on 15 September, and one informing him of major troop unit assignments.

The troops to be prepared for duty in Mississippi, as the CONARC planned initially, would be divided into two task forces. One of these, Task Force Alfa, would be built around a military police battalion from Fort Bragg. The other, Task Force Bravo, would be built around an infantry battle group and would serve as a reinforcing task force on a stand-by basis. The Third Army would work out the details of such a concept of operation and would provide information on task-force strengths, vehicles, and tonnage to the CONARC by late afternoon, 20 September, and an operations plan before the end of the following day. Task Force Alfa would be prepared to begin movement by air to a selected location in the vicinity of Memphis not later than ten hours after receipt of an order to execute, but Task Force Bravo would be prepared to move on a twenty-four-hour notice anytime subsequent to the early morning hours of 22 September. Both task forces would be prepared under the initial planning to assist civil authorities maintain law and order in the vicinity of Memphis and "provide security for designated civilian institutions and/or Tent City." They would take individual weapons and gas masks and would effect advance reconnaissance of the objective area. Crew-served weapons would not be taken, but tear gas and riot control weapons would be taken as appropriate. (Later there would be additional consideration of the question of individual weapons, and as for advance reconnaissance,

although authorized for the objective area, it was permitted for Memphis, but never for the Oxford area except for the tent-city force, as the Military Police later complained.) The Third Army would arrange for resupply and for medical evacuation. As for local procurement, there would be none for a task force after it left its home station. The commander of the motor convoy would not make arrangements with local police or traffic authorities unless directed to do so by the CONARC. As in the case of the tent-city force, the tactical forces would seek to reduce public speculation to a minimum. This meant, among other things, that no public announcement would be made. If inquiries were made the reply should be that a routine exercise was in progress.

Task Force Alfa. -- Task Force Alfa was to be a composite force built around the 503d Military Police Battalion at Fort Bragg, whose commander was Lt. Col. John J. Flanagan. Its cover mission, when alerted on 19 September, was to test air mobility during HIGH HEELS II/SPADE FORK. According to Flanagan's command report, the battalion rehearsed airplane loading combinations for nine days, but according to Capt. Fred J. Villella, the commanding officer of Company A of the 503d, his company was not alerted for its participation in the exercise until 24 September (probably because of the sensitivity of the operation). Company A, which, as it turned out, would play a leading role in the Oxford affair, organized two platoons for riot control, but only one, that led by Lt. Donnie G. Bowman and S/Sgt. Nathaniel Richey, was able to practice platoon formations. The other platoon, unfortunately, was short about twenty-seven men, who were on non-rotated military police duty, and was therefore integrated with Bowman's platoon for training purposes. Villella briefed his

officers and non-commissioned officers concerning the company's possible employment in Mississippi and had his unit practice out-loading by chucks from the company area to the assembly area, Hedrick Stadium, and from there to Pope Air Force Base.

Alfa included, altogether, besides the battalion, chemical specialists from the 502d Chemical Company, Fort Bragg; the 15th Field Hospital Detachment, with six ambulances, from Fort Bragg; the 31st Helicopter Company (Lt Hel) from Fort Benning, Georgia; and the 86th Transportation Company (Lt Trk) from Fort Campbell. Also intended for the task force, but not joining Alfa, were an intelligence detachment from Fort McPherson, Georgia; and an information detachment from Fort Bragg. Its total strength, at Oxford, was 689 officers and enlisted men.

Task Force Bravo. -- Unlike the 503d Military Police Battalion, the 2d Battle Group, 23d Infantry Regiment, commanded by Col. Lucien Fairfax Keller, which would be the principal component of Task Force Bravo, had "had very little riot control training." Upon notification of its possible role in a civil disturbance, therefore, the battle group began intensified training in riot control. Subsequently, this "proved to be most effective when infantrymen were deployed against rioters."

A serious personnel shortage led to the attachment of a company of the 2d Battle Group, 9th Infantry Regiment, to both Bravo and Delta (the latter, built around the 2d Battle Group, 1st Infantry Regiment, also from the 2d Infantry Division, was one of the three additional task forces created as the situation developed). Bravo comprised, besides the 2d Battle Group, 23d Infantry, Company B, 2d Battle Group,

9th Infantry, and the following support forces: 4th Forward Area Support Platoon; Company B, 122d Signal Battalion; 4th Combat Support Flight Group, 2d Aviation Company; an engineer detachment of the 2d Engineer Battalion; a quartermaster detachment of the 2d Quartermaster Company; a medical detachment of the 2d Medical Battalion; the 2d Military Intelligence Detachment; and Company A (minus), 13th Transportation Battalion. The 2d Battle Group put Bravo's strength at 1,076 officers and enlisted men, but the ODCSOPS listed it, at Oxford, as 1,082.⁶

Staging Areas. -- While Memphis, as a staging area for operations in Oxford, had the undeniable twin advantages of proximity and an out-of-state location, Columbus Air Force Base in Eastern Mississippi was much better situated where troop prepositions were concerned, particularly with reference to troops at Fort Benning, Georgia. As planning continued and events unfolded the Army had to consider also the possibility of putting troops not only into Oxford, but into Jackson, Mississippi, should it ever have to support the arrest of Governor Barnett. For such a mission Columbus Air Force Base would provide a better staging area than the Millington Naval Air Station. Columbus, Mississippi, was 122 miles by road from Oxford and 175 from Jackson.

With the location of Columbus in mind planning evidently went ahead with a view to airlifting the tactical forces to Columbus, while still keeping Memphis available as a staging area for the tent-city force and as an alternate staging area for the tactical forces. Maj. Gen. Charles H. Chase, who then expected to be the tactical commander, thought that Task Force Bravo should move from Benning to Columbus Air Force Base

concurrently with any actual movement order given to Alfa. Although General Abrams approved of this movement, the Tactical Air Force (TAC) found that "the absolute minimum time" in which it could lift Bravo from Benning, after moving Task Force Alfa from Bragg, would be thirty-one hours, the same time it would take Bravo to march by road. Both the CONARC and the Air Force recommended, therefore, that Alfa should move to Columbus by air and Bravo by land, a recommendation that was approved subject to final confirmation. The U.S. Air Force, it may be said, played an important supporting role not only in the Oxford planning, but in providing the necessary airlift.

On 24 September, the day before Meredith's second unsuccessful effort to enrol in the University, Task Force Alfa was on a ten-hour alert, that is, it was prepared to move from its home station ten hours after receipt of a movement order. This was changed to one of twenty-four hours, however, until such time as the situation might become more critical, thus putting both Alfa and Bravo on the same alert. Actually, the situation was already critical in that Meredith had been turned away once and there was no sign of a relaxation of attitudes on the part of Mississippi officials. Nevertheless, the Administration hoped to avoid a final confrontation by giving Governor Barnett every opportunity to admit Meredith. At the very least it hoped to be able to enforce the judicial process by using Federal marshals. It was in this knowledge of intent that a twenty-four-hour alert seemed adequate to the Army at that time -- and even to the Department of Justice the next day, 25 September, when "Geoghegan telephoned to ask whether the Army had some general plans as to how it would react" if some form of martial law had to be declared.

Geoghegan, speaking to Col. Schlotzhauer in the ODCSOPS, related that the Attorney General had spoken by telephone earlier that day with Governor Barnett who declared he was going to Oxford to take charge of the state police personally "and that he would go to jail and spend the rest of his life in jail before he would see the university integrated." This led Geoghegan to conclude that the marshals would be unable to handle the situation that was developing. Col. Schlotzhauer told him about the two Army plans, which were "ready to be implemented" -- the tent-city plan and the tactical plan. In response to Geoghegan's request for more detailed information concerning the force to be used, Col. Schlotzhauer described the two task forces and how it was proposed to use them.

As the planning shaped up about this time both task forces would be prepared to move to the objective area, now spelled out as "vicinity Oxford, Mississippi," not later than twenty-four hours after receipt of order to execute; and they would be prepared to operate under field conditions indefinitely. Road movements for Task Force Bravo were planned for several different routes by way of Federal highways only and including both routes through and around Mississippi. The assumption was that the marches would be forced; speed essential; gasoline, oil, and grease for the vehicles unavailable from local purchase; and that there would be little or no assistance from local authorities in traffic control.

Conference of 26 September. -- Abrams briefly outlined the existing plans at a conference in Secretary Vance's home on Wednesday afternoon,

26 September. Besides the Secretary and General Abrams, the persons attending this conference included other Army personnel, representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Marshall and Geoghegan from Justice. The following day General Abrams filled in Col. Wendell J. Coats of the OCINFO and other officers on what had been said at the conference. The Department of Justice expected that its efforts to get Meredith, with an escort of twenty-five marshals, into the University on 27 September would be resisted. If there were resistance and troops were needed, "the decision would be made after Friday, 28 September." The Department of Justice apparently intended to pull back on the 27th if it seemed wise. The significance of the 28th was that on that day, by court action of the 25th, Barnett was supposed to be in New Orleans to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt, but on the 26th it was not believed that he would appear; indeed, there was the prospect that a warrant for his arrest might be issued, which might give the Army an additional mission. The Guard would be called, "only when and if required," which meant that Regular Army troops would be used initially. There was further agreement "that the command line would run directly from Washington to the Army Field Commander and through this all major guidance and direction would be transmitted." The necessary coordination would be effected at the Washington level between the Departments of Justice, Defense, and the Army. Troops would not be moved in advance in order to reduce reaction time. Finally, troops would be prepared to go to Oxford or Jackson or to both places --- depending upon the actions of the Governor. Although the Army's mission

naturally came up for discussion at Secretary Vance's, the conferees
decided that they could not determine it specifically at that time. 11

General Billingslea To Be Field Commander. -- Wednesday, 26

September, the day of the conference at Secretary Vance's house, Meredith was again refused entry to the University. Also, on that day, Brig. Gen. Charles Billingslea succeeded General Chase as commander of the 2d Infantry Division and thus would become the commander of the Oxford tactical forces. 12

Thursday, 27 September, was something of a final turning point as events now moved rapidly toward their climax. For one thing, it marked still another unsuccessful effort to get Meredith on the University campus; and it was on that day that Katzenbach authorized the movement of the tent-city force to the Memphis staging area. For another thing, Exercise HIGH HEELS II/SPADE FORK, which had been used as a cover, terminated on that day. Thereafter, for example, in the 2d Division, from which two of the task forces were to come, references to Oxford matters would be to Operation RAPID ROAD. This nickname which seems to have originated with the Air Force, gained considerable currency and is to be found in many of the official Oxford documents. Yet, despite its 13
currency it never received the sanction of Army headquarters.

It was now definite that the Army must plan for possible employment at either Oxford or Jackson, or at both places, as the CONARC apparently learned on Wednesday. General Abrams clarified the situation for General Exton in a telephone conversation on Thursday, the 27th, when he also met with Col. Coats, of the OCINFO, and others at the Pentagon in order to

bring them up to date. If troop employment should be split between Oxford and Jackson, General Billingslea would appoint a commander under him at each place and would be himself in over-all command with his own command post located at either place, as he might choose. Other troops were not to be alerted as yet in light of the possibility of employment in two places, but the CONARC and the Third Army would have to identify units, plan transportation, and make other arrangements on a reinforcement basis. This meant, in part, that possible additional airlift needs would require bringing in the Military Air Transport Service in addition to the already-involved Tactical Air Force.

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Although the precise mission of the Army could not be clear until it was known what Governor Barnett would do, it was clear what the Army might have to do. As a first step in possible intervention it might have to force entrance to the University registrar's office so that Meredith, escorted by Federal marshals, could register; and it might have to clear the way for Federal marshals to arrest Governor Barnett in his own capital. As a second step in such intervention the Army would have to maintain law and order, and it would have to maintain communications for the Department of Justice. Each step would have to be accomplished with a minimum of military effort. Amid existing uncertainties Army headquarters sent instructions to the CONARC and the Third Army on Thursday, 27 September, to revise planning in the light of the over-all concept of operations now visualized.

Under this concept, if Thursday's "test" with twenty-five marshals did not succeed, there would be another on Saturday morning, 29 September,

with three or four hundred marshals, and if that did not succeed, the Army "planned to employ major portions of . . . Task Force Alfa on the University . . . campus to secure access . . . for the marshals and Mr. Meredith at 1700 hours Zulu" that same day. Whereas it had been planned to move Alfa to the Columbus Air Force Base, and from there to Oxford, the Army now decided that "these initial forces would be employed from the Memphis Naval Air Station by helicopter on one hour's notice or the shortest possible time that" the CONARC could recommend. Trucks would provide alternate transportation. Elements of Alfa, together with all of Task Force Bravo, would provide reinforcement as required. There would be no movement of troops from any location prior to a decision in Washington "about 2000 hours Zulu" (1600 hours, EDT) on the 28th on the employment of military forces. Information on the proposed use of Federal marshals was not to be made known below the CONARC level. In keeping with this concept of operations Task Forces Alfa and Bravo went on a one-hour alert effective 1930 hours Zulu, 28 September. The troops affected and inquiring reporters alike would be told that the alert was in keeping with the units' STRAC status, despite the fact that the newspapers were full of news about the Mississippi situation. The elements of the Tactical Air Force assigned to the operation would go on the same alert status as the CONARC and would respond to the CONARC upon the triggering of the operation by the Department of the Army.

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Operations Plan for Task Forces Alfa and Bravo. -- A comprehensive CONARC operations plan in the early morning of 28 September for Task Forces Alfa and Bravo reflected the Washington instructions of the 27th. It was an

Exclusive message for Lt. Gen. Thomas J. H. Trapnell, Commanding General, Third Army, with information copies for Generals Abrams, Adams of the Strike Command, Billingslea, Howze of the XVIII Airborne Corps, Rich of the 101st Airborne Division, and Donovan of AFSTRIKE. It is especially notable that General Howze was informed of developments for soon he would be in command at Oxford. Notable, too, is the fact that now "the actual repeat actual mission and area of operations of the task forces" were set forth. The Army faced civil disturbances that threatened Federal marshals charged with guaranteeing compliance with Federal court orders directing "the enrollment of a male Negro" at The University of Mississippi. An apparent change in plans was indicated in the provision for moving Task Force Bravo "by surface and air to Columbus AFB to reinforce Task Force Alfa . . . if required," rather than moving it entirely by land as had been decided upon a week earlier. The 31st Transportation Company (Lt Hel), with its attached aircraft would be available at the Air Station for lifting Alfa to Oxford. Upon arrival at Memphis the helicopter company, with the 86th Transportation Company (Lt Trk), would be attached to Alfa. Jackson was not mentioned in this plan as a possible objective area, although it was mentioned in the plan's signal instructions. The plan stated explicitly that Task Force Alfa would take "all individual arms" to Memphis, but that, as stipulated in the Washington instructions of the 27th, "when initially employed," it would "be limited to night sticks and pistols." As for prior reconnaissance, it was authorized only for the Naval Air Station at Memphis. Fort Campbell would provide total resupply in support of

the operation. The plan further provided for medical evacuation and hospitalization and for signal communications.

The task group headquarters and commander (Billingslea) would be prepared to move by air to the Naval Air Station at Memphis on order of the Commanding General, Third Army. At Memphis control would pass to the Department of the Army, and on order of the Department the headquarters would "move by surface and/or helicopter to Oxford." The task group commander would assume operational control of Task Force Alfa at the Naval Air Station, where Alfa's control would pass to the Department of the Army, and on order he would move Task Force Bravo "by Air/Surface" to Columbus Air Force Base, and be prepared to continue its movement to Oxford "by helicopter and/or surface" transportation if required.¹⁶

General Wheeler's Views. -- On Friday, 28 September, the day on which the CONARC issued this operations plan, General Abrams briefed the Vice Chief of Staff and General Wheeler, the Chief of Staff Designate, on the latest "plans . . . for the special operations in Mississippi." At that time the Vice Chief of Staff gave instructions that whenever the plans became operational the Secretary of the General Staff would see that a general officer was on watch, presumably in the Army War Room, twenty-four hours a day. General Wheeler gave some common-sense advice doubtlessly based at least partly upon his experience as General Taylor's representative in Little Rock. Abrams reported Wheeler's views as follows:

The plan laid out for the troops in the objective area should be in detail and well-organized, and the troops well instructed in it so that when they arrived they could go about the performance of their mission without lost motion in a very businesslike and knowledgeable and firm fashion. He felt . . . it was appropriate to have ammunition on the person but only as a necessary requirement . . . [were it] permitted to be loaded in weapons. The troops must have a very high sense of discipline, be especially responsive to orders and requirements of high disciplinary standards; troops should be well-informed, particularly in . . . holding their tempers, not engaging in arguments with civilians, etc. They should be prepared to accept abusive language calmly and resolutely, and wherever officers or noncommissioned officers observe soldiers losing control of their emotions, . . . [such soldiers] should be immediately removed from the scene of the operation. 17

Briefing of Secretary McNamara. -- Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara also received information on Friday to bring him up to date and, presumably, on what he ought to tell inquiring reporters. 18

Task Force Charlie. -- The possibility that Governor Barnett might become liable to arrest on Friday, 28 September, which would broaden the Army's mission, indicated the desirability of identifying the additional troops that might be needed. It is doubtlessly in that context, as well as in that of military prudence and the instructions of the 27th to revise planning in the light of the concept of operations then visualized, that the creation of a third task force, Charlie, should be viewed. The CONARC announced its creation shortly after midnight 28/29 September, Washington time, in an amendment to the operations plan issued the day before. Built around the 716th Military Police Battalion at Fort Dix, New Jersey, and commanded by Lt. Col. Brice Emmett, it had the 5th and 17th Field Hospitals and an information section (from Fort Dix) attached to it, together with a composite military intelligence detachment. According to the CONARC it had an aggregate strength of 677. 19

Proposed Instructions Sent General Billingslea for Planning. --

It was now Saturday, 29 September, and under the court's order of the day before the Governor had until the following Tuesday to comply with the finding that Meredith be admitted to the University. Clearly time was growing short, for surely there would not be another period of grace. Soon, therefore, the Army might have to act. At this juncture Army headquarters sent Billingslea at Fort Benning, for planning purposes, the texts of two proposed messages. The intention was that should it be necessary later, these would be sent him in "approved official copies." One of these was to designate him as the field commander and to provide him with his basic instructions, which had reached this form through the drafting and revision that began on 15 September.²⁰

The other proposed message was a "fragmentary order" based upon "assumed Army missions resulting from expected Executive Orders." It was expected that, although the mission and tasks might vary slightly, "the general concept of the operation should remain firm." The situation foreseen was that Mississippi officials would prevent the enrollment and attendance of Meredith at the University in Oxford, and that Governor Barnett, and possibly other state officials, would take refuge from the United States Court of Appeals "on the 10th floor of the blank building in Jackson . . . ringed and occupied by Mississippi State police and deputies." (The Governor, held in civil contempt the day before, now actually faced arrest if he did not comply with the Court's Tuesday morning deadline for compliance, but the proposed fragmentary order did not put it in those terms, but in terms of appearance before

the Court to show cause why he should not be held in contempt.)

The Army's responsibility would be, in enforcement of Federal court orders, to remove "all obstruction" to the apprehension of the Governor, or of the Governor and other state officials, and to remove "all obstruction" to Meredith's enrolment and attendance at the University. After the removal of such obstructions the Army's responsibility would be for the "maintenance of law and order."

General Billingslea would "be prepared for assignment of any National Guard units" that might be called, but should the situation permit it, he would have these units serve at their home stations. He would also "plan for the phasing-in of National Guard units and the eventual release of all Regular Army units from the Oxford . . . area" (as had been accomplished largely in Operation ARKANSAS).

In this operation the Army would "use minimum strength and force to accomplish its mission," which would "not preclude . . . use of the entire Task Force Oxford 7 a name given here to all the troops that would be at Billingslea's disposal 7, if necessary." If a squad sufficed, General Billingslea should not use a platoon, but "to assure successful completion of the mission, reserve forces must be responsive to any . . . escalation requiring more troops." The same policy would control the use of force, which normally would follow a priority of "unarmed rifles (no bayonets); unarmed rifles (fixed bayonets with sheaths on); tear gas (CN); unarmed rifles (fixed bayonets, unsheathed); loaded rifles." There would be "similar priorities for carbines and pistols." Adherence to this policy, however, should not be permitted to "jeopardize successful completion of the mission." The riot control agents CS or CN, described as gases, would be

used if "clearly required to accomplish the mission and lesser efforts would not suffice." General Billingslea would have authority to use CS or CN but he would have no authority to delegate this discretionary authority to any subordinate.

Finally, since the Army's mission was only the removal of obstructions to justice, Federal marshals, "wherever possible," would take civilian troublemakers into custody. Whenever Army personnel had to take custody they would "immediately seek a Federal marshal to take over such custody." By the same token, the Army's mission would not require it to escort Meredith or actually apprehend and escort Governor Barnett or any other Mississippi official. The Army would provide "only the assurance that no one" would interfere with the marshals in carrying out court orders. The marshals would apprehend; the Army would simply clear the path. This policy would apply "to any subsequent missions resulting from Executive Order(s), unless directed otherwise. . . ." 21

Special Problems. -- The policy spelled out in the proposed fragmentary order on the use of rifles and bayonets remained unsettled until quite late. This was despite established Army doctrine that "the rifle with bayonet is the most practical weapon for general use by troops in riot control operations." On the 27th with Army doctrine evidently in mind, General Abrams apparently favored the commitment of troops with bayonets sheathed and ammunition on their persons rather than in their weapons. Tear gas ought to be used before ammunition and bayonets, in his view, and the troops ought to be prepared to use the CS riot control agent. In the instructions to the CONARC and the Third Army on the 27th, however,

the arms to be used by Alfa's troops, if employed, would "not exceed night sticks and pistols," but they were to have "the capability to use CN and CS." Although there may have been objections as late as 28 September to the taking of rifles even to the staging area, General Abrams authorized, either late on the 27th or early on the 28th, their positioning there in response to a CONARC inquiry. He cautioned, however, that they could not be taken to the objective area without further authority, and decided, probably on 29 September, that he would take up with the Department of Justice the question of whether the military police might "use rifles" [and/or?] the "shotgun-riot gun." ²² The decision was, finally, in the affirmative, as is seen from the proposed fragmentary order, which later issued officially in almost exactly the same form. General Billingslea, however, did not actually replace night sticks with rifles until specifically authorized by Abrams to do so shortly before his actual departure for Oxford.

In the Little Rock operation it was decided that the Negroes in the 101st Airborne Division, of whom there were 114, would not be used in the operational force where they would be in contact with the civilian population. Later, in the preparations for possible troop employment in Montgomery, Army headquarters laid down the policy that the selected troop units would be sent without stripping out their Negro members. ²³ The question of how to use Negro personnel came up again, of course, during the Oxford preparations. At the 17 September meeting the instructions given the CONARC were that subject to departmental confirmation there would be no changes in the racial composition of the

units chosen for the mission. According to General Billingslea, he made the decision "during the planning phase" "that Negro personnel would remain in their respective units and duty positions during the operation," but that

on 2 October after the campus was under control, Colonel Harris, special adviser to General Billingslea, received a telephone directive from the Department of the Army that negro personnel would be removed from assignments in the public eye and be retained within parent unit but employed only in base camp or unit trains. As a result considerable resentment was noticed among negro troops. Four days later, on 6 Oct., instructions were received from /the/ XVIIIth Airborne Corps that negro troops would be returned to their normal duty positions.

Despite this recollection of General Billingslea's, however, Col. Harris told General Wheeler on Monday afternoon, 1 October, in a telephone conversation during Billingslea's absence from the office, that Negro soldiers in Oxford were "not being used on patrol" (as Senator Stennis had heard they were from an assistant to Chancellor Williams), "but were being used back in the administrative areas."

General Abrams later recollected that at a meeting in the office of Attorney General Kennedy on 27 September he informed the Attorney General that the troops planned for use in the Mississippi operation were

integrated units with an average of 15% Negro personnel; that the units would take all their personnel to the area, including Negro personnel; and that verbal instructions had been issued that when and if employed on a mission Negro personnel would be withheld from committed units so that they would not come in contact with the civil population, in order to avoid unnecessary incidents.

On the following day the matter came up again in a conversation between
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General Wheeler and the Attorney General.

Evidently by Sunday, 30 September, the policy was as General Wheeler stated it on Monday morning, 1 October, in personally written instructions for a message to be sent General Howze: "Pass to Gen Howze the instructions we gave Abrams & Billingslea forbidding use of Negro troopers on operational missions bringing them in contact with the public. This applies to truck drivers & radio operators of patrol jeeps. Keep Negro troops in base camps or administrative support duties." In its reference to truck drivers this statement was at some variance with a memorandum of 29 September indicating that Negro soldiers should be employed as drivers and cooks rather than as "part of [the] front lines."

It appears from the record, then, that actually there was some confusion about the policy or possibly some failure to communicate it to the field. It is possible, for example, that the Charlie force misunderstood its orders, which were that if the unit were committed "no Negro troops would be used." Interestingly enough, through an error a Negro sergeant in the Charlie force went to Oxford with his white comrades, whereas the other Negroes in the unit did not get to Oxford until a week later as a result of the explicit order to integrate of 6 October. The other task forces that went to Oxford apparently all took their Negro members.

In order to guarantee that there would be an adequate airlift of troops from the Memphis area, the Department of the Army received authority "to request and accept" the support of Marine Corps helicopters. These would "support General Billingslea by being prepared to lift 300 armed men, without field equipment, from the Naval Air Station at Memphis . . . and place them on the campus of the University at Oxford . . . at

1700 hours Zulu, 1 October 1962," and then return to the Air Station for 300 additional men. It was believed they could be released on 2 October. Abrams took the matter up with the Navy in the early afternoon of 29 September and by mid-afternoon the Chief of Naval Operations had ordered the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet to position twenty-five Marine troop-carrying helicopters at the Air Station, with necessary support, their crew members to have full equipment, including gas masks. At that time, as the Chief of Naval Operations understood the situation, tentative plans looked toward airlifting troops so that they would begin to arrive at the Naval Air Station at eight o'clock Sunday evening, 30 September, Washington time. The arrangements for Marine helicopters was significant not only because it involved a new facet of a complex undertaking, but because they looked toward possible troop employment on Monday, 1 October. Nevertheless in the early evening of the 29th the Chief of Naval Operations advised the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet that the helicopters should be at the Naval Air Station at two o'clock Sunday afternoon, Washington time. Then about nine o'clock the same evening he advised of an advance of the estimated-time-of-arrival to noon on Sunday, the 30th, Washington time.

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Movement of Signal Equipment. -- Late Friday afternoon, 28 September, Billingslea began loading his task group headquarters equipment aboard sixteen C-130 aircraft that had arrived at the Lawson Army Air Field, and completed the task later that evening, only to receive instructions from the Third Army to unload fourteen of the planes and release them to the Air Force, to which they were returned Saturday morning, 29 September.

At the same time the Third Army placed the task force personnel on a twenty-four hour alert with the proviso that they would resume the one-hour alert, on which they had been since earlier that afternoon, at midafternoon, Sunday, 30 September. In preparation for possible troop employment, however, General Abrams on the 29th confirmed orders given to the CONARC by telephone to move the communications equipment for General Billingslea's task force, or task group, headquarters to the Naval Air Station near Memphis that day. Accordingly, the two remaining C-130 aircraft were unloaded, reloaded with the signal equipment, and dispatched to the Air Station in the early evening. General Abrams also requested General Billingslea to move his headquarters to the Air Station on Sunday, 30 September, at which time he would come under the operational control of the Department of the Army.

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At the last accounting Task Force Bravo would move from Fort Benning at least partly by air, but with Task Force Charlie added to the task group there was evidently the problem of moving it from Fort Dix, New Jersey, in case of need, since the distance from Dix to the objective area was considerably greater than that from Fort Benning, from which Bravo could move by land. As a consequence, the airlift for Bravo was diverted on Saturday afternoon from Lawson Army Air Field to McGuire Air Force Base to airlift the Charlie force from the latter if need be. Bravo, apparently after the matter of an overland march to Columbus Air Force Base was cleared with the Attorney General, would go by land as had been planned earlier, although as late as five o'clock Saturday afternoon the intent was to move it to Memphis by air on Sunday "with no land tail" and with an eye toward its possible use "sometime on Monday," when "we can do the whole thing."

28

It is evident that although Monday, 1 October, was regarded generally as the target date, caution nevertheless dictated having troops in the Memphis staging area on Sunday, and so it was decided, probably in a telephone conversation between General Abrams and Katzenbach late Saturday afternoon. Task Forces Alfa and Charlie would be sent to Memphis to arrive by noon, Sunday, local time, as General Abrams informed General Billingslea to aid him "in being prepared to operate by noon" on that day. Underscoring the nature of the operation was the notation in Saturday's memoranda file to be sure to notify the Department of Justice "prior to" the departure of the troops.

Task Force Delta. -- Also on Saturday, 29 September, Washington authorized General Exton of the CONARC to place Task Force Delta "in an alert status" whenever he received orders to initiate movement of Task Forces Alfa, Bravo, and Charlie. Actually, Delta had been placed on a four-hour alert, although not assembled, at Benning the preceding day, and then with the other forces placed on a twenty-four hour alert until Sunday afternoon. Task Force Delta thus appeared at that time as the fourth of the special task forces created for the Oxford operation. Formed around the 2d Battle Group, 1st Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, Delta, as did Bravo, included a company of the 2d Battle Group, 9th Infantry Regiment. Also attached to it were a truck company (the 666th Transportation), ordnance, signal, aviation, medical, quartermaster and engineer troops -- 1,196 men altogether. Its commander was Col. Edgar R. Poole.

Events of Saturday Evening. -- Saturday evening saw events

crowding upon each other, partly in anticipation of Governor Barnett's refusal (made known around ten o'clock) to give the President the assurances he sought. Early that evening the Tactical Air Force ordered execution of its operational plans to provide airlift for Task Forces Alfa and Charlie, and about ten o'clock, with the Air Force waiting, General Exton ordered the First and Third Armies to execute the operations instructions of 28 September, as amended. Alfa and Charlie would move to the Memphis staging area by air, the former beginning at 30/0200 Zulu and the latter at 30/0530 Zulu (eight and eleven-thirty p.m., CST, respectively, 29 September). Bravo would move to the Memphis area by surface transportation beginning at 30/0530 Zulu, avoiding Mississippi en route. Within the hour Maj. Kristoferson received final notification to take the tent-city force to Mississippi and Col. Baldwin, Secretary Vance's aide, called General Abrams to tell him that Maj. Gen. Chester Clifton, Jr., the President's military aide, had called at ten-twenty. Apparently the President wanted a force of 500 military policemen at the Memphis staging area, in addition to those already scheduled for arrival there, as soon as possible. This resulted in orders to the 720th Military Police Battalion at Fort Hood -- Task Force Echo. Within the hour, too, the Attorney General was on his way to the White House and Secretary Vance was on the way to his office. A few minutes later General Abrams telephoned Col. Baldwin to say that there was a lack of intelligence information and Kristoferson might be walking into trouble. General Wheeler was brought up to date and five minutes before midnight the Pentagon learned that the President would have

a press conference (probably a news briefing by his press secretary) at
twelve-thirty a.m., Sunday morning, just thirty-five minutes later. ³¹

Presidential Proclamation and Executive Order. -- Meanwhile, at
one minute past midnight, 30 September 1962, President John F. Kennedy
put his name to Proclamation No. 3497, "Obstruction of Justice in the
State of Mississippi." Declaring that the Governor of Mississippi and
other officers and persons in that state were "willfully opposing and
obstructing the enforcement" of Federal court orders, that as a consequence
it was impracticable to enforce Federal laws in Mississippi "by the ordinary
course of judicial proceedings," and that the Governor had not given him
"adequate assurances" that Federal court orders would be obeyed and law
and order maintained, the President commanded "all persons engaged in
such obstructions of justice to cease and desist therefrom and to disperse
and retire peaceably forthwith." He stated his authority as "the
Constitution and laws of the United States, including chapter 15 of Title
10 of the United States Code, particularly sections 332, 333 and 334

³²
thereof." Army headquarters in Washington had expected that there
would be a time lag between any proclamation and its following executive
order, as there had been in similar cases in the past, but when the time
came there was none, for President Kennedy issued his proclamation and
executive order more or less simultaneously, thus adhering to the form
of the proclamation but not to the theory that there should be opportunity
to retire from the fray.

Executive Order No. 11053, "Assistance for Removal of Unlawful
Obstructions of Justice in the State of Mississippi," 30 September 1962,

quoted the essential parts of the proclamation of the same date and declared that, since its commands had not been obeyed, obstruction of the court orders still existed and threatened to continue; cited again the legal authority set forth in the proclamation, together with Section 301 of Title 3 of the Code; and then ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. The Secretary of Defense is authorized and directed to take all appropriate steps to enforce all orders of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and to remove all obstructions of justice in the State of Mississippi.

SEC. 2. In furtherance of the enforcement of the aforementioned orders of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to use such of the armed forces of the United States as he may deem necessary.

SEC. 3. I /the President/ hereby authorize the Secretary of Defense to call into the active military service of the United States, as he may deem appropriate to carry out the purposes of this order, any or all units of the Army National Guard and of the Air National Guard of the State of Mississippi to serve in the active military service of the United States for an indefinite period and until relieved by appropriate orders. In carrying out the provisions of Section 1, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to use the units, and members thereof, ordered into the active military service of the United States pursuant to this section.

SEC. 4. The Secretary of Defense is authorized to delegate to the Secretary of the Army or the Secretary of the Air Force, or both, any of the authority conferred upon him by this order. 33

Calling of Mississippi National Guard. -- Immediately following issuance of the executive order Secretary of Defense McNamara, by a memorandum of 30 September to the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force, called into the active military service of the United States, effective at two minutes after midnight, 30 September, EDT, "all of the units and members of the Army National Guard and Air National Guard of the State of Mississippi . . . for an indefinite

period and until relieved by appropriate orders." At the same time he directed Secretary Vance to take whatever action Vance deemed necessary, using either Regular Army or National Guard forces, or both, to implement the White House and Defense orders, and he delegated to Vance all the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense by the executive order respecting the use of these forces. Copies of Secretary McNamara's order were to "be furnished forthwith to the Governor of Mississippi and to" the commander of the Army and Air National Guard of that state.

Vance thereupon transmitted the call to the Guard through Governor Barnett by means of a message in which he quoted McNamara's order and of which he sent an information copy to each of the commanding generals of the Mississippi Guard. General Greenlief, the Assistant Chief of the National Guard Bureau, telephoned Maj. Gen. William P. Wilson, The Adjutant General of Mississippi, read to him the orders calling up the Guard, and then telephoned the same information to Brig. Gen. Claude F. Clayton, of the 31st Infantry Division Artillery and the senior commander of the Mississippi Army National Guard. He also read to Clayton a message from Abrams concerning Clayton's personal duty assignment. At Vance's direction General McGowan, chief of the Guard Bureau, sent Governor Barnett a message copy of Secretary McNamara's order and sent an additional copy to Wilson and one to Clayton. Secretary Vance's message was reported delivered to the Governor's mansion at three-thirty Sunday morning, CST, but as of around noon on Sunday McGowan's message to Governor Barnett remained undelivered. At the state

capitol in Jackson there was nobody to receive it and at the Governor's mansion the guards refused it. A copy of the message also went to each of the three -- Barnett, Wilson, and Clayton -- by air mail-special delivery. By the orders thus issued all Mississippi Guard units were to assemble at their home armories and air bases and come under General Billingslea's operational control. General Eaton, of the USARAC, would furnish the necessary administrative and logistical support to the Army National Guard, but the gaining command in each case would provide such support for the Air Guard. Army Regulations 130-10, Section II, and 135-300, paragraph 32, would control personnel procedures for the Army Guard and Air Force Manual 45-2 for the Air Guard. Air Force instructions were that the Air units would train under their gaining command in each case whenever not committed by General Billingslea to specific operations. ³⁴

In the existing circumstances, the Mississippi Army and Air National Guard, with an assigned strength of about 11,000 men (Army, 9,894, as of 30 September, and Air, 1,017, as of 31 August 1962) had had no part in the preliminary planning, and were now called up with no knowledge of what, precisely, they might be expected to do, although most of the men doubtlessly knew from the press and radio why they were called. By noon, Sunday, at least eighty percent of the Guardsmen had reported to their armories and air bases. Before Sunday was over apparently over ninety-two percent had reported. As Wilson, The Adjutant General of Mississippi, viewed the mobilization, it was "in accordance with a . . . plan . . . practiced on many occasions." The response "was completely satisfactory" with "absolutely no incidents of any individual willfully

refusing to report. . . . When the call went to the . . . units, they did not know the purpose for which they were . . . called, and therefore responded in the same manner as though they were . . . mobilized for a real -- and I say again, a real -- National emergency." 35

Actually, the decision to call the Mississippi Guard was a late one. Not until the period 27-28 September did the planners in Army headquarters obtain the names and addresses of key personnel in the Mississippi Guard from the Guard Bureau, and apparently the Bureau never entered into any serious discussion of the calling up of the Guard until early Saturday evening, after General Greenlief had been called at five-thirty to the Pentagon from his home to read a message on the developing situation and to attend, about six o'clock, with General Abrams, General Dodge, and various other officers from the ODCSOPS, a meeting in Secretary Vance's office. There the possible use of the Guard was discussed, but the decision as to whether or not to call the Guard was up to the President and he would not make it until later that night. General Greenlief took the occasion to recommend, however, that if the Guard were called, the Air units should be included in the call. He also advised that if the decision to call the Guard were made that night the 1st Battle Group, 155th Infantry Regiment, and the 108th Armored Cavalry Regiment could close in Oxford by ten o'clock, Monday morning, 1 October. 36

Although Maj. Gen. Sherman T. Clinger, The Adjutant General of Arkansas, served with the Guard when it was called up in Operation ARKANSAS, Wilson of Mississippi apparently was not called during the

Oxford troubles; however, Col. Marshall E. Bush, the state's Assistant
37
Adjutant General, was called to duty.

An unusual case under the circumstances was that of Clayton, the Commanding General of the 31st Infantry Division Artillery, Mississippi National Guard, whose position in civil life was that of the United States District Judge, Northern District of Mississippi. Judge Clayton received orders early Sunday to report to General Abrams at the Millington Naval Air Station that afternoon as a special advisor, in which position he would be removed from the chain of command. Pleading a conflict of interest, however, and declining to be called under a provision of the law exempting Federal judges, he secured the dispatch of his official release before the day was over. According to General Greenlief, after Clayton raised the question of this conflict during their early Sunday morning telephone conversation, it was agreed in the Army War Room "that the Justice Department through the medium of Judge Clayton's immediate superior should request the Army to release General Clayton." Clayton, however, had his own more direct method -- a discussion of the problem with Senator Eastland, "who told him," General Abrams reported late Sunday afternoon, "that orders relieving . . . [Clayton] from Federal duty would be forthcoming at [the] request of [the] U.S. Attorney General." General Abrams therefore assumed the responsibility of explaining the matter to the Secretary of the Army and told Clayton he would not need to report to him for duty "but could proceed . . . to attend judicial proceedings at Greenville tomorrow." "Simply stated," as Clayton wrote Abrams following his release, military service "would have

put me, a United States District Judge, in the field to assist in the enforcement of orders of United States Courts. And many, if not all, of the prosecutions for the rioters at Oxford and at the University . . . will be for trial in my court."

38

Immediately after the assignment of Judge Clayton as an advisor to General Abrams, instructions went out to three Mississippi Guard units to prepare, following assembly in their respective armories, for vehicular movement to Oxford, Mississippi, closing there not later than ten o'clock Monday morning, 1 October 1962. Their commanding officers were to report to General Billingslea for instructions at the Millington Naval Air Station by two o'clock Sunday afternoon, 30 September. One of these units was the 1st Battle Group, 155th Infantry Regiment, Col. Marion D. Odell commanding, with headquarters at Laurel, Mississippi, in the Southern part of the state, its most distant company being about 250 miles from Oxford. Another unit was the 2d Battle Group of the 155th, with headquarters at Amory, Mississippi, north of the Columbus Air Force Base and twenty-one miles southeast of Tupelo, which put it relatively close to Oxford. The third of the Guard units instructed to be ready to move on Oxford was the 108th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Col. James G. Martin commanding, with headquarters in Tupelo, Troop E in Oxford itself, and other troops in such nearby towns as Holly Springs, Water Valley, and Pontotoc.

The strength of these units upon subsequent arrival at Oxford was, respectively, 797, 794, and 1,525. There would also be called to Oxford a small unit of doctors and enlisted men from Col. David Wilson's 134th Surgical Hospital, which only recently had come off active duty

because of the Berlin Crisis -- fifty-two persons altogether.

Commanding officers of the Guard units not alerted for possible movement to Oxford on Monday were to commence training immediately "in consonance with [the] mobilization training program" and were to "await further orders." Vehicles to support troop movement were to be assembled at their home armories not later than ten o'clock Sunday evening, 30 September. The troops would use "individual weapons only," leaving crew-served weapons behind, and would use "no track vehicles," which meant that the 108th had to leave its three tank companies behind when it moved.

General Billingslea conferred at the Air Station with the commanders of the two battle groups of the 155th and with the commander of the 108th for two and one-half hours on Sunday afternoon. He explained the probable missions, his instructions from the Department of the Army, and gave them copies of the commanders' orientation information that had been prepared for issue to the troops. General Billingslea's instructions were that the commanders should return home and reach a state of readiness that would permit their movement on Billingslea's order to arbitrarily-chosen general objective areas around Oxford (within one hour's closing time of the University campus) by ten o'clock Monday morning. General Billingslea reported that the relationships between the officers were cordial, that the Guard officers were responsive, and that the status of communications in their units was deplorable. What may have been an innovation in a commanders' conference was the telephone call put through to them, as a part of the conference, by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who wanted to speak to the Guard officers. In Washington, meanwhile, there was

understandable concern about this conference. While it was still in progress, around five o'clock, EDT, General Parker, the DCSOPS, wired General Abrams for the results of the meeting at his "earliest convenience" and also for an outline of the plan for the employment of the Federal marshals in the "contemplated operation today."⁴⁰

Command Control. -- General Billingslea, of course, was now in the Memphis staging area at the Naval Air Station, as was General Abrams. In Billingslea's case, orders to move reached him at Fort Benning Saturday evening, 29 September, at eight-forty-five, EDT. The two C-130 aircraft that had taken the signal equipment to the staging area returned to Lawson Army Air Field near Benning, picked up General Billingslea and the nucleus of his headquarters staff at one-fifty EDT, Sunday morning, and arrived at the Air Station at one o'clock, Sunday morning, CST, (an hour and ten minutes later), about an hour before the arrival of the last aircraft bearing Task Force Alfa from Fort Bragg (Pope Air Force Base). Eight Caribou transports flew other elements of General Billingslea's headquarters to the staging area, the first one departing shortly after midnight, EDT, while the remainder of the headquarters moved overland, crossing the initial point at about seven o'clock Sunday morning, EDT. General Billingslea's command post became operational in Building N-26 at the Naval Air Station⁴¹ by five-thirty Sunday morning, EDT.

Washington now formally designated General Billingslea as the field commander by sending him officially the orders sent him in an abbreviated form for planning purposes only the preceding day. With the text of the President's executive order added, General Billingslea's mission as the

field commander was to use the available forces, excluding those assigned to the tent city, "to enforce all orders of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and to remove all obstructions of justice in the State of Mississippi." The message containing these orders went out at three-eleven Sunday morning, Washington time, which was shortly after General Billingslea's arrival in the staging area. Captain Tansey, a signal officer then at the Millington Naval Air Station, charged with the personal delivery of these orders to General Billingslea "immediately upon his arrival" at the Air Station, presumably discharged his duty as best he could, the message reaching Billingslea at four-fifty-five Sunday morning, Washington time.

The next order of business was to send General Billingslea officially the fragmentary order sent him the preceding day, which, it stated, was "based on assumed Army missions resulting from expected Executive Orders." At the Pentagon, Col. Jung waited for an opportunity to have it typed in a new wording that would delete the now outdated reference to "expected Executive Orders," but General Abrams, aware that time was passing, instructed him to send it in its existing form, and so he did, except for changing Northern District to Southern District, as it was supposed to be, in the reference to the United States District Court. It went out at nine-twenty-two Sunday morning, Washington time.

General Billingslea's signal communications at the Naval Air Station were those provided by a Department of the Army communications team, under

Capt. James Tansey, that did not reach the Millington Naval Air Station until almost midnight, Washington time, on Saturday. There was some misunderstanding on Maj. Kristoferson's part as to Tansey's mission, but a message from Washington made it clear

that his specific mission was to insure responsive teletype communications between the Headquarters and the field and the Department of Army War Room, and that his equipment and personnel would not be utilized for any other mission unless so directed by the Department of the Army, or by the Commanding General in charge of troops, when and if he arrived.

This apparently prevented the team Tansey sent to Kristoferson's camp site from establishing direct communication between the tent city and Oxford, which was a source of dissatisfaction with the communications provided.

It is worth noting that the Army War Room, as a new facility now coming into its own, served as the Pentagon command post for the Oxford operation. War Room Journal entries concerning the operation go back to 27 September and several officers assigned to the operation were notified on Saturday evening, 29 September, that they should go to the War Room. Later, however, Col. Jung's recollection was that the War Room did not become fully operational for Oxford business until the early morning hours of 30 September. Jung, the last of the officers assigned to Oxford duty in the War Room, did not move out of the War Room until 19 October as the Cuban Crisis came to a head, although for some time previously he had operated in the Conference Room outside the principal War Room area.

On Sunday, 30 September, the day on which General Wheeler became the Chief of Staff in Washington, General Billingslea in the field found

that one of his major problems "was the lack of any single directing agency for all U. S. Government plans and operations" concerning the enforcement of the court orders in the Meredith case. General Billingslea, both in the staging area and later at Oxford, served directly under the Chief of Staff, but received instructions to aid the Department of Justice. Indeed, he learned from Abrams "that the Attorney General was exercising overall policy direction for the . . . Government," although "it was apparent that Justice . . . and Army planning had proceeded somewhat independently. When the need for close coordination in the Memphis and Oxford areas arose, the separate instructions in the two departments . . . made unified direction and close coordination difficult." This was seen early Sunday afternoon, when, without any previous arrangements for such a command, General Abrams informed General Billingslea that he would command the Federal marshals whose purpose was to guard Meredith. When it became apparent General Billingslea could not at once command the marshals and prepare both the Regular Army and National Guard forces for employment, he was relieved of responsibility for the marshals. But this only raised another problem. If the Army's mission were simply to assist the marshals to restore and maintain order on the Oxford campus (and that was its mission) then it seemed that Billingslea would be "under Katzenbach's control," since Katzenbach would be the senior Department of Justice official in Oxford. This would have to be squared away, a staff officer in Washington thought.

46

The problem was an unusual one -- a problem of control or close coordination in joint operations with a coordinate, but civilian,

department of the Executive Branch. What it finally came down to was liaison between Katzenbach and General Billingslea. As the crisis mounted in Oxford Sunday evening, Secretary Vance learned from Katzenbach that he would like to have a liaison officer from General Billingslea's staff. Secretary Vance agreed and shortly after ten o'clock Sunday evening, Washington time, the necessary instructions went out. The previous day two officers from General Billingslea's staff had been provided "to assist Federal marshals at the Naval Air Station in planning."⁴⁷

General Billingslea's command report for the period of the riot minced no words in pointing out two unforeseen communications difficulties that stemmed directly from the command situation just described:

One consequence of the lack of a single directing agency in Washington and the lack of a single command post for issuing orders to Justice and Army representatives in Memphis was a clogging of the ample means of communication between Washington and the Naval Air Station. Another was the severe and constant pressure on General Billingslea and his staff to respond to telephonic messages. The sheer volume of messages sometimes prevented action on them or even adequate recording and dissemination. This situation hampered local preparations and coordination and delayed to some degree the execution of plans.⁴⁸

An evident characteristic of the Oxford operation is that despite the initial lack of close liaison between the responsible departments of the Government there was nevertheless a considerable preoccupation at the very top with a situation that was heavy with serious implications for government. One evidence of this was the request made Sunday morning, 30 September, that a copy of the situation report be passed to the White House. The ODCSOPS Situation Report Number 1-62, a "Summary of Special Operations" as of 30/1100 September 1962, Washington time, issued only a little more than an hour after the request was made. Thereafter, the

ODCSOPS situation reports continued, on a twenty-four basis after Number 49
51-62, through Number 107-62, as of 21/0800 December 1962.

Both Secretary Vance and General Wheeler, the Chief of Staff, met with Attorney General Kennedy Sunday noon with two things primarily in mind: If the Army were told to execute a mission on the morrow (Monday) would it be authorized to use the National Guard and what would be the Army's mission? Three units of the Guard, of course, had been alerted already for possible employment on Monday. Now, on Sunday afternoon, these Guard units received a warning order concerning "possible displacement vicinity Oxford." By nine-twenty that night, Washington time, shortly before the President went on the air, Secretary Vance and the Attorney General decided to place the three designated Guard units on a one-hour alert.
50

Strength of Forces. -- About midnight Saturday, local time, probably confirming informal notification as early as six o'clock that evening, instructions went to the Commanding General of the Fourth Army at Fort Sam Houston, as a result of Presidential determination to have sufficient troops on hand, to have the fifth of the task forces prepared to move by air to the Naval Air Station near Memphis. This was Task Force Echo, Lt. Col. Robert P. Hotaling commanding, which had been planned some days before. It consisted of the 720th Military Police Battalion at Fort Hood, Texas, together with medical and military intelligence detachments and an information team. As of six o'clock Friday evening, 28 September, Washington time, its strength was "not less than 500" officers and enlisted men. It was expected around noon on Sunday that Echo would depart from Connally Air Force Base early Monday morning, 1 October.

By Sunday afternoon there were en route, on alert, or already at the Naval Air Station in Tennessee and the tent city in Mississippi, 4,582 Regular officers and enlisted men, counting the personnel of the 26th Marine Air Group, which was at the Naval Air Station with its 51 helicopters. In addition, the Mississippi National Guard had been called into Federal service and three units, totalling 3,116 men, had been alerted for possible movement to Oxford on Monday. Not included in these figures were the Air Force personnel involved in the airlift and all the Army personnel involved in staffing the operation in Washington and at the headquarters of the CONARC and in those of the various numbered armies.

Neither do these figures include General Abrams, the personal representative of the Chief of Staff, who had left Andrews Air Force Base for the Memphis area with a small party at ten o'clock Sunday morning. Included in General Abrams' party were West of the OTJAG, his legal adviser, and a three-man team from the OCINFO composed of Lt. Col. L. Gordon Hill, Jr., Lt. Col. Patrick L. Klein, and Maj. Leo J. Parent. At their destination, Lt. Col. Hacker, the information officer from Fort Benning, and his party joined Hill and his colleagues to form the thirteen-man information section prescribed in the early planning. The information officers on the scene announced Abrams' arrival in the Memphis area, as well as initially that of the units. This policy of local announcement of the arrival of units in both the Memphis staging area and at Oxford continued until Lt. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze succeeded Billingslea as the commander. On Sunday, 30 September, the troop information

officers reproduced and distributed the orientation material for the troops in the assembly areas that had been sent them the day before. 52

Such was the planning and the Army's state of readiness on Sunday, with the expectation that troops might be needed on Monday to support Meredith and his escort in a final effort to get him enrolled. A plan was in the making, however, to put Meredith on the campus on Sunday without risking a Monday appearance when segregationist forces would expect it. The Army, however, does not appear as privy to the arrangements.

Footnotes to Chapter III

1. (S) Msg, DCSOPS (by Abrams) to CGUSCONARC (EXCLUSIVE for Powell), 15/1722Z Sep 1962 (DA 919141).

2. Notation for 15 Sep 1962 in penciled sequence of events, 13-24 Sep 1962, by Schlotzhauer in file on Planning Papers - Miscellaneous (13 Sep -); and telecons with Jung 23 and 24 Sep 1963. The (S) Little Rock and Montgomery draft instructions are in Pre-Planning Book (the original "Black Book" of the operation), App. 1, in the front of which the (S) Mississippi draft instructions are clipped. Other (S) drafts are in Action Officer's Book, tab marked "Prepared Messages/Samples"; and in Chron File, 15-28 Sep 1962, Tab 6. (S) msg, DA to CG, 2d Inf Div, 29 Sep 1962 (DA 919735), Pt. II, contains proposed instructions sent for planning purposes, which are identical with those sent as orders the next day in ,msg, DA to Billingslea, 30/0711Z Sep 1962 (DA 919745). See Coakley, op. cit., pp. 20ff. on the distinction between calling and ordering the National Guard into the Federal service and cf. EO 10730, 24 Sep 1957, with EO 11053, 30 Sep 1962, which corrected "order" to "call." See (S) ltr, Exton to DCSOPS, sub: Classified Operation (U), 19 Sep 1962, calling attention to the distinction between "called" and "ordered," with Abrams' penciled notation in Chron File, 15-28 Sep 1962, Tab 11.

3. Schlotzhauer memos for the rcd, subs: (S) Operation Oxford, Conference at CONARC, 17 Sep 1962, dated 18 Sep 1962, and (S) Oxford Problem, 19 Sep 1962; (S) cy of msg, DA (by Abrams) to CGUSCONARC, 18 Sep 1962 (DA 919180); and (S) Abrams memo for the rcd, sub: Oxford Problem, 17 Sep 1962 -- all ibid., Tabs 8, 13, 9, and 10, respectively.

4. See (S) ltr, Exton to DCSOPS, sub: Classified Operation (U), 19 Sep 1962, w/5 incls (all cys of Sep 1962 msg) as follows: (S) ATUTR-WR (30/1756, 30/1759, 30/1772, 30/1751) and (S) ATUTR-OPS, 30/1771, in Chron File, 15-28 Sep 1962, Tab 11; (S) Schlotzhauer memo for the rcd, sub: Oxford Problem, 19 Sep 1962, ibid., Tab 13; and (FOUO) 503d MP Bn Command Report, 1 Nov 1962, 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab H, par 2f.

5. See ibid., Tab H, pars 1-2; Capt Fred J. Vilella's personal history of Company A, 503d MP Bn, 24 Sep 62 to 10 Oct '62, "Operation Mississippi" (with a University of Mississippi Plot Plan showing march routes), pp. 1-2, in file on Riot at Oxford, Mississippi (cited hereafter as Vilella's History); and strength and status table in file on Strength & Status of [Oxford] Forces.

6. ibid.; and 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, par 2; and 2d BG, 23d Inf Command Report, 19 Nov 1962, ibid.; Tab D, pars 1-2.

7. See (S) Schlotzhauer memos for the rcd, sub: Oxford Problem, 19 Sep 1962, with penciled notations initialed "S" (probably for Schlotzhauer) and "cwa" (for Abrams), and, same sub, 21 Sep 1962, in Chron File, 15-28 Sep 1962, Tabs 13 and 17, respectively.

On the USAF's part in the planning, and for an indication of the planning complexities, see (S) msg, AFSTRIKE, Langley AFB, to RUEKOL/USSTRICOM, MacDill AFB, and others, sub: AFSTRIKE Operations Order 170-62, 21/0449Z Sep 1962 (DAIN 267210) (cy in Chron File, 15-28 Sep 1962); and the following, (S) cys of which are in Action Officer's Book under tab marked "Incoming Msgs": AFSTRIKE to RUCQDD/9AF, Shaw AFB, and others, sub: AFSTRIKE Ops Order 170-62, Rev Alert Status, 22/1651Z Sep 1962 (DAIN 268117); idem to idem, sub: Change 1 to AFSTRIKE Ops Order 170-62, 21/1924Z Sep 1962 (DAIN 267520); CSAF to TAC, Langley AFB, sub: Rapid Road, 27 Sep 1962 (DAIN 271018); Command Post, TAC, to CSAF, 28/0042Z Sep 1962 (DAIN 271038); Commander, TAC, to RUEAHQ/CNO, 28/0233Z Sep 1962 (DAIN 271102); AFSTRIKE to RUCQDD/9AF, and others, sub: Rev AFSTRIKE Ops Order 170-62, 28/0256Z Sep 1962 (DAIN 271335); idem to idem, sub: Annex B, Ops Order 170-62 (Rev), 28/1738Z Sep 1962 (DAIN 271465); Command Post, TAC, to RUQDD/9AF, sub: Correction to pars, 2, App 2, Annex B, AFSTRIKE Ops Order 170-62 (Rev), 28/1857Z Sep 1962 (DAIN 271462); and idem to idem, 28/2358Z Sep 1962 (DAIN 271663).

8. (S) Schlotzhauer memo for the rcd, sub: Operation Oxford, 24 Sep 1962, Chron File, 15-28 Sep 1962, Tab 21.

9. (S) Schlotzhauer memo for the rcd, sub: Operation Oxford, 25 Sep 1962, ibid., Tab 24.

10. Brief of Movement Plan, Operation Oxford, ibid., Tab 11a; and 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, par 3.

11. (S) Abrams memo for the rcd, sub: Meeting at Secretary Vance's House, 1600 Hours, 26 September, 27 Sep 1962, Chron File, 15-28 Sep 1962, Tab 27; and penciled notes on military planning, 27 - 28 Sep 1962, in files on Planning Papers -- Miscellaneous (13 Sep -).

12. 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, par 2b. Also see service record of Brig Gen Charles Billingslea, Feb 1963, GRB, OCMH; and "Combat-Tested General -- Charles Billingslea," The New York Times, 2 Oct 1962, p. 27.

13. 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962. The short cover title of this report is "Command Report Operation 'Rapid Road,' 2d Infantry Division." The USAF parentage of the term and the official view on the matter were explained to the writer by Jung, the Oxford action officer, in conversations on 10 Dec 1962 and 18 Mar 1963.

14. Abrams memo for the rcd, sub: Telephone Conversation with General Exton, 27 Sep 1962, Chron File, 15-28 Sep 1962, Tab 28; and notes for 27 Sep in penciled memoranda on military planning, 27-28 Sep 1962, in file on Planning Papers - Miscellaneous (13 Sep -).

15. (S) Msg, DA (by Abrams) to CGUSCONARC and CGUSARTHREE, 27 Sep 1962 (DA 919644); (S) msg, idem to idem, n.d. /27 or 28 Sep 1962 / (DA 919662); Schlotzhauer memo for the rcd, 27 Sep 1962, with information that the TAC could move troops from Forts Bragg and Benning with no difficulty, requiring only six hours' notice to preposition aircraft (Chron File, 15-28 Sep 1962, Tab 29); and (S) Abrams memo for the rcd, sub: Actions, Night of 27 September 1962, 28 Sep 1962 (ibid., Tab 32). Late Friday afternoon, confirming an Abrams-Exton telecon, the alert for Alfa and Bravo was changed to 24 hours until 30/1930Z Sep 1962, but by a following message the transmission of the change was described as erroneous and all copies ordered destroyed by the Third Army. (S) Msg, DA (by Abrams) to CGUSCONARC and CGUSARTHREE, 28 Sep 1962 (1740 EDT) (DA 919710); and (S) msg, DA (by L/C Clarke S. Vaughn) to CGUSARTHREE, 28 Sep 1962 (DA 919727).

16. (S) Exclusive msg, CGUSCONARC/CINCARSTRIKE to RUCAC/CGUSARTHREE, with info cys to DA and others, 28/0820Z Sep 1962 (ATUTR-WR 302048; DAIN 271230). On the airlift of TF Bravo, cf. (S) msg, AFSTRIKE, Langley AFB, to RUQDD/9AF, Shaw AFB, and others, 28/1738Z Sep 1962 (AFIN 22992; DAIN 271465), where "approximately 140 C-130 sorties for Task Force 'Bravo'" are referred to.

17. (S) Abrams memo for the rcd, sub: Briefing of the Vice Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff Designate, 28 Sep 1962, Chron File, 15-28 Sep 1962, Tab 33.

18. See "Situation (For Secretary of Defense's personal orientation, but not for use with Press.)" /28 Sep 1962 /, ibid., 28 Sep - 1 Oct 1962, Tab 5; "Questions and Proposed Answers to Be Used by Mr. McNamara," n.d. /28 Sep 1962 /, ibid., Tab 11; and Anthony Lewis, "New Move by U.S. Is Expected Soon," The New York Times, 29 Sep 1962, p. 8.

19. (S) Msg, CGUSCONARC to CGUSARONE, CGUSARTHREE, and others, 29/0505Z Sep 1962 (ATUTR-WR 302055; DAIN 271652); and Hall memo for the rcd, 29 Sep 1962, Chron File, 28 Sep - 1 Oct 1962, Tab 24.

20. See the text and references at n. 2, above.

21. (S) Msg, DA (by Abrams) to CG, 2d Inf Div, Ft Benning, Ga., 29 Sep 1962 (DA 919735).

22. See Civil Disturbances and Disasters (FM 19-15, Sep 1958), p. 43; penciled notes on military planning, 27-28 Sep 1962, in file on Planning Papers -- Miscellaneous (13 Sep -); (S) Abrams memo for the rcd, sub: Actions, Night of 27 September 1962, 28 Sep 1962 (Chron File, 15-28 Sep 1962, Tab 32); (S) msg, DA (by Abrams) to CGUSCONARC and CGUSARTHREE, 27 Sep 1962 (DA 919644); and the memo of probably 29 Sep 1962, as described in text, in file on Memoranda - Miscellaneous Drafts & Rough Notes (Sep - Dec 1962). On 29 Sep Shive telephoned instructions to the CONARC to see that "1500 policeman clubs" were drawn from the Memphis General Depot, together with "900 carriers," and prepositioned at the MNAS by 30/1900Z Sep. See (C) Msg, DA (by Abrams) to CGUSCONARC, [29 Sep 1962] (DA 919739).

The so-called CS riot control agent, to which there was a reference in the proposed order, was "a powerful eye and respiratory irritant," which was "more potent, though less toxic," than tear gas (CN). On this subject, see (C) Extract from C/S Weekly Summary, 19 Jul 1960;

(C) Fact Sheet, sub: Use of CS in Riot Control, 16 Mar 1961, prepared by L/C Floyd and signed by Brig Gen John W. Keating, then Dir of Ops, ODCSOPS; memos for the rcd (by Lt Col Charles W. Adcock), sub: Status of Chemical Ammunition, 2 Oct 1962, and, without subject, 3 Oct 1962, in file on Memoranda-General (2 Oct). Adcock's memo of 2 Oct lists the number or other quantity of each kind of chemical munition received, expended, and on hand at Oxford as of 01/2400 EDT Oct 1962, while his memo of 3 Oct states that "no record could be found that substantiated 'CS', but Colonel Baldwin, Senior Aide to the Secretary of the Army verified the fact that authority was given for the use of 'CS' tear gas by Army troops."

23. Coakley, op. cit., p. 57; and (S) "Briefing on Freedom Riders' Situation," in file on (S) Alert of Troops, Birmingham, Ala. -- Freedom Riders.

24. See 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, p. 6; the gathering of documents marked "Copies of Memos for Record & Orders Reference Use of Colored Soldiers Oxford Area," signed by Rundquist, in Memoranda -- General (9 Oct); and (FOUO) White House Fact Sheet, Dir of Opns, ODCSOPS (Abrams), to CSA (Wheeler), sub: Utilization of Negro Military Personnel in Mississippi, 10 Oct 1962, in file on Reports to White House (also, w/7 incls, in Chron File, 10-11 Oct 1962, Tab 13).

25. The entire cryptic notation of 29 Sep [1962] in an informal penciled memo reads as follows: ". . . screening out of negroes [sic] instructions stand -- not part of front lines/drivers, cooks etc. -- Gen. Powell will handle [.]". Memoranda-Misc. Drafts & Rough Notes (Sep - Dec 1962), I. See also cy of "instructions . . . prepared by C/S personally and handed to DCSOPS at [011535Z Oct 1962], in the gathering of documents cited in the immediately preceding n.; (FOUO) 716th MP Bn Command Report for Period 28 Sep - 2 Oct 1962 and 10 - 20 Oct 1962, 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962,

Tab I, pp. 3, 9; 720th MP Bn After-Action Report -- Operation "Ole Miss," 31 Oct 1962, ibid.; Tab J, p. 3; Villella's History, p. 6; Vanderburgh's diary as cited in Chap. IV, below; White House Fact Sheet, Dir of Opns, ODCSOPS (Abrams) to CofS (Wheeler), sub: Utilization of Negro Military Personnel in Mississippi, 10 Oct 1962, incl 7, p. 2, Chron File, 10-11 Oct 1962, Tab 13; and the material on Negro troops in Chap. V, below.

26. The Navy thus provided not only the use of the MNAS, but USMC helicopters as well. See Abrams memo for the rcd, no sub, 29 Sep 1962, Chron File, 28 Sep - 1 Oct 1962, Tab 17; (C) msg, CNO to CINCLANTFLT, 29/1839Z Sep 1962 (DAIN 271831); (C) msg, idem to idem, 29/2209Z Sep 1962 (DAIN 271833); (C) msg, CINCLANTFLT to RUECW/CNO, 29/2358Z Sep 1962 (DAIN 271965); and (C) msg, CINCLANTFLT to CNO, 06/1854Z Oct 1962. There are other messages bearing on the use of USMC helicopters in the Mississippi operation in the file on Miscellaneous Messages Sent by the Department of the Navy.

27. (C) Msg, DA (by Abrams) to CGUSCONARC, 29 Sep 1962 (DA 919738); and 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, p. 2.

28. (S) Msg, TAC Command Post to RUCQDD/9AF, and others, 29/1832Z Sep 1962 (DAIN 271891); notation in penciled memo of 29 Sep /1962 7 and another probably of the same date in file on Memoranda - Miscellaneous Drafts & Rough Notes (Sep - Dec 1962); unsigned rough memo, 29/1705 Sep /1962 7, ibid.; Schlotzhauer memo for the rcd, no sub, 29 Sep 1962, concerning diversion of aircraft for TF Charlie and movement schedules for T Forces Alfa and Charlie, Chron File, 28 Sep - 1 Oct 1962, Tab 22; and 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, p. 2.

29. Unsigned rough memo, 29/1705 Sep /1962 7, in file on Memoranda - Miscellaneous Drafts & Rough Notes (Sep - Dec 1962).

30. (C) Msg, DA (by Abrams) to CGUSCONARC, 29 Sep 1962 (DA 919740); 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, p. 2; (C) DA (ODCSOPS) Situation Report NR 1-62 (As of 30/1100 Sep 1962), Summary of Special Operations (this and others in the series hereafter cited as DA SitRep 1-62, 30/1100 Sep 1962, mutatis mutandis); and (C) msg, CGUSCONARC to RUCAC/CGTUSA, 30/0550Z Sep 1962 (DAIN 272006).

31. (S) Msg, CGUSCONARC/CINCARSTRIKE to RUEPGI/CG, First Army and RUCAC/CG, Third Army, 30/0154Z Sep 1962 (DAIN 271946); (S) msg, TAC Command Post, Langley AFB, to RUCQDD/9thAF, Shaw, 29/2209Z Sep 1962 (DAIN 271892); and memo, 29 Sept /1962 7, in file on Memoranda - Miscellaneous Drafts & Rough Notes (Sep - Dec 1962).

32. 10 USC 334n. (1958 ed., Supp. IV, 1959-62), citing FR 9681.

33. 10 USC 332n. (1958 ed., Supp: IV).

34. A cy of memo, McNamara to Sec/A and Sec/AF, sub: Implementation of Executive Order, 30 Sep 1962, is in Abrams' Book, Tab A-3. See, additionally, msg, DA (Vance) to Barnett, sub: Calling Army and Air National Guard Units in Active Federal Military Service, 30/0622Z Sep 1962, w/info cys to CG, Army NG, and CG, Air NG, of Miss., and to others (DA 318075); AWR Journal, 30/0640 Sep 1962; (C) msg, DA (Abrams) to CNGB, 30/0632Z Sep 1962 (DA 919744); msg, CNGB to Barnett, 30/0810Z Sep 1962 (DA 318079); msg, CSAF to MATS, AFCS, and TAG, 30 Sep 1962 (DAIN 790966); msg, idem to idem, 30 Sep 1962 (DAIN 790968), making a correction in DAIN 790966; msg, DA (Vance) to Barnett, 30/2044Z Sep 1962 (DA 318083), amending DA 318075; and svc msg, 12:18, EDT, 30 Sep, re McGowan's msg to Barnett, Chron File, 28 Sep - 1 Oct 1962, Tab 41. See NGB After Action Reports - Mississippi, 17 Dec 1962, Items 6-8, stating that Greenlief called Wilson, TAG, Miss., at 30/0230 Sep 1962, EDT, Clayton at 30/0315, and that the air mail-special delivery letter went out at approximately 30/0510. Note also that according to the same source, the messages to each of the three men - Barnett, Wilson, and Clayton - went for transmission at 30/0440, yet Vance's message to Barnett bears the dispatch date-time group 30/0622Z Sep 1962, i.e., 0222, EDT, as noted.

35. On the strength figures for the Miss. ARNG and ANG, see the papers in the file on Strength & Status of Forces, which were used in planning the Oxford operation. Included are undated machine tabulations, probably as of 31 Aug 1962, showing an aggregate assigned strength of 10,056 for the ANG. The figure of 9,894 used in the text is from /D/A, TAGO? / (C), Reserve Components Program (U) of the Army, Fiscal Year 1963, Annex II, Army National Guard Unit Program, 30 September 1962 /1962? /, p. 7. For the number of National Guardsmen actually called into the Federal service, see Chap IV, below. Also see on the turn-out, /Allan G. Crist? /, "Oxford! The Mississippi National Guard Stands Fast!" The National Guardsman, Nov 1962, p. 4, where Wilson's views on the mobilization are quoted; and DF, AACNGBAR (Greenlief) to CNGB, sub: Strength of Mississippi ARNG, 5 Oct 1962, in file on Strength & Status of Forces.

36. NGB After Action Reports - Mississippi, 17 Dec 1962, Items 1-2.

37. On Clinger, see Coakley, op. cit., pp. 116, 119, 168-72. Wilson's exemption is mentioned in /Crist? /, op. cit., p. 4. On Bush, see "Notes from General Parker," /3 Oct 1962? / in Chron File, 1-4 Oct 1962, Tab 45; and Hqs XVIII Abn Corps SO 235, 3 Oct 1962, par 32, appointing Bush cmdr of all Miss. NG forces with certain stated exceptions (quoted in CG XVIII Abn Corps to CO Armory, Miss. NG, Jackson, Miss., 03/1730Z /Oct 1962 /).

38. On the Clayton case, see msg, DA (Abrams) to Clayton, 30/0633Z Sep 1962 (DA 318077); pers ltr, Clayton to Abrams, 1 Oct 1962, w/incls, in file on Commanding Generals & Other Key Personnel; /memo on telecall? /, Abrams to Hall, 30/1750 Sep /1962 / (in pencil), ibid.; Schlotzhauer memo for the rcd, n.d., ibid.; memo on telecall, Greenlief to Clayton, 30/0315 Sep 1962, ibid.; Schlotzhauer memo for the rcd, 30/1647 Sep 1962, accompanied by cy of msg, DA (Hoskot for CS - Pers, for Gen Wheeler)

to Abrams, Memphis NAS, 30/1647 / Sep 1962 7; Chron File, 28 Sep - 1 Oct 1962, Tab 43; msg, TAG to Clayton, 01/0125Z Oct 1962 (DA 318084); (FOUO) 108th AC Command Report (For Period Ending 23 Oct 1962), 29 Oct 1962, 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab G, p. 1; and NGB After Action Reports - Mississippi, 17 Dec 1962, Items 9-10.

39. Msg, DA (by Abrams) to Miss. ARNG and ANG, 30/0634Z Sep 1962 (DA 318078); George Fielding Eliot, "Salute to the Mississippi National Guard," reprinted in The National Guardsman, Nov 1962, p. 6; The President's televised remarks of 30 Sep 1962 as provided by the White House Press Secretary; /Crist? 7, op. cit., pp. 4, 9; and strength and status report of Oxford forces as of 01/1700 Oct 1962 in file on Strength & Status of Forces. Planning information on possible closing times for Miss. NG units is in Action Officer's Book, Tab Misc.

40. See /Crist? 7, op. cit., pp. 4-5; (C) msg, Parker to Abrams, 30/2103Z Sep 1962, Chron File, 28 Sep - 1 Oct 1962, Tab 46a; Schlotzhauer memo for the rcd, 30/1900 Sep 1962, EDT, ibid., Tab 43a. Robert Kennedy did not make the call until almost six o'clock, after Billingslea's signal officer, L/C Grisard, called Washington to say that the officers were waiting for the call "and that they had other things to do and did we /in the OCSigO 7 have any idea when Mr. Kennedy was going to . . . call." Geoghegan, who had not known about the proposed call, had to remind Kennedy. OCSigO Initial After-Action Report, Entries for 30/1725 and 1755 Sep 1962, Tab A, p. 7.

41. There is some variation in arrival times as given by various sources. The times given here are from 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, p. 3, and 503d MP Bn Command Report, 1 Nov 1962, ibid., Tab H, together with the AWR Journal, 30/0440 and 30/0528 Sep 1962.

42. See msg, DA (by Abrams) to Billingslea, 30/0711Z Sep 1962 (DA 919745), the text at notes 2 and 20, above, and n. 2. DA 919745 regraded UNCLAS by msg, DA 941541, 18/2050Z Oct 1963. See also penciled special instructions for Capt Tansey and msg, with penciled notation, in Chron File, 28 Sep - 1 Oct 1962, Tab 28.

43. See (S) msg, DA (by Abrams) to Billingslea, 30/1322Z Sep 1962 (DA 919745); and the text at n. 21. Conversation with Jung is the source for the account of the hasty dispatch of DA 919746. Portions of this msg later downgraded to FOUO and then to UNCL, the latter action because of inadvertent publication of the FOUO portions (msg, DA 941559, 18/2109Z Oct 1963).

44. Tansey's After-Action Report, n.d., in OCSigO Initial After-Action Report, Tab N; ibid., Tab A, p. 5 (Entry for 29/2200 Sep 1962); Chap II at n. 22, above; and OCSigO Initial After-Action Report, Tab A, p. 6 (Entries for 30/0825, 0835, 1000, and 1100 Sept 1962).

45. Memo, Abrams for Parker, sub: Operation Mississippi, 28 Sep 1962; notation signed "S" (Schlotzhauer?) on penciled memo, 29 Sep /1962 7, in file on Memoranda - Miscellaneous Drafts & Rough Notes (Sep - Dec 1962); AWR Journal, in which see various early entries for 27 Sep and 29/1753 Sep 1962; conversations with Jung, including those of 24-25 Oct 1963; and msg, DA (Wheeler) to CGUSARONE and others, 30/1440Z Sep 1962 (DA 318080), assuming post of CS.

46. 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, pp. 6-7; penciled memo, unsigned, 1705 hours /30 Sep 1962 7 ("will ~~and~~ marshals as well as trps") in file on Memoranda --- Miscellaneous Drafts & Rough Notes (Sep - Dec 1962); and notations following handwritten draft msg, Parker to Billingslea, 01/0240Z /Oct 1962 7, re moving NG, among Parker Notes, ibid., which reads as follows: "Mission: Initially to assemble then if required assist marshals restore & maintain order on campus University. / Recognizes this puts Billingslea under Katzenbach's control but will square this away / . 7"

47. Cy msg, Parker to Abrams, 30/2212 Sep 1962, Chron File, 28 Sep - 1 Oct 1962, Tab 44; and Schlotzhauer memo for the rcd, 29 Sep 1962, in file on Memoranda - General (28 Sep - 1 Oct /1962 7).

48. 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, p. 7.

49. Beginning with (S) No. 10-62 (04/1800-05/0500 Oct 1962) the DA (ODCSOPS) SitReps went on an 1800-0500 and 0500-1800 schedule, which continued until (C) No. 51-62 (as of 26/0800 Oct 1962), which covered 27 hours (25/0500-26/0800). Thereafter they were on a 24-hour basis, 0800-0800, Washington time, until discontinued after No. 107-62, 20/0800-21/0800 Dec 1962. See memo for the rcd (unsigned), 30/0955 Sep 1962, Chron File, 28 Sep - 1 Oct 1962, Tab 30; and the DA (ODCSOPS) SitRep Files, including "General Instructions Situation Reports," and the notations thereon.

50. Schlotzhauer memo for the rcd, 30/1630 Sep /1962 7, Chron File, 28 Sep - 1 Oct 1962, Tab 41a; msg, G-2, 2d Inf Div to AWR, 30/1520 Sep 1962, cy ibid., Tab 39; msg, Parker to Abrams (for Billingslea), 30/2120 Sep 1962, with item from Cushman re Vance's conversation with the Att Gen, cy ibid., Tab 45.

51. (S) Msg, CGUSCONARC/CINCARSTRIKE to RUWFAH/CGUSARMYFOUR, 30/0545Z Sep 1962, amending ATUTR-WR 302048, 28/0820Z Sep 1962 (ATUTR-WR 302062; DAIN 272002); 716th MP Bn After-Action Report -- Operation "Ole Miss," 31 Oct 1962, in 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab J, p. 1; (C) DA SitRep 1-62, as of 30/1100 Sep 1962; (C) Breakdown of Strengths, as of 28/1800 Sep 1962, in file on Strength & Status of Forces; and AWR Journal, entry for 30/1355 Sep 1962.

52. JAGA 1962/5052, 9 Jan 1963, p. 3; and (FOUO) CINFO After-Action Report (8 Sep 1962 - 31 Mar 1963) (Working Copy), p. 3.

CHAPTER IV

THE OXFORD RIOT AND MILITARY INTERVENTION

Rioting and the Decision to Commit Troops. -- The administration of Governor Ross Barnett continued to oppose Meredith's admission to The University of Mississippi despite the Federal injunction of 13 September. Governor Barnett personally barred Meredith's effort to enrol at the University on 20 September, as well as on 25 September when Meredith appeared at the Jackson offices of the University's Board of Trustees. On 26 September Lt. Gov. Paul B. Johnson, with a considerable body of Mississippi law enforcement officers, barred Meredith's way at the Oxford campus, and on the next day, 27 September, Meredith and his escort turned back before reaching the campus, at the direction of U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, because of the menacing situation in Oxford.

Although Generals Abrams and Billingslea, together with some troops, were in Memphis on Sunday, while other troops were on the way, the Army still looked toward Monday, 1 October, as the day on which they might be needed. It was on that day, indeed, that certain Mississippi National Guard units were scheduled to arrive in Oxford. Meanwhile, however, Attorney General Kennedy sought to make arrangements with Governor Barnett for getting Meredith on the Oxford campus without difficulty and, therefore, without needing the Army, which nobody in authority wanted to use. Finally, a decision was made and an agreement reached to escort Meredith onto the campus before President Kennedy made his scheduled national television address, intended especially for the

people of Mississippi, on Sunday evening, 30 September. Exactly when this arrangement was made is not clear, but in any case as late as "approximately" two-thirty Sunday afternoon Attorney General Kennedy told Secretary Vance that "the plan was for the marshals to go it alone today."

About mid-afternoon, Sunday, 30 September, Federal marshals began arriving at the University-Oxford Airport in two groups in chartered aircraft and possibly some in an Air Force plane. Meanwhile, at Maj. Kristoferson's direction, his information officer, Maj. William J. Koch, had taken seven trucks and a sedan from the tent city to pick up the marshals at the Airport, and, he thought, take them to the camp. Four of the seven truck drivers were Negroes. All of the military personnel in this convoy were unarmed and without gas masks. When they arrived at the Airport, they found two or three hundred onlookers and 170 marshals awaiting transportation and also awaiting Katzenbach, who soon arrived from Washington. General Abrams reported from the Naval Air Station at four o'clock, CST (Oxford time), that this first group of marshals and the trucks were at the Airport and that Katzenbach was in charge. Within minutes this information was passed to Secretary Vance and to Generals Wheeler, Parker, and Dodge. After Katzenbach made several telephone calls, presumably to Washington, and conferred with several persons at the Airport, he directed the convoy to take the marshals to the University campus, where they arrived by four-fifteen and began forming about the Lyceum Building. This deployment, it should be explained, was a decoy operation to draw attention from Baxter Hall, the men's residence where

Meredith would live. Katzenbach operated from a "command post" in the Lyceum, where he had a telephone line to the Attorney General's office in Washington and one to the White House, which probably were possible because late Saturday night the Signal Corps had ordered into the test board at Oxford a spare SCAN line and a private line "to be committed on immediate notice."

Movement to the campus was without serious incident other than that a crowd of about four or five hundred persons jeered the convoy "and civilian vehicles darted in and out of the convoy in what appeared to be attempts to confuse military drivers and cause accidents." Upon arrival at the campus Chief Marshal James McShane requested the convoy to return to the Airport and pick up the second group of marshals that was expected momentarily. On this trip Maj. Koch noticed that the crowd at the Airport had thinned and had started moving toward the campus, where he deposited the second group of marshals about five o'clock. A crowd of three or four hundred persons around the Lyceum were "jeering and threatening" the marshals. There were occasional shouts of "Nigger" directed at the four Negro truck drivers, but an Army observer considered this "as merely normal healthy student activity." Some state troopers, who were on the scene, attempted to maintain order, while others "were reluctant to do so and permitted the crowd to get close enough to the military vehicles to . . . touch them or, in the case of the sedan, yell insults through the window." Maj. Koch then left, taking one two-and-one-half-ton truck with him and leaving the other six parked in front of the Lyceum for the marshals. Later the Engineers delivered rations to marshals both at the Airport and on the campus.

Heightening the Government's concern was the report that afternoon that Edwin A. Walker, formerly of the U.S. Army, had registered in Oxford on Saturday night under an assumed name and had been "positively identified." Secretary Vance then authorized General Abrams to have Walker arrested by marshals should his actions make it
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necessary.

Col. Shive, in Operations, recording General Abrams' call shortly before four o'clock Sunday afternoon, Oxford time, about the arrival of marshals on the Oxford campus, gathered that an effort was in the making to "introduce" Meredith on the campus "tonight." This was, of course, essentially the plan decided upon, but clearly without the Army's participation. Meredith arrived at the Millington Naval Air Station in a Border Patrol airplane amid arriving troops. After lunch he flew on to Oxford under instructions to be there by five-fifty, and was lodged safely on the campus in Baxter Hall. General Abrams, who was at the Naval Air Station, later related that he first learned about Meredith's arrival on the campus from one of his staff officers who learned about it from
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a newscast while out getting something to eat.

The crowd on the Oxford campus grew by early evening to 1,000 and then to about 2,000, the maximum number in the opinion of one observer. Many of these, especially as the night waxed, were outsiders. Meanwhile, among those early drawn to the scene was Lt. Col. Whitney D. Stuart, professor of military science at the University. He was accompanied by a young Army intelligence agent, who, unintentionally, was one of the first victims of the marshals' tear gas. Stuart already had become

involved personally in the Oxford troubles by opening his home to a number of Army intelligence agents who had been assigned to Oxford to augment the office maintained there by Region IV of the Intelligence Corps. To the best of his knowledge he was the only Army officer on the scene as the crowd became a mob and the marshals finally resorted to tear gas. As the situation developed, riotous persons shouted obscenities at the marshals, spit at them, and threw bottles and pieces of pipe, brick, and cinder block, which came from a construction site near The Circle on which the Lyceum stood.⁷

The first firing of tear gas by the hard-pressed marshals about the time the President began his television address on the Mississippi situation about eight o'clock, Oxford time, may be taken as marking the beginning of the Oxford riot.⁸ The focus of the attack was the cordon of marshals (later aided by National Guardsmen) about the Lyceum, even though Meredith himself was in Baxter Hall, a men's dormitory some distance away. Perhaps it was because of the irrationality of mob behavior that "only a few rioters attacked Baxter Hall, which was far more vulnerable than the Lyceum,"⁹ "the symbol" of the University.

There were several notable occurrences more or less simultaneously within about an hour from the beginning of President Kennedy's address and the beginning of the riot that indicated the character of the situation. These were the death by gunshot of Paul I. Guihard of Agence France-Presse,¹⁰ for whose body the Army provided a military escort, an appearance at the riot of Edwin A. Walker,¹¹ and the hiding by individual National Guardsmen of a number of extra gas masks requested by the Federal marshals.¹²

By early evening virtually all the street lights about the University campus were either broken or shot out. Later General Billingslea authorized the 223d Engineer Combat Battalion, a National Guard unit, to install floodlights in front of the Lyceum.

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Snipers among the rioters, using shotguns with birdshot and rifles and pistols, operated under cover of darkness and fired at marshals and others. Marshal Graham E. Same of Indianapolis almost died from a shot in his neck, and Karl Fleming, of Newsweek's Atlanta Bureau, had three quick shots fired at him, all missing. A number of persons seem to have suffered from birdshot punctures. Unsolved, as was Guihard's death, was that of Walter Ray Gunter, a twenty-three-year-old jukebox repairman from Abbeville, Mississippi, who died on the way to the hospital around eleven-thirty from a .38 bullet in his forehead. He was apparently shot near the new science building, the source of much of the rioter's ammunition, which was south of University Avenue and some distance from the spot where Guihard had been found. As the gunfire became menacing, marshals crouched behind the Army trucks in front of the Lyceum, but at no time did they return the rioters' fire, except with tear gas.

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Around ten o'clock (at least one observer might put it earlier), the whole character of the mob seemed to change as the outsiders became more and more numerous. By midnight most of the students had returned to their dormitory or other rooms and the outsiders had taken over. Reports reaching Washington around three o'clock Monday morning (about one o'clock Oxford time) of outsiders still on the way to Oxford could not have been reassuring to General Parker of Operations, Chief of Staff Wheeler, Secretary Vance, and others who received them. Included were reports of

the Federal Bureau of Investigation that 100 persons from Selma were due to arrive in Oxford at ten o'clock, that twenty-five persons from Mobile had been reported in Durant, Mississippi, three hours earlier, and that a Mercedes Benz with armed men was on the way to Oxford. In addition, 100 students from Mississippi State were said to have parked outside Oxford and to be walking into town, and there was a "rumor" that 2,000 Mississippi State students had plans to go to Oxford. Later that morning, after Walker's arrest, word came that there were many persons in the Oxford area who did "not look like local people"; indeed, "better than" fifty percent of the persons seen on the streets were estimated to be from out of town. Father Duncan Gray, who was at the riot until after eleven o'clock Sunday night, thought that several of the rioters' cars had two-way radios for the purpose of bringing in reinforcements from the outside.

15

Meanwhile, Katzenbach held off asking for troops as long as possible, but sometime before ten o'clock Sunday evening, Oxford time, he advised Washington that the Army had better be called in. He probably talked with both Attorney General Robert Kennedy and with the President. Then, at nine-fifty, he called Capt. Falkner at the National Guard Armory in Oxford. To Falkner he said "he had just conferred with the President and that Kennedy had ordered [Falkner's] Troop E to the University Campus."

16

Troop E and Its Commitment. -- Capt. Murry C. Falkner commanded Troop E, 2d Reconnaissance Squadron, 108th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Mississippi National Guard. Stationed at the Oxford Armory, Troop E, had a strength of three officers and seventy-one enlisted men.

Capt. Falkner learned officially about four o'clock Sunday morning that the Guard had been called into the Federal service with instructions for the men to report to the Armory not later than five-thirty that same morning with enough clothes for three days. When the men fell in at the Armory at five-thirty there were thirty-three reporting. Instructions now arrived ordering preparations for a motor march and the purchase of food for three meals, which would take the unit through breakfast on 1 October. Falkner and others still believed as they had the evening before upon receiving the news report of their call, that the President had federalized the Guard so he "could know where approximately 12,000 Mississippians were" and to take it from Governor Barnett's control. Capt. Falkner's "supposition was that Troop E would probably be moved to New Albany or Ripley, Miss., taking us completely out of the Oxford area."

The troop raised both the American and Mississippi flags at the Armory, posted a guard to keep reporters away, and loaded equipment and duffle bags. With all vehicles loaded the troop could move out on short notice. By mid-afternoon all but three enlisted men were present and only one of these was unaccounted for. Morale "was no problem." With radio reports coming in of cars headed toward Oxford, Falkner conferred with his executive officer and decided to issue M-1 rifles -- "as far as they would go." But he still did not think his unit would be
17
ordered to the University campus.

Meanwhile, as early as eight-forty, Oxford time, General Billingslea, in the Memphis staging area, received instructions to move a force of 800

to 1,000 National Guardsmen to Oxford to reinforce the marshals. His instructions at that time were at the direction of Secretary Vance upon the request of the Attorney General. Excepting only the small troop in Oxford, these forces would have to come, of course, from some distance. Apparently the only one of the three major units already alerted for movement to Oxford that was ordered there immediately was the 108th Armored Cavalry, to which Oxford's Troop E belonged. Even so, Troop G and a howitzer battery (without its howitzers) did not reach Oxford in time to depart from the Armory for the campus before about twelve o'clock, midnight, 30 September. ¹⁸

As the general situation at the Lyceum worsened, the authorities called for more troops, and at nine-thirty-three, Oxford time, Secretary Vance ordered General Billingslea to initiate movement of Regular Army military police units in numbers he deemed necessary to support the Federal marshals in Oxford. There he was to establish contact with Katzenbach and keep informed concerning his needs. Thirteen minutes later, however, General Billingslea received instructions, issued by the President, to go to Oxford and make a personal evaluation before committing Regular troops, and to report the results directly to the President. Meanwhile, he would "initiate movement of all forces" under his command, "including all of the National Guard, to Oxford or other locations," so that they would "be in position for employment." But events overtook him, and at about five minutes after ten, before he could leave for Oxford, Secretary Vance ordered him to move troops to the campus. These instructions probably were issued by telephone, for at ten-eighteen,

Oxford time, General Parker of Operations confirmed "telephonic instructions already issued you" and authorized Billingslea in an operational immediate message "to take all necessary action with all forces" at his disposal to aid the marshals. He was to report progress of the action, the movement of troops, and the situation as frequently as possible. In order to free him for operations, General Parker would keep in touch with General Abrams, whom Billingslea was to keep "informed as fully as possible."
19

When Katzenbach called Capt. Falkner at nine-fifty to bring Troop E to the campus, he instructed Falkner to use it to surround the Lyceum and then to report to him. Falkner explained that he had only two officers besides himself and only seventy-one enlisted men -- and that the unit "had had only a few hours of riot . . . training." He could have added that he had no tear gas. He told Katzenbach, in reply to a question, that he could leave the Armory in ten minutes and be at the Lyceum "in no less than" fifteen minutes. While his men lined up the troop's little convoy of four jeeps, with radios, and three trucks, Capt. Falkner telephoned his squadron commander because he thought it somewhat irregular to receive a military order through the Deputy Attorney General of the United States. The commander, Lt. Col. J. R. Williams, instructed him to comply. At first Williams authorized ammunition for the troop, but changed his mind and instructed Falkner to leave his ammunition at the Armory.

It was now ten o'clock, Falkner recalled, and Katzenbach telephoned again, wanting to know if the troop were ready to pull out. When Falkner

answered in the affirmative, Katzenbach questioned him further as if to determine whether or not Falkner were positive. After the latter's second affirmative reply Katzenbach wanted to know how many men would accompany Falkner. Falkner told him that he would leave only the cook section behind to guard the Armory, and Katzenbach then instructed Falkner to make sure the enlisted men were loaded aboard their trucks and would follow him to the Lyceum. In his conversation with Falkner, however, Katzenbach did not suggest any route to take from the Armory or tell him what to expect concerning the mob. He did not say that tear gas was heavy about the Lyceum, either, but only to surround the building and report. Leaving the Armory and turning onto University Avenue, Falkner stopped the convoy and, for no reason that he could recollect later, ordered his men to put on their gas masks. Also, fortunately, there had not been time to roll back the tarpaulins on the vehicles, so that the canvas offered the men some protection when they drove into the mob.

Being unadvised as to the route to take, Falkner took the shortest route to the Armory -- straight west through Oxford on University Avenue -- and right into the mob at The Circle. En route he reflected upon the questions Katzenbach had asked him about his men, and for the first time realized that Katzenbach was questioning their loyalty. He knew they were segregationists to a man, but it had never occurred to him that they would not follow him.²⁰

As the convoy passed the high school, persons on both sides of the street yelled and threw small rocks. From the bridge over Hilgard Cut and the Illinois Central tracks at the entrance to the University campus,

where the street was crowded with persons moving onto the campus, Falkner and his men "were constantly yelled at and cursed." His own most graphic and personal account follows:

. . . as we passed the old Geology Building . . . I could see the mob in the Grove and the Lyceum Building. It appeared the Grove was full of people and the street on which we were to drive was a sea of people. The only lights were at the Lyceum and the glow from a burning automobile. As we passed the Geology Building and the Confederate Statue, a 2 x 6 piece of lumber was thrown at my jeep. Fortunately, it missed its target! From here to the Lyceum Bldg. was absolute Hell! People would not move out of the street. They threw bricks, concrete, everything and anything they could find -- including words. I leaned over to my driver and screamed for him to put the jeep in second gear and not to slow down or stop for anything.

While we were approaching the Lyceum, one of the men stuck his head out of the back of the truck he was in and started yelling the famous Ole Miss yell, "Hot Toddy." He didn't get to finish the yell for fear of being "finished" himself by bricks "raining" against the side of the truck and into the back. Another truck had a similar incident. If there had been any doubt as to whether the men would follow me, there was none now. I was indubitably sure I had their support. . . . A person loose in that mob, wearing a uniform, would have been dead. Now we were all concerned with a matter of self-preservation.

As my lead jeep passed the "Y", there were 3 concrete benches spaced across the street. My driver and I saw them at the same time and, fortunately, we dodged them. A brick came through my side of the windshield and glass shattered over us. We straightened out in the street again and I noticed something white coming toward my face from the right of my jeep. [By] reflex action I threw up my left arm to shield my face. . . . [It] broke three bones [in my arm] and cut my wrist. The number 3 jeep in line hit one of the benches, a 2½-ton truck got another, and the trail jeep got the third one. This only provided more Ammo for the mob. All vehicles took a terrific beating from the debris that was thrown. My driver and several other men were hit as we drove on toward the Lyceum.

As we approached the Lyceum, the marshals laid down a volley of tear gas for us to drive through. . . . 21

The next morning, when Capt. Falkner was able to examine his equipment back at the Armory, he found his vehicles more "beat up" than any he had ever seen before. One of the jeeps had six bullet holes in the right side of the windshield, but, fortunately, they had been made after the jeep had been parked. "All vehicles had broken windshields or windows." In his own jeep he found seven bricks and a Molotov cocktail. "There was also a bullet hole in the radiator on the extreme right side about three inches from the top. This had to have happened on the way in," he thought.

Reaching the Lyceum Capt. Falkner had his men fall in with the marshals around the north side of the building. He then reported to Katzenbach inside. It was ten minutes past ten, only twenty minutes since Katzenbach's first call. He explained that he had only sixty-six enlisted men and two officers, little riot training, and no ammunition. Both men agreeing that there were not enough Guardsmen to surround the building, Katzenbach instructed Falkner to have his men fall in with the marshals on the north, east, and south sides of the Lyceum. As Capt. Falkner went back through the Lyceum to the front door he saw several of his men on the floor who had been hurt driving through the mob. After seeing to the agreed-upon disposition of his men and reporting it to Katzenbach, Falkner went to see about his injured men. "Most of the wall space was taken up by hurt men," one of whom had glass in his eye from the shattering of the eyepiece of a gas mask, while another had an elbow swollen to about one and one-half times its normal size.

At Katzenbach's request, Capt. Falkner now took a bull horn and with about a half dozen of his men went before the mob in an effort to reason with it. The bull horn stopped working and the mob rushed them, but they returned safely to the Lyceum under cover of tear gas. Capt. Falkner and another group of volunteers took a second bull horn and tried again, but again they were cursed and stoned and had to retreat under a cover of gas. By now one of his officers, Lt. Metts, had been stoned in the chest. From the marshals' conversation Falkner learned that they had had only a ten-minute supply of tear gas left when Troop E arrived and that now, about eleven o'clock, even after replenishment, their supply was again low. In response to a request, Capt. Falkner dispatched his only uninjured officer to the University-Oxford Airport with his three trucks to pick up General Billingslea and his staff who were expected soon.

About this time Capt. Falkner "heard the sound of trucks coming toward us," as he put it, adding: "My first thought was that some of these people had broken into the Armory, overcome the security guards . . . taken the two M41A1 tanks, and were now using them against us." Actually, the sound was only that of a bulldozer driven by a rioter who got himself dragged off by the marshals. Now came a fire truck, which had made an earlier appearance in an effort to hose the marshals. On its third pass two marshals shot its tires and grabbed the driver. It was not until after these occurrences, apparently, that Falkner got any medical attention. Meanwhile an ambulance had managed to get to the back of the Lyceum, where Mississippi Highway Patrolmen were also taking away the injured.

Closing of Other Units of the 108th Armored Cavalry. -- Only about five minutes after he received orders at eight-forty, Oxford time, Sunday evening, to move 800 or 1,000 National Guardsmen to Oxford, General Billingslea ordered Troop E's parent unit, the 108th Armored Cavalry Regiment, which was then on a one-hour alert, to move immediately to Oxford. With its headquarters in Tupelo, the 108th was the closest to Oxford of the three major units originally instructed to be in Oxford on Monday morning, although, as in the cases of the two battle groups of the 155th Infantry Regiment, its subordinate units were in various places, one troop, of course, being in Oxford itself.

Col. James G. Martin, the 108th's commander, left Tupelo, about fifty miles from Oxford, with his regimental headquarters, about nine-twenty Sunday evening, Oxford time, and reached the Oxford Armory about ten-thirty. There he found Howitzer Battery and Troop G of the 108th's 2d Reconnaissance Squadron, which had arrived just ahead of him. For the first time, he learned by a telephone call from General Billingslea's chief of staff at the Millington Naval Air Station that Troop E had been committed not long before and that he should seek instructions from Katzenbach. Katzenbach, whom he telephoned immediately, ordered Martin, "in the name of the President . . . to commit whatever force he had . . . immediately . . . to relieve pressure . . . on the Lyceum." Martin thereupon committed Howitzer Battery and Troop G of the 2d Squadron, but lining up and instructing the men apparently made it impossible for them to depart from the Armory for the campus until about midnight, which was about the time General Billingslea arrived at the Airport from Tennessee.

Meanwhile, at eleven-twenty-eight, General Abrams, in Tennessee, reported to Washington that there were three troops of the 108th in Oxford, but that only one [Troop E] had been committed on the campus. Four minutes later General Parker replied that the President wanted the other two troops moved onto the campus as soon as possible.

23

The regimental S-3, Maj. Warwick B. Beane, was to establish liaison with Katzenbach and therefore accompanied the battery and Troop G as they moved, about 95 strong, to the campus. The men carried ammunition in their pockets, with orders to load only upon an officer's command, and scabbarded bayonets on their rifles. Beane led this force up University Avenue to the same kind of a reception at The Circle that Troop E had received. There the mob smashed the windshield of Beane's jeep and knocked Troop G's Capt. Hassel Franklin out of action with a bleeding mouth and a smashed finger. Beane and his men reached the Lyceum about twelve-twenty-five, where Falkner saw him a short time later, and there stationed his troopers on the north side and at the rear of the Lyceum. Soon the mob managed to set one truck tarpaulin on fire and put a bullet in the radiator of another truck.

24

At about this time, with the hour approaching one o'clock in the morning, Capt. Falkner found that the shooting was dangerous. "During one good volley of shots into the front" of the Lyceum, he observed that several of his men knocked down marshals "as they hit the dirt." Another group of three or four Guardsmen from his troop "got behind the columns of the building and decided to take a 'smoke break,'" and "discovered they couldn't get near the front door" because of marshals "clamoring to

get in," everyone apparently having "the same idea at the same time." As time went by firing came "from all directions." Several of Falkner's men were hit by spent bullets falling to the ground after striking the columns of the Lyceum.

Meanwhile, just after midnight, as the Howitzer Battery and Troop G were on their way to the campus, Col. Martin, the regimental commander, reconnoitered the campus and found there "an uncontrollable, vicious mob . . . engaged in throwing brick-bats . . . bottles, and other various and sundry objects at anyone suspected . . . of being there for the purpose of restoring law and order." Martin stopped at the Alumni Building "where 20 to 25 Mississippi Highway Patrol vehicles were parked," only to be greeted by patrolmen and others "with a most antagonistic attitude." In the absence of tear gas or knowledge that tear gas was available to his regiment, Martin concluded "that it would be impossible to disperse this mob with anything less than firepower." General Abrams reported that Martin believed the gas angered the mob, that the Highway Patrol was not helping to establish order, but that additional forces would bring on more injuries. At more or less the same time Capt. Falkner "talked with a local law enforcement officer who had just walked through the mob trying to recognize someone," but "hadn't known a soul!"

Headquarters, Headquarters Troop, and Troop F of the 108th's 2d Reconnaissance Squadron arrived at the Armory, with the squadron commander, about ten minutes of one, Oxford time, and at approximately one-thirty the 3d Reconnaissance Squadron arrived without its Troop M. By this time tear

gas (CN) had been obtained by the regimental S-4 from the dump at the University-Oxford Airport, which presumably contained gas brought in by the marshals. Six cases of this gas were distributed to the 3d Squadron.

When the 1st Reconnaissance Squadron arrived in Oxford, without its Troop D, about two o'clock (about the time General Billingslea and the first Regular Army troops reached the Lyceum), the responsible regimental officers devised a plan and issued orders for deployment on the campus. Having no maps of the University campus, bits and pieces of information from Guardsmen who had some familiarity with the campus went into the rough sketch on a blackboard, which they used as their operational plan. By this plan the 1st and 3d Squadrons would clear the campus of the mob, while part of the 2d Squadron would remain in reserve. The plan was for the 1st Squadron to move directly west on University Avenue, while the 3d Squadron would circle to the north side of the campus and come in from that direction onto The Circle on which the Lyceum sat. The two squadrons reached the Lyceum about three-five, ²⁶ a little more than an hour following the arrival there of the first troops of the Regular Army -- Company A of the 503d Military Police Battalion, the first element of Task Force Alfa.

Commitment of Company A of Task Force Alfa. President Kennedy's television address sent a feeling of relief throughout Task Force Alfa, which at nine o'clock received orders to release its entire load of tear gas (CN) for airlifting to the marshals in Oxford. In another hour, however, it had to reclaim this gas when orders arrived to prepare for

movement to Mississippi. This would have been around ten-eighteen, Oxford time, when General Parker confirmed telephonic instructions to General Billingslea to use all his forces to aid the marshals. General Billingslea at this late hour asked General Abrams if his troops might take rifles instead of night sticks, apparently wanting to be certain of his authority to use them despite the wording of the instructions he had received Sunday morning. Upon Billingslea's assurance that changing to rifles would cause no delay, they were authorized. Soon there would arise the question of why the troops did not move faster, and, apparently, this last-minute change of weapons would be suggested as a reason.

28

The Billingslea party, with two light radio-equipped trucks, left the Memphis staging area at eleven-fifteen, local time, when, by one account, the first troop helicopter took off for Oxford, although there is not complete agreement on this point. General Billingslea traveled by Caribou aircraft and arrived at the University-Oxford Airport approximately with the first of the troops. Immediately upon arriving he telephoned Katzenbach, who told him the situation at the Lyceum was critical.

29

In General Billingslea's party was Lt. Col. L. Gordon Hill, Jr., of the OCINFO in Washington, who had gone to Memphis with Abrams. Now he accompanied Billingslea as the latter's principal information officer. Arriving at the airport, Hill placed a collect telephone call to the Army War Room in the Pentagon from a public telephone booth. He had to do this because security considerations had made it impossible for the Signal Corps to preposition signal equipment in Oxford. Compounding this difficulty was the additional one that General Billingslea's signal officer,

Lt. Col. Gus H. Grisard, was unable to accompany Billingslea to Oxford. As a matter of fact, Washington was completely out of touch with General Billingslea for a time, and it was into this communication gap that Col. Hill stepped with the pay telephone. For five and one-half hours, until Airport personnel expelled him about seven o'clock Monday morning, Hill kept this line open and, with the help of Maj. Koch, relayed information to Washington. They received intelligence from the campus, monitored "various Federal and State Police radio nets," and then passed the information to the War Room.³⁰

Evidently the Army could have used more radios such as the marshals used, since Billingslea, for some reason, had to leave his light radio-equipped truck at the Airport when he moved onto the campus. In its stead he used commercial telephone lines and radios in the border patrol cars of some of the deputy marshals, "but small portable FM radios would have assisted greatly."³¹

General Billingslea's instructions were for Company A of the 503d, that is, Task Force Alfa, to be airlifted by helicopter to Oxford. The remainder of the battalion would travel by road. For airlifting Company A, the task force had nineteen H-34 Hercules helicopters.³²

Company A's orders, issued shortly after ten o'clock, were to assemble on the airstrip at the Naval Station where the men would board the helicopters for Oxford. Upon assembly, the members of the Company received individual issues of M-1, carbine, and .45 ammunition, and the unit about ten cases of M25A1 tear gas grenades, which were nailed and tightly banded shut. The unit also received and took to Oxford sixteen shotguns and 500 shells to go with them. Capt. Villella, the Company commander, gave instructions

for uncrating the gas while in flight. Because of the necessity for haste, personnel boarded the helicopters at random, that is, apparently without regard for chocks. The men carried STRAC packs, weapons, and ammunition.

33

The first helicopter, whose passengers included Lt. Col. Flanagan, the Battalion commander, Capt. Villella, and several enlisted men, took off before midnight, Oxford time. Although Alfa sources put the time of departure at around eleven, the President complained, probably to Secretary Vance, at eleven-forty-five, Oxford time, that they (presumably the military policemen) "still haven't taken off," to which the Secretary replied that the helicopter (helicopters?) would take off momentarily. At twelve-forty-one, Oxford time, Lt. Cmdr. Corey of the Navy reported the "1st helicopter off at 1149 local," that is, eleven-forty-nine, Oxford time.

At the same time General Abrams revealed that there was no communication with the airstrip at Oxford (the University-Oxford Airport) and that Robert Kennedy wanted to know why the delay in the movement of the military policemen. The Attorney General also believed another 1,500 troops should be moved, and General Abrams, as he had promised to do, was now notifying the Department of the Army. Over a week later General Wheeler would tell Abrams that he had talked to the President the day before, and that the President

still is back on the night of 30 September - 1 October -- he insists that he was told three times that Billingslea and company were moving and that this was not the case; so I don't know how we are going to get him off that pitch. He said something about my coming over on Monday and sitting down with Bobby and himself and going over all these things. 34

In the first helicopter that was airborne on its way to Oxford, Capt. Villella learned from his superior, Col. Flanagan, that their objective was the Lyceum on the Oxford campus, where they were to assist the marshals. An H-13 reconnaissance helicopter, that had gone ahead to determine whether or not it was safe to land near the Lyceum, radioed that the area was insecure and that the Company should land at the University-Oxford Airport. There, according to the 503d's command report, the first helicopter put down at twelve-thirty Monday morning, Oxford-time, the flight having taken about an hour. The others landed at two-minute intervals, and by one-ten all had arrived and had been unloaded, if the command reports are accurate.

35

Assembly of the Company's personnel as they arrived -- approximately 119 men, with the battalion commander, the battalion S-2, three company officers, a medical officer, and a chemical officer -- was difficult in the darkness and amid the roar of the arriving and departing helicopters and other aircraft. Amid the hurly-burly, General Billingslea shouted "urgently and desperately" "for expeditious assemblage and immediate movement." Upon assembly, Lt. Donnie Bowman, a young Texan, received command of the riot platoon, to which a shotgun squad of twelve men was attached. Bayonets were ordered fixed on all rifles. Lt. Migliore commanded the other platoon and headquarters personnel, and seven men were designated to remain at the Airport with baggage and gas grenades. According to Capt. Villella, his company completed this two-platoon formation shortly after one-forty, Oxford time, although according to General Billingslea's command report the convoy, with the general accompanying it, actually reached the campus entrance at one-thirty-five.

36

The trucks that Capt. Falkner had dispatched to the Airport under Lt. Crowe were not used for the journey to the campus; instead the men were loaded into four Navy buses. Using a map of the campus under headlights, Col. Flanagan explained to General Billingslea how it was planned to approach the Lyceum. Billingslea, with some staff officers, traveled with the buses in a Border Patrol car. The journey from the Airport to the campus was an unnerving experience, or so Capt. Vilella found it, with natural anxieties sharpened in the lead bus by the blaring of a radio whose announcer described the violence of the mob and the plight of the marshals at the Lyceum, which was now not far away. In this atmosphere, Capt. Vilella ordered rifles locked and loaded. Suddenly there was a shot, immediately suggesting an ambush in the dark. When it was determined that no one had been injured and that the shot was an accidental one from within the bus, there was considerable relief. What had happened was that a soldier, loading his M-1 rifle in the darkness, had fired it through the roof of the bus.

37

The tactical plan, which had been made en route to Oxford after the decision to land at the Airport instead of on the campus, and which had been explained to General Billingslea, would permit an approach to the Lyceum from its rear and thus obviate the necessity of having to march through the worst of the mob. It would take the Company to the Lyceum from Highway 6, on which they would come in from the road to the Airport, by way of Rebel Drive, Dormitory Row, and Union Loop. This would permit the Company to send one platoon in wedge formation around the north side of the Lyceum to the latter's front by way of Union Loop, while the other platoon, in the same formation, would pass behind the Lyceum on Library Place

and come around the south side of the Lyceum to its front by way of the southern arm of Union Loop. This was a good tactical plan, but it was not carried out because the buses, for reasons that are not clear, took the convoy to the Sorority Row entrance to the campus instead of to the Rebel Drive entrance.

38

Capt. Villella assumed that the bus drivers were Federal marshals, while General Billingslea's command report stated that a carload of marshals, "who knew the route," led the buses to the Sorority Row entrance. The 503d's command report had a different explanation, however, declaring that the buses were directed to this entrance "by the Mississippi Highway Patrol whose motives appeared questionable" inasmuch as Sorority Row "was more heavily barricaded." Not only, as it turned out, was the route itself a dangerous one, but there were state policemen and others at the Sorority Row entrance who harrassed the soldiers as they alighted from their buses for the march the rest of the way to their objective. The Company's Negro soldiers had lights flashed in their faces and offensive remarks made to them, while the Company as a whole was the target of remarks concerning the marshals' treatment of students and the inhumanity of bayonets.

39

Thus did General Billingslea and the first Regular troops reach the edge of the campus at the Sorority Row entrance. The 503d's command report put this arrival at one-thirty (and their arrival at the Lyceum at about two o'clock), whereas General Billingslea's command report placed it at one-thirty-five.

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This was about three and one-half hours from the time of Billingslea's telephonic instructions in the staging area

to move troops to the campus, or about three and one-quarter hours from General Parker's confirmation of those orders at ten-eighteen, Oxford time. To take another base time, it was almost exactly four hours from General Billingslea's nine-thirty-three instructions to initiate movement of troops to Oxford, which had been followed at nine-forty-six with instructions to go to Oxford, make a personal evaluation, and report to the President before committing Regular troops -- instructions rescinded by telephone about ten-five and by message at ten-eighteen.

Four days later, in discussing the matter with General Abrams, Chief of Staff Wheeler was not sure which hour the reaction time should be calculated from, but he thought twelve-eighteen (ten-eighteen, Oxford time) was the correct one, since that was the time at which General Billingslea received "firm instructions." Recalling that the troops were on a one-hour alert, he thought it had taken them an hour to get ready, fifty minutes to fly to Oxford, thirty minutes to close the helicopters, fifteen to twenty minutes to get the troops loaded, and twenty-five minutes to get them to the scene of the riot -- about three hours altogether, "or about 20 minutes behind the postulated schedule," which was close to the approximately three and one-quarter hours calculated from the ten-eighteen confirmation of orders by General Parker to the arrival of Company A at the Sorority Row entrance to the campus, at which point they were still about a half hour from their final objective. General Wheeler seemed to be satisfied with his recollection of events, saying that one had to take into consideration such factors as

starting the troops "50 miles away [it was actually more than this] from a standing start in the dark," loading them, and moving them "to an unknown area." General Wheeler did not think "that the time needed to switch from night sticks to rifles" could have caused "more than a few minutes delay." General Abrams agreed and added that he would have to say "honestly" that he "never knew the time we were ordered to commit troops because I never checked the time. There were so many things happening . . . I had no reference point and neither did anyone else there."

As the men alighted from each bus they were ordered into formation immediately. Lt. Bowman and Staff Sgt. Richey of the riot platoon formed two squads in wedge formation, with Pvt. First Class Pennington as point man, with two squads in lateral support followed by the shotgun squad formed laterally to cover the left and right flanks. The other platoon, which included the company headquarters personnel, immediately followed the riot platoon in column formation. Capt. Villella, the Company commander, was in the center. Also in the formation were General Billingslea, in the Border Patrol sedan, Col. Flanagan, and several other, presumably battalion, officers, as well as Crowe, the lieutenant from Capt. Falkner's troop, who served as a guide.

The order was to mask and proceed quickly. With bayonets fixed, the troops marched to cadence. The air was chill and, at first, still. The route lay in darkness through a gulley and then up a steep curving hill past various sorority houses to the Chancellor's residence. It was seven-tenths of a mile from Highway 6 to the Lyceum by way of Sorority Row, Grove Loop, and the University Circle. On the right, at the crest

of the hill, stood "a small group of silent spectators," their silence creating a false sense of security as the Company marched past, although now distant shouts and other noises could be heard.

Soon the Company was passing the Chancellor's residence on its right and bearing right onto Grove Loop. With the wooded Grove on its left, the Company now bore down upon the YMCA Building, which stood in The Grove where Grove Loop entered University Circle. There elements of the mob surging about The Grove and The Circle waylaid the troops and rained upon them a shower of Molotov cocktails, bricks, and rocks of all sizes. Many men were hit as were the sides and top of General Billingslea's car. The commander, unmasked, urged his men to "take it" and not to break formation. Pvt. Pennington, the point man, felt the slap of his sergeant's hand on his buttocks urging him not to falter, for, indeed, if the men had not kept on their way in riot formation they might well have been either overcome or forced to use firearms. Col. Flanagan later told a reporter that if any of his men had been burned by Molotov cocktails he might have commanded use of shotguns, which carried light shot. The reporter quoted him as saying that "the men were wearing so many straps that they couldn't have gotten out of their clothes if they had been set afire."

Company A both kept its feet and its forward motion and surprisingly emerged from this ambush without serious injury. Bearing right onto University Circle, the Lyceum lay just ahead. There the weary marshals, in their gas masks, "stood with a warm welcome, unrestrained applause . . . muffled cheers, and . . . waving arms."

The Company quickly deployed along the roadway in front of the Lyceum with the immobilized fire truck and bulldozer to its right. It required every man to fill this line. It was now about two o'clock, Oxford time, or four o'clock in Washington. In about fifteen minutes, or about four hours from his final orders at ten-eighteen to relieve the marshals, General Billingslea and Col. Flanagan conferred with Katzenbach inside the Lyceum.

Capt. Vilella's small force cleared the immediate front of the Lyceum and found it necessary to use tear gas against the mob, which attacked with Molotov cocktails and rocks. The rifles and bayonets of the Company's skirmish line protected the grenade throwers, but the soldiers fired no shots. When Capt. Vilella reported inside the Lyceum about three o'clock, he found many exhausted marshals and Mississippi National Guardsmen. He received instructions to send a squad of twenty-four men from his small force to assist the marshals guarding Baxter Hall, where Meredith was. He was also to detail two or three squads to secure the campus power plant, but before this latter mission could be carried out it was handed to National Guard troops. Lt. Bowman and Sgt. Richey with twenty-three enlisted men, and with a marshal to guide them, moved to Baxter Hall, which they encircled and secured by about three-fifteen, without meeting any "significant resistance."

Clearing the Campus. -- The 1st Reconnaissance Squadron, 108th Armored Cavalry, ran the same gauntlet that Troop E and other units of the 2d Squadron had run, on the way to the campus. One missile struck the squadron commander, Lt. Col. Guy J. Gravlee, Jr., in his mid-section

and mashed two packs of cigarets tucked into his fatigues. His driver crashed his jeep through a crude timber-and-concrete roadblock, knocking debris in every direction. Missiles thrown by the mob knocked out vehicular radio power packs and one Molotov cocktail fired a tarpaulin on one of the trucks. To reach the Lyceum, the convoy had to turn onto the grass in order to bypass the flaming wreckage of three automobiles. At the Lyceum fifteen marshals covered their unloading from the trucks.

Meanwhile, the 3d Squadron moved in, dismounted, from the northern edge of the campus, and with unsheathed bayonets moved to The Circle in columns of sixes. It came out in front of the line of military policemen and marshals and took its share of whatever was thrown, but it made effective use of tear gas. One officer's helmet was creased apparently by a piece of pipe, while another man was felled by pipe. The 3d Squadron reached the Lyceum only minutes before the 1st Squadron arrived in its trucks. The time was three o'clock, or a little after, and it was after this, as the hour advanced toward daybreak, that the troops, now in adequate strength, moved the mob away from the Lyceum and off the campus.

The skirmish line that moved against the rioters, who now tended to drift about, included about 200 marshals, who joined the line voluntarily, and about 400 soldiers, including Company A of Task Force Alfa, what was left of Capt. Falkner's Troop E, and the 1st and 3d Squadrons, 108th Armored Cavalry. Falkner, who had returned to the Armory after having his arm dressed, and who did not participate in the mopping up on the campus, tried unsuccessfully to get Troop E relieved. Thus, the remnant of this troop was in the line, although as a part of the 2d

Squadron, the reserve force, it was not supposed to be. The principal responsibility, however, was that of the 1st and 3d Squadrons, the former to clear the northern side of the campus and the latter the eastern by pressing the rioters down University Avenue across the bridge over Hilgard's Cut.

Company A moved only as far as the bridge over Hilgard's Cut, apprehending several rioters and returning them to the Lyceum, and leaving the main burden of the work to the Guardsmen. One of Troop E's men picked up a brick thrown at the troops -- the first ammunition he had had all night. He was about to fire it back, when ordered not to. At several points during the retreat of the rioters the latter stopped in an effort to talk. The high school was one such point. Several times during the action enlisted men of Troop E broke formation, raced toward the mob, and had to be ordered back. On orders the troops moving eastward stopped at the corner of University Avenue and South Fifth Street. Thus released, this part of the mob moved to the corner of South Lamar Boulevard and University Avenue, which was also the intersection of Highways 6 and 7. There it made a nuisance of itself until dispersed later in the morning.

At least part of the mob that was swept off the campus to the north by the 1st Reconnaissance Squadron went right through a faculty yard on the northern side of Faculty Circle, in the northeastern section of the campus. With soldiers in jeeps behind them, the rioters retired from the yard up to the next street and across the highway.

At approximately six o'clock, Company A moved in column to Baxter Hall, where Meredith had spent the night, and established a bivouac in the adjacent Intramural Field. Capt. Villella noted that "about the Lyceum was a mass of . . . rocks, bricks, broken Coke bottles, glass, tear gas . . . containers, broken windshield glass . . . several civilian vehicles with all the glass broken" and with great dents "in the sides and . . . hoods," and "at least" five wrecked and overturned vehicles. Similarly, the way to Baxter Hall was also strewn with glass, bottles, rocks, and "numerous . . . concrete benches."

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The Land Tail of Task Force Alfa. -- Because Company A of the 503d Military Police Battalion, or Task Force Alfa, traveled to Oxford by helicopter, its vehicles had to go by land. In the land convoy were Companies B and C of the 503d under the command of Maj. Raymond E. LeVan, the battalion's executive officer, whose superior, Col. Flanagan, had gone with Company A. Altogether there were 161 jeeps and trucks in the convoy, including those belonging to Company A. Because of the urgency of the situation, there was no time to plan this movement.

The column cleared the Millington Naval Air Station at eleven-forty, local time, Sunday night, and left Memphis by way of a circumferential road to which a Navy shore patrol guided it. It received its only information concerning the situation in Oxford from transistor radios belonging to some of the men. As the situation seemed to grow worse, the column speeded up dangerously until it sometimes traveled at forty-five miles an hour. According to the official command report, "the convoy was neither assisted nor delayed by" Mississippi state troopers, but, in

LeVan's opinion, "to say that the State Police gave no trouble would be 'eyewash' and untrue." About twenty-six miles from Oxford, the convoy passed two state police monitoring vehicles, and about eight or ten miles from Oxford there was a roadblock by what appeared to be twenty or twenty-five scout cars. Maj. LeVan advised the officer in charge that this was a Federal troop convoy and demanded that the road be opened and that the convoy be allowed to pass unmolested. LeVan also requested the officer to clear the convoy through any other roadblocks that might lie ahead. Apparently the officer complied, because there was no interference with the convoy at two additional roadblocks it passed, although it heard such remarks as "God Damm Yankees" and "Nigger Lovers" as it sped by.

As the convoy approached Oxford on Highway 6, "things did not appear to be just right" at the Illinois Central's overpass just ahead. Apparently to see better, Maj. LeVan stood up in his jeep as they passed under the bridge. As he did so, "about five persons," as it appeared to him, dropped a railroad tie, which missed him and smashed the back of his jeep. An open jeep in the convoy was overturned when a truck was rolled on top of it, according to an official report, while Capt. Villella heard that a scrap automobile housing was dropped onto it. The convoy continued, however, and a local policeman at a filling station directed Col. LeVan and his command to the Armory. LeVan noticed that the mood of the people at the filling station "was not too good," and that "the majority" of them appeared to be outlanders -- "trouble makers" of the so-called Red Neck class -- but he exchanged no words with them.

At the Armory, from which he reported to General Billingslea's headquarters around four or four-thirty (the reported time varies with the source used), Maj. LeVan received directions, especially from Capt. Vilella, for reaching the campus by a roundabout way, but when some of his Negro Military policemen were spotted among the rear elements of the column while circling the town "objects of all types" were thrown and some of the men were injured. LeVan thereupon took the convoy to the town square, procured some town maps from the National Guard, and sent eight combat jeeps to reconnoiter "two lateral roads" to the campus. Rioters smashed all eight windshields before this party returned, which prompted LeVan to bring ten combat vehicles forward and arm their riders with shotguns in plain view of everybody in the square. His orders were, however, that the shotguns were not to be used unless life was endangered. He also ordered his men to mask "to protect them from flying objects," and started the convoy to the campus by way of University Boulevard after deciding that the other routes were too narrow and easily ambushed.

The rear of the convoy was composed of Company A's vehicles driven by men of Company C. Upon its being attacked, Maj. LeVan diverted it to the Airport and took the rest of his force to the campus, which he must have reached not long after it had been cleared of the rioters. There he found "many State and Campus Policemen at the main entrances," but they were not taking sides. He immediately made a reconnaissance of the entrances and set up roadblocks for purposes "of identification and looking for contraband material, particularly firearms."

During the first twelve hours of operations, Task Force Alfa had 124 windshields shattered and suffered considerable other damage to its vehicles. Besides that, its enlisted personnel sustained ⁴⁴ "many injuries."

Arrival of Other Task Forces and National Guard Troops. -- The 716th Military Police Battalion (Task Force Charlie), with its attachments, had completed its arrival at the Millington Naval Air Station by midday Sunday. There it learned that evening that it would support Task Force Alfa at Oxford and perform whatever other tasks might be assigned to it. Its movement orders were for travel to Oxford by road. After packing up, and clearing the base gymnasium in the wake of Alfa, it crossed the initial point at the Air Station at twelve-thirty Monday morning, local time. A Navy truck guided the convoy through Memphis and a motorcycle escort of Tennessee state troopers took it to the state line, where Pvt. Charles Vanderburgh, an eyewitness, reported a large sign reading "'Welcome to Mississippi -- Land of Beautiful Women.' What a ride that was!" he added. "Flat out all the way. Pitch black. Not a sign of life. As if we had fallen into a pit."

Task Force Charlie arrived at a point about three miles north of Oxford on Highway 7, the road from Holly Springs, at three-thirty Monday morning. From there a reconnaissance party went ahead to secure information and to establish contact with Billingslea's headquarters. According to Charlie's command report, the party got in touch with General Billingslea at the Airport, but it must have been by telephone from the Airport since Billingslea must have been still at the Lyceum. Instructions were for

Charlie to commit a platoon in support of troops at the Lyceum; disperse crowds at the Fraternity Row, Rebel Drive, Sorority Row, and Faculty Row entrances to the campus from Highway 6; and establish roadblocks when these entrances were secured. The reconnaissance party returned to the main body at four-thirty-five, whereupon Charlie moved to the intersection of Highways 6 and 314, which put it between the Rebel Drive and Sorority Row entrances from which place it could easily perform its assigned mission. One platoon went to support the troops at the Lyceum and one company to sweep the northwest section of the campus.

45

Task Force Bravo, built around Keller's 2d Battle Group, 23d Infantry Regiment, which had been scheduled to leave Fort Benning for the Memphis staging area shortly before midnight Saturday, Washington time, did not get away from Benning until about one o'clock Sunday morning. It traveled by motor convoy and expected to close at the Naval Air Station before midnight Sunday, local time, avoiding Mississippi en route. In a progress report from Anniston, Alabama, after several hours on the way, Bravo reported that its drivers were getting sleepy. From Anniston it continued to the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville for fuel and rest. By eight-thirty Sunday evening, Oxford time, with the riot under way, lead elements of Bravo were at Waynesboro, Tennessee. Then, just after eleven-thirty, at Selmar, short of Bolivar, Tennessee, Bravo received word of its diversion.

The new instructions, received during a periodic report to Third Army headquarters, which Bravo tried to make every two hours, were to proceed directly to Oxford through Bolivar, Tennessee, and Holly Springs, reaching Oxford on Highway 7. Bravo's operational control now passed to General Billingslea. A telephone conversation with the Chief of Staff, 2d Infantry Division, at Fort Benning, revealed conditions in Oxford and instructions to Bravo's commander to report to Billingslea at the Lyceum. Unit commanders now received aerial photographs of Oxford and of the University and oral instructions went to all elements, including those not yet joined, to proceed to Oxford under the new orders. The men were issued armored vests, which proved to be very useful against bottles, rocks, and bricks the next morning. Rerouted, the advance party arrived

at Oxford about three-thirty Monday morning, Oxford time, but it was later before the various other elements could close. Meanwhile, before Bravo's arrival, radioed instructions informed the task force that it was not to enter the city until its commander could be instructed in person. Bravo arrived in time to assist in bringing order to Oxford by daylight.⁴⁶

Of the National Guard units ordered to Oxford the two battle groups of the 155th Infantry Regiment (31st Infantry, or Dixie, Division) were the last to close there. Col. Robert L. Gray, commander of the 2d Battle Group, had been instructed at General Billingslea's commanders' conference to have his unit close near Oxford by ten o'clock Monday morning. Accordingly, a member of his staff telephoned the necessary instructions from Millington to the battle group's headquarters in Amory, Mississippi, and the assembly area near Oxford was reconnoitered before dark. Orders were to load equipment and for all subordinate units to be on alert for movement. Then, at eight-thirty Sunday evening, with the riot in progress, the battle group went under a one-hour alert and at eleven-thirty, Oxford time it received orders to move immediately to the vicinity of Oxford. At four-thirty Monday morning, Gray's headquarters reported from the Oxford Armory that the battle group would be ready to move onto the campus at five-thirty, an hour later. Its first mission was to secure the area around the campus power plant, but just as this mission was about to be accomplished the battle group received orders to halt in place until further orders.⁴⁷

The 1st Battle Group, 155th Infantry, which, like the 2d, had been notified of its call into Federal service at three-thirty Sunday morning, had alerted its subordinate units in less than an hour. The latter issued and loaded equipment on vehicles for possible movement. The battle group drafted an operations plan for movement to a tentative assembly area and for initial employment in the objective area. At five o'clock Sunday afternoon subordinate units reported their readiness to move upon orders, but they received no such orders until ten-fifty-five that night, when they were ordered to move immediately to an assembly area west of Oxford. Thereupon battle group headquarters issued orders to the subordinate units to assemble at Brookhaven, Mississippi, for motor movement to Oxford. Because of the distance involved the battle group did not close at its bivouac area twelve miles west of Oxford until ten o'clock Monday morning, Oxford time, after the crisis was over. This was the closing time originally scheduled.

Upon arrival unit commanders received a briefing on the current situation and made a reconnaissance tour of the Oxford area. The 690 officers and enlisted men of the battle group organized themselves into two subordinate task forces and stood on a thirty-minute alert. There was, however, little for them to do, although following a report that "a great number of armed civilians were located in the Batesville area," one of these two small task forces set up check points near the junction of Highways 6 and 315, towards Batesville, to prevent such persons from reaching Oxford. It maintained these without incident until early the next

day. Additionally, this unit also served as a reserve force to support, as necessary, Task Force Campus or Task Force City, which will be described later. 48

Task Force Echo, built around the 720th Military Police Battalion at Fort Hood, Texas, did not leave Fort Hood until four o'clock Sunday afternoon, Oxford time, for James Connally Air Force Base, Waco, Texas, from which it flew in fifty C-130 aircraft to the Millington Naval Air Station. The lead vehicle of the convoy reached Connally just after six o'clock Sunday evening, but the first plane did not depart for Millington until two-fifteen the following morning, Oxford time, and the last plane until seven-forty. The task force carried a basic load of ball ammunition and chemical munitions. Two hundred and twenty M1 rifles replaced carbines and .45 caliber machine guns. Nine two and one-half ton trucks and nine one-half ton trailers made the unit completely mobile.

At the Naval Air Station command and control of Echo passed to General Billingslea. From the Air Station the task force dispatched five forty-man platoons to Oxford by helicopter. The first of these platoons "was on the ground and operative" about eight o'clock Monday morning, Oxford time, and the fifth about nine-twenty-five. The remainder of the task forces motor marched to Oxford and arrived at the bivouac area at three o'clock Monday afternoon. Upon their arrival at Oxford the airlifted platoons manned roadblocks at critical points on main roads entering the city. Subsequently the unit also conducted patrols and searches and performed other functions. Altogether it confiscated 104

weapons of various kinds and apprehended forty-seven persons, turning both weapons and prisoners over to the marshals.⁴⁹

The last of the five task forces planned before the riot, Task Force Delta, built around the 2d Battle Group, 1st Infantry Regiment, with station at Fort Benning, Georgia, left its home station early Monday morning under orders to travel overland. Apparently the intention was for it to go to Oxford, where it was expected to arrive at nine o'clock Monday evening, Oxford time. Delta never reached Oxford, however, getting no closer than Columbus Air Force Base, where it was held until ordered back to Benning a week later.⁵⁰

Events of the Early Daylight Hours. -- At seven-thirty Monday morning, Oxford time, General Billingslea met with the unit commanders who were now present and organized their units into two task forces for controlling the campus and the city. To Col. James G. Martin, commander of the 108th Armored Cavalry, Billingslea gave the command of Task Force Campus, to which he assigned the 108th; the 2d Battle Group, 155th Infantry Regiment; the 503d Military Police Battalion; and the 716th Military Police Battalion. For the city he gave responsibility to Col. Keller, whose 2d Battle Group, 23d Infantry Regiment, and the 720th Military Police Battalion formed Task Force City. The 1st Battle Group, 155th Infantry Regiment, when it later went into bivouac west of Oxford, served as the reserve force for these two task forces with the mission of backing up one or the other as necessary.⁵¹

At seven-thirty or eight o'clock Monday morning, Oxford time, probably about the time General Billingslea was having his conference, Federal marshals escorted James Meredith into the Lyceum through a back door for registration as a junior in the College of Liberal Arts. An hour later Guthman, of the Department of Justice, announced Meredith's registration and Meredith, with his escort, went to his first class.⁵² But even as Meredith registered, rioters were still about in the streets of Oxford.

Shortly after Meredith's registration, General Billingslea moved his command post to the National Guard Armory in Oxford, where Army headquarters in Oxford would remain until well into the following year. His divisional rear headquarters at the Millington Naval Air Station remained operational under his chief of staff, Col. Louis A. Kunzig, Jr., until it was displaced in mid-afternoon, 1 October.⁵³

Now General Billingslea's first order of business was to see to it that the remaining rioters were dispersed. Evidently there was some change in the task force assignments he had just made, perhaps because the 720th Military Police Battalion was still arriving, for a platoon of the 716th participated with Company B of Col. Keller's battle group in dispersing "a stubborn mob" in the Oxford city square around nine o'clock. Of special interest is the fact that Mayor Richard Elliott of Oxford requested the assistance of troops because of this mob in the city square. His own police contained only seven men and the state troopers, as he put it, were just "sitting there watching." Another interesting sidelight on this action is the fact that the armored vests

worn by the men in Keller's battle group were found to provide
54
considerable protection against objects thrown by the mob.

The former general, Edwin A. Walker, spotted at a roadblock by men belonging to Col. Keller's task force, was thought to have "strongly influenced" this mob by his presence. Katzenbach, informed by Washington that a warrant for Walker's arrest would be issued in fifteen minutes, requested that Col. Keller detain Walker for a short time and then escort him to the Lyceum for arrest. With the dispersal of the mob at the city square, Walker attempted to leave, but was detained at a checkpoint near the center of town, as Katzenbach requested, by Lt. Robert Clark, the commander of Company B, 2d Battle Group, 9th Infantry Regiment, whose men had discovered Walker's presence. Escorted to the Lyceum, Walker was placed under arrest at about eleven-thirty Monday morning, Oxford
55
time.

Sometime early Monday morning President Kennedy may have talked with Governor Barnett. If he did, he could not have been reassured, for he decided to send more troops to Oxford and to place Lt. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze in command. General Billingslea requested instructions to govern his actions should Governor Barnett come to Oxford as rumored. The resulting instructions, issued shortly after nine o'clock, Oxford time, by decision of President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara, were that any aircraft carrying Barnett should not be permitted to land at Oxford. Accordingly, the Federal Aviation Agency was alerted, in case one of its control towers might be involved, and two companies of Col. Keller's task force were dispatched to implement the instructions. One of these companies, Company C, was sent to the University-Oxford Airport, while the other company, Company A, hastened to a small field

eight miles south of Oxford that belonged to the Champion Oil Company. Barnett, however, did not appear.

These precautions against a possible appearance of the Governor seem to have been taken more or less concurrently with the action in the Oxford city square and with the action of part of Company D, also of Col. Keller's task force, against rioters on the University High School campus, near the University Avenue bridge.⁵⁶

It will be recalled that part of the mob swept from the campus in the early morning gathered at the intersection of Highways 6 and 7. There it made a nuisance of itself, or worse, by throwing debris at every passing soldier. As a consequence, Col. Martin of the 108th Armored Cavalry and Task Force Campus, created two special subordinate forces of about forty men each. Included were some men of Troop E. With these troops (or perhaps with one of the forces of about platoon size, while holding the other in reserve) he approached this "unruly, riotous mob [which was] armed with bricks, bottles, iron pipes, spikes, etc." It turned upon the troops so menacingly that there was real danger it would overwhelm the "comparatively small military force." Consequently, Martin ordered that shots be fired over the heads of the mob, and "approximately fifteen rounds of ammunition" were fired, which stopped the mob's advance and enabled the troops to capture and turn over to the custody of the marshals about forty-two prisoners.

This action took place about mid-morning. That afternoon Congressman John Bell Williams wired Secretary Vance to find out "who ordered Mississippi National Guardsmen to fire over the heads of their fellow citizens in Oxford." When queried about it, General Howze, then

in command, promised an investigation, but, meanwhile, defended his subordinate by replying that Col. Martin had been instructed to use the minimum force necessary and that in Martin's opinion the firing was necessary to protect his troops from bodily harm at the hands of an enraged mob "armed with bottles and rocks." Martin, Howze reported, "also stated that no one was hit by the fire." After further inquiry General Howze reported a few days later that he considered Martin's action "probably correct" in that it "averted circumstances even worse than those obtaining at the time of the order. I believe," he added, that Martin "did his duty properly and propose no action against him."⁵⁷

Meanwhile, by ten-thirty Monday morning, Oxford time, General Billingslea could report that things were as quiet as ever. At the same time, he reported that fifty percent of the persons in the area were from outside of Oxford and that about 100 prisoners had been taken.⁵⁸

Casualties. -- Some figures will serve to emphasize the human cost of the rioting. The Army's first report counted forty-eight military injuries -- "contusions, lacerations, and cuts caused by thrown objects and flying glass." The same report counted twenty Federal marshals, three state troopers, an estimated twenty students, and eight other civilians who received treatment at the University infirmary during the night of 30 September and the morning of 1 October, besides the two civilian deaths from gunshot wounds. There was no record kept of minor injuries treated at the Lyceum. Whether or not the four marshals at the U.S. Naval Hospital in Memphis at that time, including the seriously wounded Marshal Same, who had been

shot, were included in the total of those treated at the infirmary is not evident.

On 4 October the Department of Justice released figures revealing 166 injuries to its personnel during the riot. Injured were seventy-nine marshals, seventy-two Border Patrolmen, and fifteen Bureau of Prison guards. The Border Patrolmen and prison guards had all served, presumably, as deputy marshals. When this total is added to the first figures compiled by the Army -- forty-eight military casualties, three state troopers, and twenty-eight other civilians -- the total figure comes to 245 injuries, which does not include such minor injuries as went unreported and at least one additional military injury that grew out of a post-riot difficulty. In addition, of course, there were the two deaths.

According to Congressman John Bell Williams, in one of the telegrams he sent to Secretary Vance Monday afternoon, there were reports from Oxford that soldiers were "lining up citizens and needlessly beating them with rifle butts." He said it had also been "reported that prisoners taken last evening are being held in a basement without food or water, upon order of military authorities," and he requested "an immediate personal investigation" by Secretary Vance. Asked to investigate, the Army commander in Oxford made inquiries of Katzenbach; George M. Street, the University's assistant director of development; Burnes Tatum, the University's safety director; J. W. Davidson, freshman football coach and dormitory supervisor; and James Jones, the Oxford chief of police.

On the basis of this investigation, General Howze reported as follows:

The allegations that soldiers were lining up people and beating them with rifle butts is not substantiated. In fact . . . University officials . . . stated that the soldiers conducted themselves in an exemplary manner and that at no time was any brutality whatsoever observed. Mr. James Jones, Chief of [the] Oxford Police Department stated that he not only did not see any brutality but that no reports of any brutality were received by his department. One "Ku Klux Klan imitator" was according to the press "forced at bayonet point by [a] Mississippi Nat [ional] Guardsman to lie flat on the floor of the Lyceum." The press did not allege injury to the man.

On the alleged mistreatment of prisoners, General Howze's report observed that on Monday the military authorities "did not have prisoners in custody" and did not dictate the conditions under which they were detained. Furthermore, Katzenbach reported that "prisoners were given water and provided C rations as soon as" the marshals were provided theirs. The report continued that at Katzenbach's request the troops were now aiding the marshals in securing the "prisoners who are being provided proper food and water." 60

Meanwhile, as the situation in Oxford assumed dangerous proportions late Sunday night, it appeared to the President that more troops might be needed than planning had contemplated. As a consequence of this concern, there was a continued troop buildup.

Footnotes to Chapter IV

1. See contemporary newspapers and The University of Mississippi and the Meredith Case (University, Miss., 15 Nov 1962), pp. 7-8, 11. The date of 28 Sep given on the latter page should read 27 Sep.

2. See George B. Leonard, T. George Harris, and Christopher S. Wren, "How a Secret Deal Prevented a Massacre at Ole Miss," Look, XXVI (31 Dec 1962), 20-23, which a Justice Dept. spokesman (Guthman) characterized as accurate, according to an AP dispatch in The Washington Post Times Herald (undated clipping). Additionally, see Tristram Coffin, "The Department of Justice," Holiday, XXIII (Mar 1963), 45.

3. Schlotzhauer memo for rcd, 30/1630 Sep /1962 7, Chron File, 28 Sep - 1 Oct 1962, Tab 41a. This is but one of various authoritative indications that it was not planned to use troops on Sunday, although they were alerted and positioned in case of need. At 30/1647Z, Wheeler advised Abrams that, as of that time, there were "no definite instructions for action tomorrow; however, tentative plan remains unchanged" (/S 7 msg, Wheeler to Abrams, 30/1647Z Sep 1962, cy in Abrams Book).

4. On the beginnings of the riot, see (FOUO) 101st Abn Div Command Report, 17 Nov 1962, Incl 5, p. 3, XVIII Abn Corps Command Report, 6 Dec 1962, Incl 3; Schlotzhauer memo for rcd, 30 Sep 1962, Chron File, 28 Sep - 1 Oct 1962, Tab 42a, with which cf. Shive memo for rcd, 30/1750 Sep 1962, ibid., Tab 43b; Intelligence Log, 30/1735 Sep 1962; OCSigO Initial After-Action Report, 29/2215 Sep 1962, Tab A, p. 5; conversation with Kristoferson in Oxford, Miss., in Mar 1963; XVIII Abn Corps Intelligence Report, G-2, Lt. Reiber, s/Chamberlain, 04/2345 /Oct 1962 7, in file on Border Patrol Personnel; AWR Journal, 30/1735 Sep 1962; McDaniel memo for rcd, 5 Oct 1962, in file on Memoranda -- General (5 Oct); and various newspaper and other periodical accounts of that time. Also see Russell H. Barrett, "A Night of Violence," p. 4 (MS draft of chapter for book); and A Report by the General Legislative Investigating Committee to the Mississippi State Legislature Concerning the Occupation of the Campus of the University of Mississippi September 30, 1962 by the Department of Justice of the United States /Released 8 May 1963 7, pp. iiiff. (Cited hereafter as Report of Miss. Legis. Invest. Comm.)

5. Unsigned memo for the rcd, 30/1500 Sep 1962, Chron File, 28 Sep - 1 Oct 1962, Tab 37; and Schlotzhauer memo for the rcd, 30/1630 Sep 1962, ibid., Tab 41a.

6. Shive's memo for rcd, 30/1750 Sep /1962 7, ibid.; Tab 43b; informal conversation with Abrams in Dec 1962; Leonard, Harris, and Wren, op. cit., pp. 23-24; and miscellaneous periodical accounts.

7. Barrett, "A Night of Violence," p. 13; and conversation with Stuart in Oxford, Miss., in Mar 1963 and telecon with him 13 Dec 1963. Additionally, see various newspaper and other periodical accounts.

8. Cf. Report of Miss. Legis. Invest. Comm., p. 13, with Leonard, Harris, and Wren, op. cit., pp. 30, and other accounts in contemporary periodicals. See also Barrett, "A Night of Violence," p. 22. For the text of the President's television address, see ibid., pp. 22-24, or as put out by the White House Press Secretary, 30 Sep 1962.

9. Leonard, Harris, and Wren, op. cit., p. 34; and Dean Love in The University of Mississippi and the Meredith Case, p. 23.

10. On Guihard's death, see (C) msg, COUSAFOX to DAWR, 26/0225Z Feb 1963; undated and unsigned rough memo in file on Memoranda - Miscellaneous Drafts & Rough Notes (Sep - Dec 1962); AWR Journal, 01/1415 and 01/1520 Oct 1962; memo for rcd (signed by Hoskot, Dep Sec/GS), sub: Movement of Body of Mr. Guihard . . . , 2 Oct 1962, Chron File, 1-4 Oct 1962, Tab 17; memo, Gray to Scheips, sub: The Night of Sep 30, 1962, on the campus of the University of Mississippi, p. 2, incl/w ltr, idem to idem, 26 Apr 1963 (hereafter cited as Gray Memorandum), in file on Riot at Oxford, Miss.; and miscellaneous items in periodicals of the Oct - Nov 1962 period.

11. On Walker, see Richard Dudman, Men of the Far Right (New York, 1962), pp. 52-53; Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon (New York, 1964), pp. 119-26; the same author's "Military Men Say Walker Changed After He Became a General; Defend Promotion System," The New York Times, 4 Oct 1962; Richard Allin, "Apologetic Walker Returns to Arkansas 'Right Side,'" The Commercial Appeal (Memphis), 25 May 1963, p. 17; John J. Lindsay, "The Case of General Walker," The Nation, CXCLIII (14 Oct 1963), 245-48; Gray Memorandum, pp. 2-4; Leonard, Harris, and Wren, op. cit., pp. 33-34; Love in The University of Mississippi and the Meredith Case, p. 25; and "Walker Awarded \$800,000 in Libel," The New York Times, 20 Jun 1964, p. 9.

12. Undated recollection by Capt Falkner prepared at the request of L/C Stuart, PMS, Univ. of Miss. as edited for typographical and other minor errors (hereafter cited as Falkner Statement), p. 3. After the marshal left but before Falkner could call a unit formation on the incident, the missing masks were replaced in the supply room.

13. Claude Sitton, "Student Enrolls: Ends Segregation of Public Education in Mississippi," The New York Times, 2 Oct 1962, p. 24; and AWR Journal, 01/0012 Oct 1962.

14. "Text of Mississippi Grand Jury's Report of Rioting at University in Oxford," The New York Times, 17 Nov 1962, p. 10; and Leonard, Harris, and Wren, op. cit., pp. 34, 36.

15. Penciled memo, unsigned, w/info from Abrams, 01/0318 Oct 1962, EDT; inked memo, unsigned, w/info from Billingslea, /1 Oct 1962 7, in file on Memoranda - Rough Notes & Drafts (Sep - Dec 1962); notes on interview with Gray in Oxford, 8 Mar 1963; and Barrett, "A Night of Violence," p. 14.

16. Leonard, Harris, and Wren, op. cit., p. 34. Also see comment by Theodore G. Sorenson, Decision-Making in the White House (New York, 1963), p. 26. See also ibid., p. 41; and Falkner Statement, p. 4. At 01/0022 Oct 1962, presumably EDT (1022 Sunday evening, Oxford time) Abrams learned that the President had directed Troop E to move from the Oxford Armory to the campus "as soon as possible" (DA SitRep No. 2-62 [as of 01/0700 Oct 1962]).

17. On the Guardsmen's reaction to events, see Falkner Statement, pp. 1-3.

18. Msg, Parker to Billingslea, 01/0240Z [Oct 1962] 7, Chron File, 28 Sep - 1 Oct 1962, Tab 48a; and (S) DA SitRep No. 2-62 (as of 01/0700 Oct 1962), (C) pars 2, 5. The 108th AC was ordered to the vicinity of the Oxford Armory about 8:45 CST; the 1st BG, 155th Inf, was ordered to its assembly area near Oxford, at 10:55 CST, 30 Sep; and the 2d BG, 155th Inf, was ordered to the University campus at 11:30 CST, 30 Sep -- all times p.m. See 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab G, p. 2, Tab E, p. 1, and Tab F, p. 2, respectively.

19. Leonard, Harris, and Wren, op. cit., p. 34; msg, Parker to Billingslea, 01/0333Z (2333 EDT), idem to idem, 01/0346Z (2346 EDT), and idem to idem, 01/0418Z (2418 EDT) -- Chron File, 28 Sep - 1 Oct 1962, Tabs 48-50. (S) DA SitRep No. 2-62 puts the time of the message ordering Billingslea to make his own prior evaluation at 2336 EDT, rather than at 2346, or 0346Z.

20. Falkner Statement, pp. 3-5.

21. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

22. Ibid., pp. 6-7, 11; and Leonard, Harris, and Wren, op. cit., pp. 34, 36. Troop E's march to the Lyceum is also described in [Crist?] 7, op. cit., p. 5.

23. (FOUO) 108th ACR Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 23 Oct 1962, 29 Oct 1962, 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab G, p. 2; and DA SitRep No. 2-62 (as of 01/0700 Oct 1962).

24. [Crist?] 7, op. cit., p. 6.

25. 108th ACR Command Report, 29 Oct 1962, 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab G, pp. 2-3; and [probably a telephone] 7 msg from Abrams re a report from Martin, 0241, 1 Oct 1962, EDT, in Chron File, 28 Sep - 1 Oct 1962, Tab 55.

26. 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, p. 5; 108th ACR Command Report, ibid., Tab G, p. 3; and [Crist?] 7, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

27. 503d MP Bn Command Report, 1 Nov 1962, 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab H, par 1-a-(7-8).

28. Memo for the recd / of Wheeler-Abrams conversation 7, 04/0800 Oct 1962, p. 2, in file on Memoranda of Conversations (Sep 1962 -).

29. 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, p. 4; and 503d MP Bn Command Report, 1 Nov 1962, ibid., Tab H, par 1-a-(8). On the departure of the first helicopter, see this chap, n. 34.

30. Telecon with Hill, OCINFO, 5 Sep 1963; / George Raynor Thompson 7, (C) The Signal Corps Role in the Cuban Crisis 1962, p. 5, incl/w ltr, Exec, OCSigO (Col L. W. Jones), to CG, OCMH, sub: U.S. Army Signal Corps Role in the Cuban Crisis, 1962, 30 Apr 1963, in file on Signal Communications; and 101st Abn Div Command Report, 17 Nov 1962, Incl 5, p. 4, XVIII Abn Corps Command Report, 6 Dec 1962, Incl 3.

31. 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, p. 10.

32. 503d MP Bn Command Report, 1 Nov 1962, ibid., Tab H, par 1-a-(8).

33. Vilella's History, pp. 3-4.

34. On the departure of the troops from the Naval Air Station to Oxford, see ibid., p. 4; 503d MP Bn Command Report, 1 Nov 1962, 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab H, par 1-a-(8); unidentified pencilled note in file on Memoranda -- Miscellaneous Drafts & Rough Notes (Sep -- Dec 1962), I; Abrams report / probably by telephone 7, 0241 / EDT 7, 1 Oct 1962, Chron File, 28 Sep -- 1 Oct 1962, Tab 55; and "Notes -- General Wheeler's Visit to the War Room," 0755 / EDT 7, 11 Oct 1962, in file on Memoranda of Conversations (Sep 1962 -).

35. Vilella's History, p. 4; 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, p. 4; and 503d MP Bn Command Report, 1 Nov 1962, ibid., Tab H, par 1-a-(8). Vilella states that the first helicopter landed at 0115 hours, but this seems an obvious error in view of his other statements and the evidence of the 503d's command Report. Rather, 0115 was about the time at which the last helicopter put down at the University-Oxford Airport, according to the command reports.

36. Vilella's History, p. 5; and 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, p. 4.

37. Ibid., and Vilella's History, p. 6.

38. Ibid., pp. 4 and 6, and the accompanying University Plot Plan showing both Company A's proposed and actual routes to the Lyceum.

39. Ibid., p. 5; 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, p. 4; and 503d MP Bn Command Report, 1 Nov 1962, ibid., Tab H, par 1-a-(8).

40. Ibid., par 1-b-(1); and ibid., Tab A, p. 4. Vilella, whose History is rather unsatisfactory where times are concerned, does not give a time for this arrival.

41. Memo for the rcd of Wheeler-Abrams conversation, 0800-0830, 4 Oct 1962, in file on Memoranda of Conversations (Sep 1962 -).

42. On the formation, march, and engagement of Company A, see 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, pp. 4-5; 503d MP Bn Command Report, 1 Nov 1962, ibid., Tab H, para 1-a-(8) and 1-b-(1-2); Villella's History, pp. 7-10; interview with Villella and Bowman in Oxford, Miss., in Mar 1963; "Army Unit Chief Re-creates Action at Oxford," The New York Times, 5 Oct 1962, p. 19; and Falkner's Statement, p. 9. Also see Leonard, Harris, and Wren, op. cit., p. 36.

43. This account of clearing the campus is based principally upon Falkner's Statement, p. 10; Villella's History, pp. 10-11; 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, p. 5; 108th ACR Command Report, 29 Oct 1962, ibid., Tab G, pp. 3-4; and / Crist? /, op. cit., pp. 6-8.

44. This account of Alfa's land tail is based primarily upon LeVan's recollections set down in ltr to Lt Col K. C. Donaldson, Act Ch, Hist Div /OCMH/, 11 Aug 1963, in Riot file. See also, 503d MP Bn Command Report, 1 Nov 1962, 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab H, par 1-a-(9-10); Villella's History, p. 11; and the relevant note in "Memorandum for Record . . .," The Military Police Journal, XII (Mar 1963), 18.

45. (FOUO) 716th MP Bn Command Report for Period 25 Sep - 2 Oct 1962 and 10 - 20 Oct 1962, 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab I, pp. 2-4; and Charles Vanderburgh, "A Draftee's Diary from the Mississippi Front," Harper's, CCXXVIII (Feb 1964), 38-39.

46. (FOUO) 2d BG, 23d Inf Reg, Command Report for Period Ending 21 Oct 1962, 19 Nov 1962, 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab D, p. 2; DA SitRep No. 1-62 (as of 30/1100 Sep 1962 /EDT 7; AWR Journal, 30/0814, 30/1715, 30/1719, and 30/2345; memo for rcd, Abrams to AWR, 0/0141 Oct 1962, and cy msg, DCSOPS to CONARC, 01/0141 Oct 1962, in Chron File, 28 Sep - 1 Oct 1962, Tabs 52-53.

47. (FOUO) 2d BG, 155th Inf, Command Report for Period 30 Sep through 16 Oct 62, 30 Oct 1962, 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab F, pp. 1-2.

48. (FOUO) 1st BG, 155th Inf, Command Report for Special Operations in Oxford, Mississippi, 29 Oct 1962, *ibid.*, Tab E, p. 1; XVIII Abn Corps and Ft. Bragg Command Report, 6 Dec 1962, p. 2; and the text at n. 51, this chap.

49. (FOUO) 720th MP Bn After-Action Report -- Operation "OLE Miss," 31 Oct 1962, 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab J, p. 1. See also James A. Thompson and Wellington J. Griffith, "720th MPs at Oxford," The Military Police Journal, XII (Jan 1963), 8-9.

50. 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, p. 3 (par 3-g-37), seems to be in error in stating that 2d BG, 1st Inf (TF Delta), crossed the IP at Ft Benning at 30/1000Z Sep 1962, instead of on 1 Oct. See additionally AWR Journal, 01/0710 Oct 1962, which states that Delta (2/1 Inf) cleared the IP at Benning at 01/1045Z /6:45 EDT 7 Oct 1962; DA SitRep No. 2-62 (as of 01/0700 Oct 1962), which puts the departure time at 01/0600 EDT Oct 1962; and *ibid.*, (C) No. 15-62 (as of 07/1800 EDT Oct 1962), which indicates that the CONARC was to redeploy Delta to Benning by surface transportation at 08/1400Z Oct 1962.

51. 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, p. 5.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 6; Goldman, *op. cit.*, p. 28, the quotation being as it appears *ibid.*; and The University of Mississippi and the Meredith Case, p. 13.

53. 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, p. 6.

54. *Ibid.*; 2d BG, 23d Inf, Command Report, 19 Nov 1962, *ibid.*, Tab D, p. 2; 716th MP Bn Command Report, 9 Nov 1962, *ibid.*, Tab I, p. 4; (C) msg, CO, USAFOX to AWR, /08 7 2030Z /Nov 1962/; and Vanderburgh, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

55. 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, p. 6; 2d BG 23d Inf, Command Report, 19 Nov 1962, *ibid.*, Tab D, p. 3; and "Walker Is Facing Charges in Riot," with accompanying UPI telephoto, The New York Times, 2 Oct 1962, pp. 1, 27.

56. Undated Memoranda of Conversations [but evidently 1010 hrs and after, 1 Oct 1962, EDT 7, in file on Memoranda of Conversations (Sep 1962 -); (S) DA SitRep No. 3-62 (as of 01/2000 Oct 1962); 2d IG, 23d Inf, Command Report, 19 Nov 1962, 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab D, p. 2; and memo for the rcd, Shive (by McDaniel), 03/2400 Oct 1962, Chron File, 1-4 Oct 1962, Tab 37.

57. 108th ACR Command Report, 29 Oct 1962, 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab G, p. 4; Falkner Statement, p. 11, where it is stated that the troops brought "20 to 30 prisoners" to the Armory; teleg, Williams to Vance, 01/4:35 p.m., EDT, Oct 1962 (DAIN 791207); msg, CO [CG 7 XVIII Abn Corps to AWR [2 Oct? 1962 7; and msg, idem to idem, 06/0200Z [Oct 1962 7, cy in Chron File, 4-6 Oct 1962, Tab 80.

58. DA SitRep No. 3-62 (as of 01/2000 [EDT 7 Oct 1962), (U) par 11.

59. (S) Ibid., No. 8-62 (as of 04/0600 Oct 1962); (S) ibid., No. 10-62 (04/1800 - 05/0500 Oct 1962), EDT), (FOUO) par 2; ODCSOPS [by Jung and Scheips 7, (S) Congressional Fact Paper, sub: Mississippi Operations (cited hereafter as Cong. Fact Paper), (FOUO) p. 3.3 (11 Jan 1963); and Report of the Miss. Legis. Invest. Comm., pp. 14-15.

60. Msg, CO [CG 7 XVIII Abn Corps to AWR, [2 Oct 1962? 7, "Lycerum" being corrected to "Lyceum."

CHAPTER V

GENERAL HOWZE'S COMMAND AND REDEPLOYMENT

Continued Troop Buildup and General Howze's Selection. -- Not long before midnight Sunday, Oxford time, President Kennedy asked for a list of all units that would close in Oxford in the next sixteen hours. Then, about an hour later, at twelve-forty, Oxford time, Washington queried the Continental Army Command as to what Regular Army division it would recommend for movement to Oxford, how it would propose to move it, and what degree of alert it would recommend.¹ That there was cause for this concern the record makes clear, for the situation was critical and might even get worse.²

Eased, presumably, upon the CONARC's reply to the query at twelve-forty, Washington issued instructions at one-thirty-two, Oxford time, to move one battle group of the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, to Oxford by road as soon as possible and to have a second battle group ready to move by air if aircraft could be obtained. A third battle group of the same division was also soon ordered to move, so that as of five o'clock Monday morning, Oxford time, three battle groups of the 101st were scheduled for movement -- one to the Columbus Air Force Base, one to the Naval Air Station, and one to Oxford, their estimated times of departure being, seven, seven, and seven-thirty, Oxford time, respectively. Washington, while ordering Task Force Delta out of Benning, also instructed the CONARC, at one-fifty-five, Oxford time, to move one battle group of the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg directly to Oxford by aircraft of the Tactical Air Force.³

This concern about more troops, not foreseen in the original planning, carried over into the daylight hours, when at seven-fifteen, Oxford time, Washington queried the CONARC by telephone as to what additional troops could be moved to the Oxford area by midnight, and when, two minutes later, General Parker, the DCSOPS, reaffirmed this query as a "Presidential request with the highest priority." In hardly more than a half hour Parker, fresh from a meeting with Secretary McNamara, was back on the telephone to the CONARC with instructions concerning an important Presidential decision. While the situation on the ground at Oxford did not indicate that things were getting worse, Parker explained to General Buchanan, who raised the question, the President had had a conversation with Governor Barnett which seemed to indicate a need for these extra forces. "This is all we know," he added, "and this is directed by the President."

Instructions now were to move the two remaining battle groups of the 101st (there being five altogether) from Campbell to Oxford, one to go by road as soon as possible and the other by air. Additionally the remaining four battle groups of the 82d Airborne Division were to be airlifted as soon as possible (but General Wheeler would send word at eleven-thirty to hold them at their initial destination, unless it were too faraway, instead of taking them all the way to Oxford). Finally, the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters would proceed to Oxford to take over control of all these units. The troops were to travel as light as possible in order to cut down on airlift requirements, which would be worked out between the CONARC and the Tactical Air Force. In the same conversation General Parker gave

the CONARC authority to have the Third Army take over the rear in the Memphis staging area, which was done, thus relieving the over-all tactical commander of that responsibility. Parker wanted a report in forty minutes on what the CONARC had been able to do in that time since there was to be another meeting with Secretary McNamara at eight-forty-five, Oxford time.

General Carns in Operations telephoned General Abrams at eight-ten, Oxford time, to tell him that in view of the additional troop assignments Lt. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, of the XVIII Airborne Corps, would take over the field command. He also told General Abrams that the Third Army now had authority to take over the rear at the Naval Air Station. At eight-twenty-five Oxford time, General Parker apparently informed General Howze, who was then at Fort Bragg, of his new command, and told him that the instructions were coming directly from the President through Secretary McNamara. At the same time his deputy, General Carns, talked with General Billingslea and told him of the new developments. A few minutes later General Parker informed the CONARC that General Howze would take off for Oxford at nine o'clock, Oxford time, with a headquarters element of about six persons.

In the very early afternoon, Oxford time (two-twenty-five in Washington), Secretary Vance passed along to General Parker a Presidential query that had reached him through Secretary McNamara as to what other forces could be brought to bear if it were assumed that those now scheduled were not enough. Apparently, too, the President raised a question about the possibility of using Marine ground forces. Also, the 100 additional helicopters McNamara had requested earlier

(at nine-thirty-five, Oxford time) for locations one hour from Oxford, were to be brought in and stationed at locations the Army selected. Queried about the emergency airlifting of some of its ground forces, the Marine Corps replied that one battalion at Camp Lejeune could depart on twelve hours notice, plus the additional hour and a half required to reach Cherry Point where they would board their aircraft. Another battalion could leave Camp Pendleton on twenty-four hours notice, and the remainder of the Division/Wing Team located on either coast would be available for subsequent movement upon short notice. These forces, however, were under the operational control of the unified commanders of the two oceans, who could provide the definitive information. The Army pursued this matter until early the next day, but no Marine ground forces were called upon, although the Marine Corps did provide some helicopters in addition to those originally provided.

There were, of course, a number of administrative and support units that had to be brought into the operation in support of the troops to be deployed, which now included three military police battalions, four infantry battle groups (including two National Guard groups), ten airborne battle groups, one armored cavalry regiment, and headquarters troops from the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 2d Infantry Division. The administrative and support troops -- signal, quartermaster, logistical, aviation, hospital, transportation, maintenance, and engineer troops (the latter in the tent city) -- came from such places as Forts Bragg, Campbell, McPherson, Hood, Rucker, Knox, Wood, and Lee.

Of the tactical units, only seven battle groups, one armored cavalry regiment, and three military police battalions ever reached the Oxford area itself, the other Regular Army units being held in the two staging areas used -- the Columbus Air Force Base and the Millington Naval Air Station. All of the Mississippi National Guard, of course, excepting the two battle groups of the 155th Infantry Regiment, the 108th Armored Cavalry, and a small medical unit, remained at their home stations.

The approximate strength of all the units deployed, including the Mississippi National Guard, was 30,656. Of this total the maximum number of Regular Army troops deployed for the operation reached a total of about 20,600 (a figure rounded off to the nearest 100) on 6 October, although the maximum number of troops in the Oxford area never reached more than about 12,000, at which point they peaked on 2 October. Of the 10,393 Mississippi National Guardsmen actually called into Federal service, there were never more than about 2,700 in the Oxford area. The Guard reached this maximum on Monday, 1 October, and maintained it for several days.

Of the troops deployed for the Oxford operation, about ninety percent reached their assigned destinations within twenty-four hours. Those which reached Oxford after the riot and the relatively minor difficulties of the daylight hours of Monday morning never had more than ⁵ routine missions to carry out, as, for example, at checkpoints.

Martial law was never declared in Oxford despite the riot and the fact that the troops bivouacked in the Oxford area -- at the Airport,

Hemingway Stadium (the University football field), and in outlying places -- were about twice as numerous as the townspeople. With the troops so numerous, martial law may have seemed unnecessary as well as undesirable.

General Howze's Instructions and Assumption of Command. -- General Howze's instructions, which went to him at midday, Washington time, Monday, 1 October, were the same as the instructions given General Billingslea on Sunday, 30 September, except, of course, for the necessary minor changes in wording. In effect, therefore, General Billingslea passed on his mission to General Howze, who became, when the command passed to him at about three o'clock Monday afternoon, 1 October, directly responsible to the Chief of Staff, whose personal representative in the Oxford operation continued to be General Abrams.

General Abrams, it may be said, went down to Oxford from Memphis for only a brief visit, and then apparently not until 2 October. Quickly completing his business there, he proceeded to Washington. He did not again return to Oxford while the Army was there, although Lt. Col. Thomas J. McGuire of the ODCSOPS went to Oxford on a liaison mission at the critical period of the beginning of the University's second semester, and Col. Jung, the Oxford action officer, made a short trip there in early March 1963.

When General Howze assumed command at Oxford, the troop buildup was still in progress and nobody in authority knew whether there would be more trouble or not. Indeed just prior to his assumption of command Howze approved, with the concurrence of Chancellor Williams, a search of the Sigma Nu fraternity house by soldiers of the 716th Military Police Battalion,

with the faculty adviser of the fraternity, on the report of a cache of weapons there. This search, which rather characterized the atmosphere in Oxford at that time, turned up two rifles (a .22 and a .30 calibre), twenty-one shotguns, and a .22 Colt pistol, but no ammunition. These weapons were turned over to University officials.

On Monday evening General Howze explained in reports by telephone, one of them to General Wheeler personally, that while visiting units and driving about the town and University he found everything quiet. The military organization was poor, but he was trying to dispose his troops in such a way as to stop things before they started. His problem was not being able to recognize the enemy. He had a cordial one-hour meeting with Chancellor Williams and solicited his cooperation. This marked the beginning of a consultative relationship between the Army and the University that would continue as long as the Army remained in Oxford.

He also met with Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach for an hour and arrived at a plan of operations for the marshals and the Army. Of the marshals, he reported, only twenty-five would be left in town. They were both "pretty well beat" and not very popular with the townspeople. Soldiers were guarding the prisoners, but there was a marshal present to have custody of them. Eight marshals were in Baxter Hall with Meredith, while soldiers guarded it outside. He found his units arriving piecemeal because of the weather. He was short of communications. He had roadblocks on all roads in town and all vehicles were searched, although this did not prevent persons from leaving their cars and walking around the roadblocks.

General Rich vice General Billingslea in Oxford Area. -- Maj. Gen. Charles W. G. Rich, who commanded the 101st Airborne Division, replaced General Billingslea on 2 October as the commander of the troops in the Oxford area, while General Howze retained over-all command in a "sphere of activity" that embraced not only the Oxford area, but also the two staging areas of the Millington Naval Air Station and the Columbus Air Force Base. The force employed at that time for securing both the campus and the city and, therefore, under Rich's command, included the 1st Airborne Battle Group of the 327th Infantry Regiment, the 1st Airborne Battle Group of the 501st Infantry Regiment, and the 716th and 720th Military Police Battalions. In keeping with the relaxed situation and the principle of using the minimum force necessary, the other combat and support units in the Oxford area "were placed in assembly areas out of sight of the general public, but prepared on short notice to reinforce the units in the city and on the campus." In order to meet the requirement that there not be more than 10,000 troops in the Oxford area ("in and within 10 miles of Oxford"), two battle groups were moved to the Naval Air Station at Millington and one battle group was moved to the Columbus Air Force Base, where it joined the 82d Airborne Division.

Command Post and Communications. -- After initially establishing his command post in the vicinity of the University-Oxford Airport, Howze after some consideration of various sites, moved it into the Armory apparently on Tuesday, where Billingslea had already established his command post. As a matter of fact, Howze's own signal officer at Fort Bragg had, in advance, arbitrarily settled upon the Armory for the

termination of commercial tie-line circuits. In addition, both the Department of the Army and the Third Army had also arranged for communications terminating in the Armory, the former for three SCAN dial lines, one point-to-point hot-line to the OCINFO, and two teletype circuits direct to the Army War Room. The Third Army lines were to connect Oxford with the Millington Naval Air Station, where
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the Third Army Rear was located.

Third Army (Rear) and Logistics. --- About the same time that General Howze assumed command of the Oxford forces, exclusive of those in the tent city, Maj. Gen. Derrill M. Daniel, Deputy Commander of the Third Army, was ordered, probably in confirmation of an earlier telephone call, to assume command of the rear at the Millington Naval Air Station for the "purpose of providing administrative and logistical support" for the combat elements deployed in the Mississippi operation. In that capacity he would also have control of the task force operating the tent city for the Federal marshals (it previously being under control of the Department of the Army) and would coordinate "staging area requirements" for the Army troops deployed through the Air Station. Under this arrangement General Daniel took over command of the Oxford rear from Billingslea's subordinate, Col. Kunzig, for the Third Army, whose assumption of this
11
responsibility General Abrams was believed to favor.

This new command, generally referred to as the Third Army (Rear), but officially called the Third Army Logistical Command (Provisional) became operational on Monday afternoon, 1 October. To staff his new headquarters, General Daniel thought he would need thirty officers and

forty enlisted men. After arrival at the Naval Air Station, Daniel informed Washington that "except for minor adjustments of equipment . . . effecting resupply from bulk resources," he anticipated "no major difficulties" in providing logistical support "to units in their presently assigned mission." He found Class I, III, and V supplies, including "chemical grenades" "in adequate supply to accomplish present mission." On 13 October, after the major redeployment of troops under Howze, and having been authorized several days earlier to change the rearward organization "in consonance with the overall redeployment plan," the Third Army (Rear) closed up shop. The support troops still needed in the Oxford area reverted to the operational control of the Commanding General of Fort Campbell. Later, on 22 October, logistical responsibility passed to Fort McClellan.¹² Thus, the Third Army (Rear) existed for less than a fortnight and was, in the length of its life, almost coterminous with General Howze's command, which was transferred back to General Billingslea on 10 October, as will be seen.

General Howze complained in passing that during his command of the Oxford operation, 1-10 October, logistical support units in some instances "received and acted on orders from headquarters outside the chain of command due largely to a lack of clear understanding of the chain of command." Thus, he explained, "the 504th Quartermaster Company at Oxford . . . was directly responsible to the Army Field Commander but received orders from [the] Third Logistical Command (Prov)." The Third Army also complained with special reference to its Medical Service that initially it "received directions from Department of the Army . . . CONARC, XVIII

Airborne Corps, and queries from the Commanding General, Mississippi National Guard." For the most part, General Howze found that during the critical period of his command "logistical support was adequate." 13

A logistical development that perhaps was not foreseen, and that early required a survey in order to deal with it, was the arrival of Mississippi National Guard units without riot control ammunition and with a shortage of communications; moreover, because of a shortage of state funds Guard units arrived "with little or no expendable supplies" and even without sufficient individual clothing and sleeping gear. In the matter of sleeping gear, for example, the Third Army (Rear) provided approximately 2,660 sleeping bags and pneumatic mattresses from the Memphis General Depot -- and delivered them "by helicopter within six hours after" it received the request. Some Guard units also lacked facilities for adequate medical evacuation and received ambulances in the early period from the 2d Infantry Division. In general the precipitous manner in which the Guard units were federalized rather than mobilized made it impossible for them to "operate entirely through active Army supply channels," which "complicated and slowed the supply of essential items." 14

The Oxford operation "presented no unusual problems" to the Medical Service except for confusion over the chain of command, which has been mentioned, and the fact that, as in the case of Little Rock, National Guard troops were brought into the Federal service so fast that they could not be given their initial physical examination. There was, indeed, little time in which to give some of them their separation examination.

Since, however, each Guardsman was supposed to have "at least one physical examination" while on active duty, they all had to be given "at least a physical inspection" that could serve as both their initial and separation physical examination. In giving this inspection, Navy and Air Force medical facilities assisted the Army. They also assisted the Army in providing medical care for the Guardsmen and their dependents.

The 134th Medical Hospital (Surgical), a National Guard unit having seventeen officers and twenty-eight enlisted men, which arrived at Oxford on Monday and established itself at the Airport, was supposed to provide field-hospital support for the Army forces in the Oxford area. It was unable to provide proper hospitalization, however, even when augmented by a surgical team from the Walter Reed Army Medical Center, because, having only a tent, it lacked the necessary equipment "and was inadequately staffed with professional and enlisted personnel." Consequently a call went out to the 15th Field Hospital at Fort Bragg to provide one hospitalization unit without doctors. This unit, augmented by the Walter Reed team and professional personnel of the 134th, provided "adequate field hospitalization for the balance of the operation." The U.S. Naval Hospital in Memphis and the Base Hospital at Columbus Air Force Base provided the necessary fixed hospital support for the operation. Organic ambulances evacuated patients to both the field and fixed hospitals and two medical helicopters attached to the 15th Field Hospital unit provided emergency air evacuation.

In the area of environmental sanitation, some unsatisfactory conditions existed because units failed to take with them to Oxford

"sufficient supplies and equipment to maintain a high level of field sanitation" -- for example, chlorination kits for disinfecting water in lister bags. As for medical supply, "with few exceptions, organic medical units and detachments arrived in the operational area with insufficient . . . medical items to provide routine dispensary 'sick call' support. Most battle group aid stations were either low or out of medical consumables by the end of the first four days of operations." Consequently, the Naval Hospital and the Columbus Base Hospital, had to provide medical supplies in their respective areas through "a hasty informal agreement." The Naval Hospital provided resupply for the 15th Field Hospital unit in the Oxford area.

Football, Incidents, and Contingency Planning. -- The question of the University's homecoming football game scheduled for Saturday, 6 October, was of the first magnitude during the first week after the riot, and everybody up and down the Federal chain of command, including the President, was concerned about it. It was a serious problem because of the possibly explosive mixture of a large football crowd and the presence of Meredith, or, given the atmosphere of that time, of the combustible parts of such a crowd even without Meredith.

On 2 October General Howze conferred with both Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach and Chancellor Williams and asked Katzenbach if Meredith could be persuaded to leave Oxford for the weekend; Katzenbach said he could. General Howze believed "strongly," as did the Chancellor, that holding the football game on Saturday would "be taken as an indication of return to normalcy." After additional discussions with

Katzenbach, General Howze again talked to Williams and again both agreed that the game should be held as scheduled. Howze represented Williams as feeling that agitation to stop the game was coming from other parts of the state and from various state officials who would like to see the University closed, and also that the Department of Justice perhaps wanted the game cancelled. Katzenbach planned to visit Washington and invited General Howze to send a representative, but Howze declined.

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An intelligence survey made during the daylight hours of 3 October in the vicinity of towns close to Oxford revealed that the game should not be played, for people feared "that outside elements such as teenagers and riff-raff" who were believed to have formed the core of the rioters the preceding weekend, "would incite additional incidents." If Meredith attended trouble would be certain. People still supported Governor Barnett and felt that they lost their states' rights when troops moved in. The survey found the prevailing view to be that Meredith would withdraw in the near future, but that if he should remain after the withdrawal of Federal forces he would be a "dead duck." People, in that early period, did not resent troops in the Oxford area, but believed the state police could have handled the situation without Federal assistance. People did resent, however, the use of local National Guardsmen, but they were proud that they made such a good showing.

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There were numerous incidents and rumors that could only have given rise to uneasiness respecting the situation in general, and that bore out the general sense of the survey results. Once there was a report that

Baxter Hall would be bombed and on another occasion students threw a rock through a cafeteria window while Meredith was eating. On 5 October a roving patrol of the 716th Military Police Battalion reported that it was fired upon from a green Corvair driven by a woman. These are some of the incidents that occurred.

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On the afternoon of 3 October, General Howze discussed the problem concerning the game with General Carns, and then talked with Secretary McNamara, who had just heard about the problem, and who seemed disposed against holding the game. Howze reported that he had conferred with Chancellor Williams and University athletic officials together with Patterson, the state attorney general, and Birdsong, the state safety director. The latter two men "expressed great alarm at what might happen at the game," but General Howze discovered that they had not been informed, as had the Governor, concerning the precautions that the Army would take. When these were explained to them they withdrew their objections to a statement to be issued by Williams that the game would be played in Oxford, and General Howze did not object. Howze said he did not "pretend that it is altogether without difficulty," but he indicated that the proposal to give students free railroad tickets and then to move the game to Jackson was a dangerous idea. The University officials, he said "thought that would be the most dangerous place in the whole state to have a football game." Continuing, Howze told the Secretary that he understood that trustees from among the University alumni favored holding the game in Oxford.

General Howze repeated that he knew there was risk involved in holding the game in Oxford, but he thought the precautions referred to would

minimize it. For one thing, Meredith would not be there. Also, there would not be "any colored troops in evidence except those . . . behind their own . . . sentries in their own encampments." In fact, there would "be practically no soldiers visible at all anywhere." Checkpoints would be removed for the game, but without announcement. He was not sure how the Army would restrict people after the game, but thought it fortunate that the stadium was "somewhat removed from the . . . dormitory areas." National Guardsmen would not be in evidence either, apparently, and neither would the marshals. Birdsong told General Howze he was not a free agent and thus could not commit himself but Howze at least thought he had a tentative understanding with the safety director under which state troopers would direct traffic with the aid of military policemen who would be "under their obvious control in such matters as parking." Secretary McNamara told General Howze he appreciated his advice and that Howze should assume that the decision to have the game in Oxford stood unless he heard "from Buzz Wheeler, Cy Vance, or myself." Howze replied that he was "neither permitting" the game "nor encouraging it," that he had "not taken a position that I should stop it" and had posed "no objections." In such manner the conversation ended.

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General Abrams said it was the Secretary's impression that "they would go ahead with the game," and General Wheeler thought the game should be held as scheduled, for he thought that matter had to be faced up to sometime. The Attorney General, however, "apparently called" McNamara and wanted to cancel the game. When it became apparent "from local

sources" and the continuing incidents that it would be unwise to play the game in Oxford, Secretaries McNamara and Vance concluded that it should not be played there. The Governor urged Chancellor Williams to have the game played in Jackson, saying that he would be responsible for the railroad fares of the University students who attended. To General Howze the Chancellor remarked, Abrams reported, that "the people in Jackson would be responsible for all measures between the halves."²⁰

The Army did not view the problem now posed as a simple one, for there would be two football games and a parade in Jackson on Saturday, 6 October. Not only would Mississippi be meeting Houston in Jackson, but Jackson State College would be playing Arkansas State at home, and there would be an annual Jackson State parade through the streets of the city. The Army worried about the possibility of an explosion when two football crowds, one white and the other Negro, and a Negro parade, came together²¹ in a not-so-large Mississippi urban community.

The result of its concern was a contingency plan ordered on 5 October by which two battle groups of the 82d Airborne Division could be airlifted to Jackson from the Columbus Air Force Base, if called for by the President. One of these, on a one-hour alert, would travel by Air Force C-123's, with a flying time to Jackson of fifty minutes, as the White House was informed, and one battle group by helicopters with a flying time of one hour and twenty minutes -- over 2,000 soldiers altogether. In the case of this latter battle group, General Wheeler wanted "one company ready to depart immediately, together with some tear gas

dispensing choppers," with the remainder of the unit on a one-hour alert.

There would also be seven or more Army intelligence agents, together

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with FBI agents, in Jackson.

After all these preparations, the proceedings in Jackson, under a call from the mayor to desist from violence -- backed up on the scene by policemen with riot guns -- went off quite peacefully. Similarly,

the student train returned to Oxford without incident, and at

seven-forty-five Saturday evening, Washington time, Secretary Vance and

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General Wheeler called off the Jackson alert.

Meanwhile, Meredith had left Oxford for the weekend accompanied by an escort of four marshals, as he would do on many weekends in the coming months. On this occasion, Army intelligence had it from Meredith that he would go to Jackson. Then it was reported that the marshals had tentative plans to fly him to Memphis, but that Meredith had not yet agreed to the

plan. Finally he left Oxford by car, with four marshals, destination

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unannounced probably for security reasons. Whether or not Meredith had some responsibility for the changing reports, it was true throughout his stay in Oxford that he often kept his protectors guessing, as Army reports often mentioned.

Security Arrangements for Meredith. -- Pressing as was the matter of what to do about the homecoming football game of 6 October, a matter of basic urgency from the beginning was, of course, that of guaranteeing Meredith's physical safety to the greatest extent possible. All along, however, those most concerned must have been aware that it was all but impossible to guarantee Meredith's life absolutely against sniping from

ambush or some suicidal attempt to murder him. In any case, General Howze,²⁵ in one of his first official acts, met with Katzenbach for an hour and probably at that time agreed on the modus operandi for the marshals and the Army that, with little change, except in degree and upon special occasions, served through succeeding months.

The plan developed for the long haul was to reduce promptly and considerably the number of marshals in Oxford, to use the small number of marshals regularly assigned to duty in Oxford as a constant escort and protective body for Meredith, and to use the Army for guard duty at Baxter Hall (both inside and out), where there were eight guards as late as mid-May 1963, and a force in the immediate background to support the marshals in case of need whenever Meredith went abroad on the campus. The immediate support on the campus took the form of a jeep patrol, with a backup force of platoon strength (the Alert Platoon) bivouacked in a gully back of Baxter Hall referred to as "The Hole." Among the duties of the Alert Platoon was the provision of the security details for Baxter Hall, but its principal mission was to respond immediately, upon order, in case²⁶ of trouble at Baxter Hall or at any other place on the campus. The reserve force, the main body of troops stationed at Oxford after the major redeployments of October, was divided, at first, in about a one-to-two ratio, between an encampment at the Armory and one at the University-Oxford Airport, but after March 1963 they were brought together, except for a small security detachment at the Airport, in a base camp adjacent to the Chambers Manufacturing Company one mile south of Baxter Hall.

Other features of the security arrangements were a sedan that patrolled the campus and the town of Oxford, a small Army aircraft support (four helicopters and one fixed-wing aircraft as late as mid-May 1963), Army intelligence agents in the Oxford area (twenty on 4 October, 27 which, of course, was during the early period of uncertainty), and, finally, troops earmarked for rapid deployment to Oxford to reinforce the troops stationed there.

At mid-October 1962 there were twelve marshals on duty at Oxford, including two supervisors, one driver, and three reliefs of three men each. These reliefs worked on two shifts each twenty-four hour day -- one from seven o'clock in the morning until five in the afternoon, and one from five o'clock in the afternoon until seven the next morning. During each shift one relief would be on duty with Meredith, one would be on call, and one would be off duty. During the daytime shift three marshals accompanied Meredith wherever he went, although not necessarily alongside him. During the evening shift three marshals had a room adjoining Meredith's in Baxter Hall with a connecting door (through an efficiency kitchen) between Meredith's room and that of the marshals. One marshal was always awake, while the other two might or might not be awake. When the relief changed at five o'clock in the late afternoon, Meredith was usually eating. At that meal as many as nine marshals might be near Meredith -- the relief going off duty, the relief coming on, and the two supervisors and the driver. At the noon meal the relief on duty was with Meredith. For ten days prior to 17 October, Mr. Sather, a Department of Justice attorney, accompanied Meredith wherever he went. 28 John Doar also spent some time with him in the early days.

Apparently at first the military security force responsible for accompanying Meredith and the marshals was on foot, but when Lt. Gallagher, a young officer of the 716th Military Police Battalion, took over the responsibility from an officer of the 2d Infantry Division (who seems to have inherited it from the 327th Battle Group of the 101st Airborne Division), he mounted his men in five jeeps with three-man crews and followed Meredith's and the marshals' sedan, which was dispensed with later. At that early stage the security squad used Golf One through Five as its radio call sign, but then began to get interference and feared that ham operators or other outside monitors had discovered its frequency. In changing its frequency it decided upon a new call sign and adopted the first one that popped into the head of Major John D. A. Hogan, Jr. -- "Peanut" or "Peanuts." Ever after, officially and unofficially, the Special Security Patrol was referred to almost exclusively as the "Peanut Patrol."

When the Peanut Patrol consisted of only four jeeps, as was the case by mid-November, the officer in charge would always position his jeep "in the approximate vicinity of Mr. Meredith," whenever the latter went out, while the remaining three jeeps would position themselves "in the general area of travel by Mr. Meredith, but out of" his sight. If he went to Fulton Chapel, for example, they would then shift positions so as to be at definite positions in the vicinity of the chapel and on various sides of it.

The Oxford-University Area Patrol, using a sedan, which patrolled twenty-four hours a day, came in for considerable criticism from local

authorities and from Senator Stennis, who resented it. It was
continued, however, without being aimed at the Oxonians.

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As will be seen, there was a considerable modification of these
security arrangements in the summer of 1963 prior to the Army's withdrawal.

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Integration of Troops at Oxford. -- One of the most important problems
that the Army faced during General Howze's command at Oxford was that of
utilizing its Negro troops. It will be recalled that there was some
confusion about them on the Sunday and Monday of the riot, when the
intended policy was to forbid their use "on operational missions bringing
them in contact with the public," as General Wheeler emphasized on 1 October

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for General Howze's guidance. Wheeler's instructions to Howze to adhere
to the policy of which he said both General Abrams and General Billingslea
had earlier been informed was precipitated by Senator Stennis' inquiry
after an administrative assistant to Chancellor Williams complained "that
negro troops were being used on patrols" in Oxford, which Stennis said
"he couldn't believe." At about the same time Secretary Vance had
received Congressman John Bell Williams' complaint about the Guardsmen
firing over the heads of their fellow citizens together with the following
inquiry: "The sending of negro troops to Oxford has served only to further
inflame citizens. Did you bear this in mind when ordering troops to Oxford
or did you do it by design? Please reply promptly." Negro soldiers were
not, of course, popular in Mississippi. In late November Oxford city
officials would even object to the Army's use of Negro soldiers on a
regular water detail on which they drew water from an outlet near the
fire station. Col. Keller, however, refused to remove them from the
detail and began using water outlets at the Armory instead.

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On Wednesday, 3 October, when Secretary Vance and General Wheeler discussed redeployment of Oxford troops with the President, they told him about the exclusion of Negro soldiers from public operations which "could cause possible conflict."³⁴ On the following day there were two significant developments respecting the Negro troops in Oxford. For one thing, on Thursday afternoon, General Howze telephoned General Abrams to propose, as Abrams reported the conversation, that he would "start a gradual movement of Negro soldiers from Memphis, Oxford, and Columbus to their home stations. He would not move all of them, but it would be a gradual operation and they would move by aircraft." To this proposal, the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff said "No," as General Abrams recorded the response without explanation.³⁵

At the same time, Meredith complained to Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach that the troops guarding him and seen elsewhere on the campus were segregated. In passing this complaint along early Friday morning as he received it from Katzenbach, General Howze admitted the truth of Meredith's complaint but pointed out that the situation was at Washington's direction. In a briefing later that morning, presumably with reference to this matter, General Wheeler said to ignore Meredith's statements and also cautioned not to attract attention to the Army just then, but that after the coming weekend, which was presumably a reference to the football game, publicity would be all right.³⁶

A series of discussions took place on Friday morning and afternoon between Secretaries McNamara and Vance and Attorney General Kennedy on the subject of utilizing Negro soldiers on operational duties in Mississippi.

Secretary McNamara and President Kennedy also discussed the matter by telephone, and the President directed full integration of Negro soldiers in all cases excepting those of individual sentinels or of isolated missions. On Saturday, 6 October, therefore, General Howze issued instructions to his subordinate commanders to use their Negro soldiers in all duty assignments with two exceptions. Negro soldiers would not be used as "individual sentinels or on isolated individual missions," this being for their own protection. At the same time, the order would not affect the forces then in a ready status on account of the Jackson football game as long as their ready status had to be maintained. He added that "this policy must be applied with great care by all commanders to assure that our men are not placed in situations exposing them to undue risk or where the possibility of conflict with the local citizenry is high." The Columbia Broadcasting System took motion picture films in Oxford on 6 and 7 October of a foot patrol and a jeep patrol showing Negro soldiers which they televised on 9 October.

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Meredith, who was out of town over the weekend, sized up the situation resulting from his protest to Katzenbach the week before and the promise made to him on Friday that corrective measures would be taken. Then, on Tuesday he issued a hand-written statement to a pool correspondent that got widespread coverage and created a considerable stir. This was a two-part statement, in the first half of which he charged that on Monday he had seen unarmed Negro soldiers on a garbage detail. During his first two days at the University, he said,

the military units looked like American units. All soldiers held their positions and performed the task for which they had been trained and ordered. . . . Since that time, the units have been resegregated. Negroes have been purged from their positions in the ranks. On Thursday, Oct. 4, 1962, I brought this to the attention of the proper authorities. On Friday, I was informed that the situation would be corrected and the Negroes would be put back into their places in the ranks. On Monday, Oct. 8, 1962, Negro soldiers were indeed seen again among the soldiers. The ones I saw, however, were on a garbage detail truck and unarmed. The white members of the detail were armed. This condition constitutes a dishonor and a disgrace to the hundreds of thousands of Negroes who wear the uniforms of our military services.

. . . My conscience would not allow me to go on observing the situation without, at least, letting the Negro soldiers know that I did not like them being dishonored. 38

General Clifton, the President's military aide, took the matter up at the Carleton Hotel on Tuesday evening, 9 October, with Generals Wheeler, Dodge, and V. P. Mock, the latter of the Office of the Chief of Staff, and later called the Army War Room to get figures on the number of Negroes returned to their duties. When queried by the War Room, the XVIII Airborne Corps in Oxford asserted that it "could find absolutely no basis for" Meredith's statement and that the units complied with Howze's orders to have Negro soldiers assume their normal duties "almost instantaneously," although "there were, of course, certain restrictions to avoid undue risk." General Dodge and two associates, charged with preparing a press release on the subject, sought information from the War Room around nine o'clock Tuesday evening, but "after working for several hours on a press release to counter the allegations made by Meredith . . . [it] was stopped by the President." 39 Instead of issuing a press release, Secretary Vance simply stated

that during the difficult periods when troops were still employed in the Oxford area Negro soldiers were not used on patrols in order to avoid unnecessary incidents. On 6 Oct. when the situation became more stabilized orders were issued that Negro military personnel of Army units employed in connection with the Oxford situation would be used in the performance of all normal functions in the units in all operations. 40

General Wheeler asked General Howze specifically what implementary steps his local commanders had taken and what the situation was on Sunday, 7 October. General Howze concluded his detailed reply as follows:

I wish to assure DA that orders received at this headquarters have been placed in effect altogether without reluctance or footdragging. I acknowledge some delay in retransmission of instructions -- which instructions manifested no time urgency of execution -- by a very busy staff. Subordinate commanders did not immediately jerk white troopers off details already ordered for execution, nor would I expect them to do so. Personnel on detail at Baxter Hall as individual door guards have the mission of checking each student in and out by pass; it was and remains a matter of good judgment not to put Negroes in such a position of control over white students whose prejudices on this matter are extraordinarily strong. 41

That there was no one view in the Army respecting the question whether or not to keep troops integrated during their participation in racial troubles was seen clearly when the Oxford units prepared their command reports after the riot. General Howze thought that "'across the board' segregation" in the Oxford troubles "had a disruptive effect" on the units involved inasmuch as twenty percent of the strength of the Regular Army was Negro and therefore included company commanders "and other key leaders." He thought "the proper solution" was to give 42 "the field commander all latitude" respecting the matter.

The 82d Airborne Division found that "a serious morale problem" resulted from the fact that the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 503d Infantry

Regiment, had to leave its Negro personnel at the Airport while the
rest of the battle group moved into Oxford. ⁴³ The 101st Airborne
Division complained that "segregation of Negro troops is highly
undesirable. Negro soldiers should perform their normal functions
with their units." ⁴⁴

The 2d Infantry Division, which had reported resentment when
Negroes were withdrawn from the public eye on 2 October, concluded
only that "in operations when racial issues are involved, an early
determination should be made concerning the introduction of negro
[sic] personnel into the area." ⁴⁵

The commander of the 716th Military Police Battalion, who had left
his Negro soldiers in the Memphis staging area at Abrams' order (excepting
one soldier who was overlooked), expressed himself rather strongly
the subject:

The category II personnel of the 716th Military
Police Battalion were left in [the] Memphis Naval Air
Station per order. In addition to the morale factor
among the category II personnel, communication between
Task Force forward and rear was limited, seriously affecting
morning reports, personnel actions and publishing of orders.
By leaving category II personnel in Memphis, the unit lost two
company commanders, one First Sergeant and the communications
sergeant. This greatly hampered operations of the unit. There
were no category II personnel in attachments. Personnel left
in [the] Memphis Naval Air Station were moved to Oxford in two
increments on 2 and 7 October. ⁴⁶

Of the Oxford units commenting on this question of integration of
troops during racial troubles, the only one that took a flatly negative
attitude, was the 720th Military Police Battalion from Fort Hood, Texas,
its commanding officer, Col. Hotaling commenting: "Taking negro [sic]

personnel to Oxford was ill advised. Their presence created a great morale problem for the Battalion commander because they could not be used as Military Policemen. It is recommended that in any future operation of this type the negro personnel remain at home station." 47

Redeployment. -- Washington headquarters initiated planning for redeployment of the military forces by instructions sent General Howze on 2 October. Under them his instructions were to "plan for phased reduction of regular Army troop strength," the objective being "to retain only minimum troops necessary for the maintenance of order in the Oxford area." In developing his plan he was to consult "Dr. Katzenbach and such other officials of the Justice Department as you consider appropriate." 48

President Kennedy, who played an important personal role in the Mississippi operation, took a direct hand in the troop redeployment in the days after the riot. On 3 October, while the troop buildup was still in progress, the staff briefed him on various matters on which he had to make decisions. Prepared for him, among other things, was a summary of force dispositions as of that time -- 9,827 at Oxford, 6,705 at Columbus, and 6,477 at Memphis, 23,009 altogether, which did not include the National Guardsmen at home stations. Also prepared for him was General Howze's plan for a redeployment of the troops then deployed in the operation. President Kennedy approved the undertaking of detailed planning based on the Howze proposal, but "with the understanding that movement would not be initiated prior to 1000 hours, Washington time, 8 October 1962," which would enable the President to make a final decision in the matter as late as Monday morning, 8 October. Such a

postponement of the decision would guarantee, of course, that a sufficient force would be at hand for any developments growing out of the Saturday football game. A further Presidential proviso was that the detailed plan should be drawn so that "movements could be suspended at any time after initiation as the President might desire."

Still another redeployment problem taken up at that time was the matter of the possible release of 2,500 National Guardsmen because of dangerous efforts to raise a sunken chlorine barge in the Mississippi River. Here President Kennedy stood on some ceremony in indicating approval in principle of such a release "provided a request for release of the Guardsmen, specifically for the barge operation, was made to him by Governor Barnett."

President Kennedy also indicated he would be prepared on Monday, 8 October, to consider releasing all of the Mississippi National Guard from Federal control with the exception of the two battle groups, the 108th Armored Cavalry, and the hospital unit then employed in the Oxford area.⁴⁹

In the period immediately following the riot all but approximately two dozen marshals, or deputy marshals, were redeployed, almost 400 border patrolmen and prison guards leaving in the period of 4-5 October. This permitted the dismantling of the tent city in the Holly Springs National Forest, for the remaining marshals would be billeted at the University and in town. In the event of further trouble this large group of marshals would not return; instead, the Army would be used. Upon closing out the tent city the 70th Engineer Battalion (Minus) that had built and operated it, returned to Fort Campbell on 7 October 105 officers and enlisted men

and sixty vehicles, leaving a small detachment of one officer and two
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enlisted men behind.

Under General Howze's instructions, he was to prepare for the redeployment of troops of the Regular Army, nothing being said about the National Guard. As the planning went forward, Katzenbach stated several times in one conference that there should be an Army company in Oxford indefinitely, but Howze disagreed, believing that Regular Army troops would give "a very poor image of the Army." If troops were going to have to remain, General Howze believed a National Guard unit should be used. Col. Smith, Howze's acting chief of staff, believed that National Guardsmen would be perfectly acceptable to Katzenbach, who, he said, "made no differentiation between" Guardsmen and Regulars. General Wheeler's position at that time was that in redeploying the active Army, the military policemen should be the last troops left in Oxford. "I want to get the divisions out first," he said, adding:

I agree with General Howze that leaving an Army company in Oxford indefinitely is for the birds. National Guardsmen -- OK. We can get a hard core group by transfers, etc, that we can keep there forever. What I am really saying here is that this schedule [Howze's proposals?], in my opinion, is much faster than the political leadership will ever permit, so the thing to do is to start scaling down in the Oxford area [by relocating troops in the Memphis or Columbus areas] in order to establish some sort of confidence here and normalcy there that something isn't going to blow up. 51

In accordance with General Wheeler's views respecting a scaling down in the Oxford area by moving units to the Memphis area or to Columbus pending redeployment to home stations, General Abrams, early Monday morning, 8 October, requested Howze to explain how he would go about it, should such movements be ordered. Also, in accordance with

General Wheeler's view that there was "no law that says the National Guard can't be used on operational missions," Abrams told Howze that the Department believed the time was "approaching when it would be appropriate and beneficial to make greater use of the Army National Guard . . . in the actual operations pertaining to Oxford and the University campus. This reintroduction of" Guard units, Abrams explained, "should visualize for the future an appropriate . . . Guard unit of a composition to be determined to remain on Federal duty in the Oxford area over a protracted period of time. . . ."

By 9 October, however, it was clear that General Wheeler had no fixed views on the subject of what kind of force to use over the long term. "On balance" he did "not believe it in the best interests of the Army to be saddled with the whole long-term task in the Oxford area." At the same time, he was "not aware of the reliability of the State Police," and he might therefore be "more conservative" in his approach than those . . . [persons] on the ground and aware of the local attitudes and dangers." He knew, of course, that there had to be enough force in Oxford to "guarantee the personal safety of Mr. Meredith," and he had come to some conclusions. He thought "the residual force" should be a mixed force of Regular Army military police and National Guard units all commanded by a Regular Army senior field or general officer. He thought, too, that the ratio of Regular to Guard personnel should be one to two. These forces, on the total strength of which he had not yet made up his mind, would be supported by suitable Regular Army administrative and support elements.

General Howze's recommendations, which provided for the phased return of the Regular Army units to home stations over the brief span of five days,

went to the Continental Army Command on 3 October for planning, which the Department directed the following day. The plan was to provide that M-day might be Monday, 8 October, or any day thereafter. H-hour was not to be earlier than 1400Z (eight o'clock in the morning, CST), and the execution of each day's redeployment was subject to clearance by the Department. (R-day and R-hour, the time redeployment actually would commence, was finally used, while H-hour was used by the Air Force for positioning its planes.) Finally, the plan was to be so drawn that its operation could be suspended at any time.

On 6 October, the CONARC transmitted the resulting plan, which, as General Howze had recommended, provided for return of the Regular Army troops to their home stations over a period of five days. The Jackson football games having gone off without any trouble, there having been no reaction to the reintegration of the Negro troops (which Wheeler thought was the x-factor in the equation), and Meredith having returned safely to the University shortly before six o'clock Sunday evening, Oxford time, from a weekend away from the campus, the Department later that evening set the following day, Monday, 8 October, as R-day, in accordance with the
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CONARC plan.

The initial units departed from Oxford by air promptly at eight o'clock Monday morning, Oxford time, as scheduled. Among the units redeploying that day were the 1st Battle Group, 502d Airborne Infantry Regiment; the 2d Battle Group, 501st Airborne Infantry Regiment; the 1st Battle Group, 1st Infantry Regiment; and several miscellaneous support units, with an aggregate strength of somewhat less than 6,000. Also redeployed at that time was the 26th Aviation Squadron of the U.S.

Marine Corps. Redeployments on R-plus-1 and R-plus-2, Tuesday and Wednesday, 9 and 10 October, proceeded largely as planned, and on the latter day General Billingslea resumed command of the Oxford forces in place of General Howze. On the following day, R-plus-3, the Department informed General Billingslea's headquarters that there would be no redeployment of Regular Army forces that day, and, indeed, there were no more significant redeployments until Friday, 19 October.

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Meanwhile, on 9 October, looking toward the further redeployments of the next day, General Wheeler reminded General Howze that they were now accomplishing their "first objective of restoring to ready STRAC status at home stations the two airborne divisions" and General Howze's own headquarters. Those redeployments, together with the release of thirty percent of the Mississippi National Guard for hardship and compassionate reasons, General Wheeler said, now brought the Army "to the problem of determining military posture in Mississippi for the long term." He then spoke of the possibility of a mixed Regular and Guard force, as has been seen; however, this would be a problem that General Billingslea would have to face. In the meantime, there were several problems respecting the National Guard, besides that of deciding about the use of Guardsmen at Oxford, that pressed for attention.

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Many Guardsmen who had been called had pressing personal objections, for they were, variously, "junior college and high school teachers and college students, as well as . . . key personnel of many small businesses . . . farmers, doctors, lawyers and other professional men," as Senator Stennis pointed out in a telegram to General Wheeler on 5 October. "Great personal inconveniences and hardships are being endured not only

by the individuals themselves but by entire communities," he added. He thought they ought to be released at once, and that, for that matter, the troops in the Oxford area ought to be reduced in number for they were many more than "could possibly be needed." The whole situation was "deplorable." Representative Arthur Winstead sent Wheeler and the President similar messages on 8 October, joining with the people of his state "in bitter protest" and calling upon him "to release these men immediately."⁵⁷

Aware of the problem before hearing from Senator Stennis and Representative Winstead, however, the Army laid it down on 4 October that effective the next day all members of the Mississippi Army and Air National Guard, excepting those units employed in the Oxford area -- the 1st Battle Group, 155th Infantry Regiment (less two companies and the platoon of another company), the 2d Battle Group, 155th Infantry, the 108th Armored Cavalry Regiment (to which Capt. Falkner's Troop E belonged), and the 134th Medical Hospital, would "be authorized to pursue their normal vocations," provided they kept their units informed constantly of their whereabouts. Then, on 9 October, the Department laid it down that certain categories of Guardsmen would be released effective midnight, 10 October. Included were teachers, students, and those who could be released because of personal hardship, community hardship, critical occupations, and seasonal employment.⁵⁸

At least as early as 1 October the Oxford staff officers in the Pentagon had learned from the Chief of Engineers that pressure might be exerted to release National Guardsmen for civil defense operations in the

Natchez area where the Corps of Engineers had responsibility for raising, as a dangerous threat to the surrounding population, some 1,100 tons of liquid chlorine in four tanks from a barge that had sunk in the Mississippi River eighteen months before. The result was that in the next few days this matter required considerable attention and resulted, after an official request from the State of Mississippi, in the release of a number of Guard units -- about 3,500 men -- as of midnight, Oxford time, 5 October. Included, at the express request of the State of Mississippi, were two companies and a platoon from another company of the 1st Battle Group, 155th Infantry Regiment, which was on duty in the Oxford area, because its men came from the vicinity of the salvage operation.

As of midnight, 9 October 1962, the Department of the Army released over 3,000 additional Army National Guardsmen, together with slightly more than 1,000 Air National Guardsmen, leaving on duty the 1st Battle Group, 155th Infantry Regiment (Minus), the 2d Battle Group, 155th Infantry, and the 108th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the three principal units that had been ordered to the Oxford area on 30 September. These three units were reduced the following day by the release of teachers,⁵⁹ students, and other special classes.

As in the case of the Arkansas National Guard called up for the Little Rock operation,⁶⁰ there was difficulty processing the Guard because of the haste with which it was called into Federal service and the almost equal haste with which much of it was released. The problem of physical examinations, was perhaps especially troublesome. What it

came down to in general was that if the units themselves could not complete their own processing prior to release, the processing was to "be accomplished as expeditiously as possibly subsequent to release date."
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The Department's planning objective for 10 October was to deploy from Mississippi and Tennessee the Headquarters of General Howze's XVIII Airborne Corps, the remainder of the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions, the 503d Military Police Battalion (which had been the first Regular Army unit at the riot), and appropriate elements of Marine and Army aviation. Under this plan, which would replace General Howze with General Billingslea as the commanding general of the operational forces in Mississippi, there would be left, basically, the Headquarters of Billingslea's 2d Infantry Division; the 2d Battle Group, 23d Infantry Regiment; the 716th and 720th Military Police Battalions (with attachments); the 1st Battle Group, 155th Infantry (Minus); the 2d Battle Group, 155th Infantry; the 108th Armored Cavalry Regiment (minus three tank companies that were never in Oxford); some Marine and Army aviation elements; and other support units. When the Army carried this plan out on schedule, there remained in the Oxford area about 2,600 Regular Army and 2,600 National Guardsmen,
62
soon to be decreased by about 400 -- still a sizeable force. As a matter of fact, there was criticism of what seemed to some persons the deployment of an unnecessarily large number of troops to accomplish the task at hand.

Question of Overreaction. -- As the Office of the Chief of Information put it succinctly, "a decision was reached shortly after

Army units began arriving at Oxford to make no public announcement locally of the large number of units being ordered into the area." The OCINFO established a press office in the Armory on Monday morning where "the members of the press were given assistance," and then found that the large number of reporters "remained a problem throughout the day." When General Howze arrived to take command Monday afternoon, the Army announced his arrival to the press, but "he directed that local announcement as units arrived be discontinued and that . . . in response to queries" no strength figures should be released, but only unit designations. Both the Departments of the Army and of Defense approved this policy.

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One cannot say from the record whether General Howze's refusal to publish strength figures was simply a standard operating procedure or whether he was concerned with public reaction to the numbers of troops deployed. There was concern in Washington, however, which resulted very quickly, on the morning of 2 October, in instructions to Howze to stabilize troop strength in the Oxford area "at not to exceed 10,000." He was to hold the remainder of the deployed troops "in the vicinity of Memphis NAS or Columbus AFB." The Chief of Staff thought General Howze could "accomplish the desired stabilization in an orderly fashion in about 12 hours." He could rotate his troops as desired, while maintaining the 10,000-man level in the Oxford area, but he was to keep Federalized Mississippi National Guard troops "in the Oxford area at all times, to include any periods when . . . withdrawn from operations for rest." If, for operational reasons, General Howze found it necessary "to deviate

from the ceiling established for the Oxford area," he was to recommend
64
the change to General Wheeler "prior to initiating troop movements."

In explaining these instructions to General Howze over the telephone
an hour or so before he confirmed them, General Wheeler observed that he
thought

the possibilities of anything blowing up are not very great.
I haven't found anybody that disagrees with that. One thing
I know triggered this restriction this morning []: [] our
people for good reasons don't want to show any continuing
buildup in the Oxford area. We were asked what the buildup
had reached and the figure of 10,000 was acceptable. Anything
greater than that was not. . . . I have one further thing.
The desire was expressed . . . not to turn the campus into an
armed campus

On the latter point, Wheeler explained that Howze should keep directly
on the campus only those men engaged in some necessary activity --
guarding the entrances, maintaining patrols, and so on; otherwise,
as when they were off duty, for example, the soldiers should be kept away
65
from the campus.

There was more than one reason why Washington and the Army wanted
to redeploy the troops assigned to the Oxford operation as soon as
possible. As has been seen, most of them were redeployed within a
relatively short time, but despite this, and despite such other
precautions as those just mentioned, there was sharp criticism of the
deployment and troop buildup. Washington authorities justified it,
however, on the grounds that given the circumstances they could not
know how bad the situation would become and therefore had to be prepared
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for the worst.

Change of Command. -- With the scheduled redeployment of General Howze's
headquarters, his own tour in Oxford came to an end. In passing command of

the Mississippi forces to General Billingslea, Howze spoke well of both his successor and of the Army. There had been, he said, no serious disorder since Monday, 1 October, which was "due in very large measure to the exceptionally effective performance of duty by troops under command of General Billingslea prior to my arrival." To this he added:

The Army at this time enjoys a remarkably good reputation in and about the town of Oxford and The University of Mississippi. There is a mountain of evidence to support this. Credit is due the trooper whose soldierly appearance, discipline, courtesy and forbearance has earned him the liking and respect of local citizens under sometimes very trying circumstances. 67

General Howze thought that the force to which the Army ought to phase down at Oxford should consist of the second squadron of the 108th Armored Cavalry, which, with the authorized removal of thirty percent of its strength, would approximate 290 men, including Oxford's Troop E, plus one company (150 men) of the 720th Military Police Battalion. Such a force, he said, would meet the desired ratio of two to one. For its command he suggested a colonel to be nominated by the Third Army or the Department in Washington. Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach, he said, concurred in such a force and in General Billingslea's phasing down to it by the following Saturday, provided the University took prompt disciplinary action.

At eight o'clock on Wednesday morning, 10 October, Oxford time, General Howze passed command of the Oxford forces to General Billingslea, who again assumed command responsibility in Mississippi. 68

Footnotes to Chapter V

1. DA SitRep No. 2-62 (as of 01/0700 Oct 1962 [EDT 7]), (U) par 16; and memo of telecon with Rickett, CONARC, 01/0240 Oct 1962 [EDT 7], Chron File, 28 Sep - 1 Oct 1962, Tab 54.
2. Pencil memo of telecon with Abrams, 01/0318 [Oct 1962, EDT 7], in file on Memoranda -- Miscellaneous Drafts & Rough Notes (Sep - Dec 1962), I.
3. DA SitRep No. 2-62 (as of 01/0700 Oct 1962 [EDT 7]), (U) pars 20, 21, 27.
4. Memos for the rcd, 0915 and 0917 [EDT 7] 1 Oct 1962, Chron File, 28 Sep - 1 Oct 1962, Tab 61. See also telecons (all from typescripts in file on Memoranda of Conversations [Sep 1962 - 7]) as follows: Parker-Buchanan, 0952 [EDT 7], 1 Oct 1962; Carns-Abrams, 1010 [EDT, 1 Oct 1962 7]; Howze-Parker, 1025 [EDT, 1 Oct 1962 7]; Billingslea-Carns, 1025 [EDT, 1 Oct 1962 7]; Erlbert [Hurlbut? 7]-Parker, 1040 [EDT, 1 Oct 1962 7]; and Parker-Exton or Hurlbut, 1330 [EDT 7], 1 Oct 1962. On the assumption that all forces scheduled might not be enough, see pencil memo marked "McNamara from Pres" (and, in ink, "Sec Vance 1425 hrs") in file on Memoranda - Drafts & Rough Notes (Sep - Dec 1962), I; DA SitRep No. 3-62 (as of 01/2000 [EDT 7]) pars (S) 17 and (U) 21. On Marine forces and helicopters, see (S) Memo for the CNO from CS USMC (Lt Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr.), sub: Availability and Readiness of Marine Ground Forces for Emergency Airlift from CONUS Bases -- preliminary planning data, 1 Oct 1962; msg, CINCPACFLT to CNO, 02/0559Z; and msg, CINCLANTFLT to CNO, [02/1010Z 7]. On the movement to Oxford of the 82d Abn Div and that of the 101st Abn Div, see 82d Abn Div After Action Report Operation RAPID ROAD, 2 Nov 1962, and 101st Abn Div Command Report, 17 Nov 1962, XVIII Abn Corps Command Report, 6 Dec 1962, incls 2-3.
5. Figures on troop strengths are available, of course, in DA and other sitreps, but the above summary is based upon Jung's figures in the Cong. Fact Paper, pp. 3-3.1, 5.1-5.2, which he says are "the most honest" [i.e., the most carefully arrived at 7] figures available. Also telecon with Jung, 23 Apr 1964.
6. Cf. Billingslea's instructions (msg, DA [by Abrams 7] to Billingslea, 30/0711Z Sep 1962, DA 919745) with Howze's instructions ([S 7] msg, DA [by Parker 7] to CG XVIII Abn Corps [Howze 7], 01/1640Z Oct 1962, DA 919750). See also XVIII Abn Corps Command Report, 6 Dec 1962, p. 1.
7. Memo for red (by Hall), 1 Oct 1962, and memo, Stromberg to Parker, 3 Oct 1962, both in Chron File, 1-4 Oct 1962, Tabs 6 and 44, respectively. See also transcript of Carns - Abrams telecon, 03/1003 [EDT 7], Oct 1962, in file on Memoranda of Conversations (Sep 1962 -); and unsigned memo, 3 Oct 1962 (in file on Memoranda -- Misc Drafts & Rough Notes [Sep - Dec 1962 7], I, stating that Abrams would arrive in Washington at "1705 today on American Flt 304").

8. Memo for rcd on Chief of Staff Conversation with Gen Howze at 01/2225 - 2235, Oct 1963, Chron File, 1-4 Oct 1962, Tab 11; (S) DA SitRep No. 4-62 (as of 02/0700 Oct 1962), (U) pars 2-3; msg, 2d Inf Div to AWR, 01/2145S / Oct 1962 7; and XVIII Abn Corps Command Report, 6 Dec 1962, p. 1. Howze's instructions were in msg, DA (DCSOPS--Parker) to CG XVIII Abn Corps (Howze), 01/1640Z (DA 919750). Latter msg downgraded to FOUO; then downgraded to UNCLAS because of publication. See DA 941541, 18/2050Z Oct 1963.

9. XVIII Abn Corps Command Report, 6 Dec 1962, p. 2; 2d Inf Div Command Report for Period 01/2100Z Oct 1962, 31 Oct 1962, ibid., Incl 1, p. 2; draft msg, CSA to Howze, 02/1114 / Oct 1962 7, Chron File, 1-4 Oct 1962, Tab 18a; and XVIII Abn Corps SitRep No. 2 (01/1700S - 02/1700S).

10. XVIII Abn Corps Command Report, 6 Dec 1962, pp. 7-8; / G. R. Thompson 7 op. cit., pp. 5-6; OCSigO After-Action Report on the Oxford, Mississippi Operation / Initial Report 7, various entries, pp. 2, 8, 10-11; OCSigO After-Action Report on the Oxford Mississippi Operation, 14 Sep - 31 Oct 1962, pp. 2-3; transcripts of Wheeler-Parker telecon and of related telecons, 02/1215 - 1225 Oct / 1962 7, in file on Memoranda of Conversations (Sep 1962 -); msg, CGUSCONARC, to RUCAC/CGUSATHREE, and others, 02/0640Z Oct 1962 (DAIN 791422); msg, in penciled draft, Parker to Howze, marked "Priority / Also Sent info to CG CONARC" and identified as "Item 22, 01/1908Z," which must surely have been 02/1908Z / Oct 1962 7, in file on Signal Communications; msg, CG XVIII Abn Corps to DA, 02/1345 / CST? 7 (Howze to Parker, reading "reference Your Item 22 please inform Wheeler we did not repeat not request enormous lift signal equipment"); and (FOUO) msg, DA to CGUSCONARC, 02/2247Z Oct 1962 (DA 318336). The Signal Corps retained responsibility for signal communications in Oxford as long as the Army remained there. For additional information on those communications, see the misc docs in file on Signal Communications, but also the monthly OCSigO Oxford after-action reports, the final one of which was dated 19 Aug 1963.

11. (S) Msg, DA (by Parker) to CGUSCONARC (for Buchanan), 01/1638Z Oct 1962 (DA 919749); msg, DA to Abrams, 01/1936Z Oct 1962, who was to pass it to Daniel (DA 919757); and 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, p. 6.

12. AWR Journal, entries for 01/0845, 01/1200, 01/1758 / all EDT 7 Oct 1962; (C) 3d Army (Rear) Logistic Report / No. 1 7 as of 02/2100Z Oct 1962); ibid., No. 10 (Final Report, 14/0012Z Oct 1962), adv cy having been sent DCSLOG, AQC, at 13/0132Z Oct 1962, giving the time of the closing out of 3d Army (Rear) at the MNAS as 13/1400E / sic 7 Oct 1962; msg, DA (by DCSOPS) to CGUSCONARC, 09/1509Z Oct 1962 (DA 318874); DA SitRep No. 19-62 (as of 09/1800 Oct 1962), par 4; (C) msg, CGUSATHREE to CGUSCONARC, 14/1849Z Oct 1962 (DAIN 276373); and USAFOX SitRep No. 50 (22/1900Z - 23/0100Z Oct 1962).

13. XVIII Abn Corps Command Report, 6 Dec 1962, pp. 5, 6; and Extract from the Annual Report of Medical Service Activities, Third Army [1963?] (unpag), provided by the OTSG. For strength figures on units controlled by the 3d Army, as of 10 Oct 1962 (290 at Memphis and 701 at Oxford), see memos for the rcd (by Branch), both 10 Oct 1962, in Chron File, 10-11 Oct 1962, Tabs 19 and 23, respectively.

14. Cong. Fact Paper, p. 3.2 (11 Jan 1963); XVIII Abn Corps Command Report, 6 Dec 1962, p. 5; and 2d Inf Div Command Report, 31 Oct 1962, ibid., Incl 1, pp. 4 and 5. Also see 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, p. 8, and the logistical sections of the monthly command reports of the U.S. Army Oxford prepared for the period 20 Oct 1962 to July 1963. None for the month of July 1963 (to 25 Jul) is in the files and probably was ever prepared. See additionally the following 3d Army files, passim: Messages Sent by 3d Army; Messages Sent by 3d Army (Rear) -- General; and Messages Sent by 3d Army (Rear) -- Logistics Reports [1-10].

15. (C) Msg, DA (DCSPER) to CGUSATHREE, 04/006Z Oct 1962 (DA 919869); msg, DA (DCSPER, ACTCOM) to CGUSCONARC, 4 Oct [04/1720Z] 1962; msg, idem to idem, 04/2008Z Oct 1962 (DA 318542); msg, OPO DA (HPMP) to CGUSCONARC, 05/2103Z Oct 1962 (DA 318678); Extract from the Annual Report of Medical Service Activities THIRD ARMY [1963?] , in file on 3d Army Medical Service, Oxford; [Welch], op. cit., p. 3; and AWR Journal entry in Chron File, 1-4 Oct 1962, Tab 20. On physical examinations (which physical "inspections" apparently equalled only for the sake of the record), note Abrams' remark on the morning of 6 Oct 1962 that "General McGowan called [Miss. Adj Gen] Wilson's office and told them these people [certain Guardsmen] would be off the Federal payroll at midnight last night; but it wasn't necessary to have a physical examination." Memo for rcd [of discussion in AWR], 06/0800-0900 Oct 1962, in file on Memoranda of Conversations (Sep 1962 -).

16. Memo for rcd (by Schlotzhauer), sub: Call from Gen Howze, 03/1250 Oct 1962, Chron File, 1-4 Oct 1962, Tab 30.

17. Intelligence Log, entry R-2000/ACSI 2050.

18. Ibid., entries for 02/0410, 02/0700, 02/1135, 02/1330, 03/1659, 03/2245, 04/0025, 04/1100, 04/1930 -- Oct 1962; XVIII Abn Corps SitRep No. 24 (09/0100Z - 0700Z Oct 1962), cy in Chron File, 7-9 Oct 1962, Tab 88; and Vanderburgh, op. cit., p. 41.

19. Memo for rcd (by Carns), 3 Oct 1962, Chron File, 1-4 Oct 1962, Tab 30a; and McNamara - [Howze?] telecon, [4 Oct 1962], in file on Memoranda of Conversations (Sep 1962 -).

20. Memo for rcd (Wheeler - Abrams conversation), 04/0800 1962, in file ibid.; statement by DOD, 4 Oct 1962, which went out to the press, Chron File, 1-4 Oct 1962, Tab 57; memo for rcd (by Abrams), sub: Scheduling Football Game, 4 Oct 1962, ibid., Tab 61; and memo for rcd (by Abrams), 4 Oct 1962, in file on Memoranda -- General (4 Oct).

21. Memo for rcd (by McGuire), 5 Oct 1962, Chron File, 4-6 Oct 1962, Tab 75.

22. (S) Msg, CSA to CG XVIII Abn Corps, 05/2358Z /Oct 1962 7, Item 19, cy ibid., Tab 78; (S) msg, AWR to idem, 06/0431Z, cy in file on Memoranda -- General (6 Oct); memos for rcd (by Adcock), 5 and 6 Oct 1962, Chron File, 4-6 Oct 1962, Tabs 73-74 and 79; memo for rcd (by McDaniel), 6 Oct 1962, ibid., Tab 82; Special Report to White House SitRm (by Abrams), n.d., ibid., Tab 83; notes dictated by Wheeler, 06/1245 /Oct 1962 7 for incorporation in msg to Howze and in SitRep to White House, ibid., Tab 87; and memo for rcd (by Davis), 6 Oct 1962, ibid., Tab 90.

23. Memo for rcd (by Orr), 6 Oct 1962, ibid., Tab 86; tel msg, Fisher, G2, XVIII Abn Corps, to /AWR? 7, 06/1320 /Oct 1962 7, taken by Orr, ibid., Tab 89; memo for rcd (by Orr), sub: Periodic Intelligence Report, 6 Oct 1962, ibid., Tab 93; another memo by Orr, same date, ibid., Tab 97; memo for rcd (by Jung), 6 Oct 1962, ibid., Tab 98; XVIII Abn Corps SitRep No. 15, 06/1837Z /Oct 1962 7, cy ibid., Tab 99; and memos for rcd (by Rundquist), 6 Oct 1962, ibid., Tabs 105 and 108.

24. See (C) DA SitRep No. 9-62 (04/0600 - 1800 EDT Oct 1962); (S) ibid., No. 10-62 (04/1800 - 05/0500 EDT Oct 1962); (C) ibid., No. 11-62 (05/0500 - 1800 Oct 1962); and (C) ibid., No. 12-62 (05/1800 - 06/0500 EDT, Oct 1962).

25. When he was about to leave Oxford, Howze observed that while he did not want to "split hairs," he had to "point out that to guarantee repeat guarantee /the 7 personal safety of Mr. Meredith would require extraordinary measures not now being enforced. For example, it would be possible for a crackpot to secrete himself in a building" that no troops occupied -- "and with a rifle shoot Meredith." Msg, CG XVIII Abn Corps to AWR, 10/0302Z /Oct 1962 7; and (S) msg, CG XVIII Abn Corps to DA (DCSOPS for Fisher), 02/0145Z /Oct 1962 7.

26. For the SOP of the Alert Platoon, see Hqs USAFOX directive by that title, 27 Jan 1963, in file on Security Arrangements, Oxford. For an incident involving the Alert Platoon and the National Guard, see Falkner Statement, p. 12.

27. See (C) DA SitRep No. 9-62 (04/0600 - 1800 EDT Oct 1962) on the intelligence agents; and (C) msg, DA (DCSOPS) to COUSAOX /hereafter regularly USAFOX 7, 14/0613Z May 1963, DA 928000, on the security arrangements as they were in mid-May 1963. In the early weeks a guard was also wounded at Gerard Hall, which was alongside Baxter Hall.

28. Memo, U.S. Federal Marshal Activities /at Oxford, Miss. 7, 17 Oct 1962, in file on Security Arrangements, Oxford; and the following note.

29. For an account of how "The Peanut Patrol" got its name, see the paper by that title by Capt. Robert D. Masters, USAFOX IO, 13 Apr 1963, in file on Security Arrangements, Oxford. On the mission, composition, and operational procedures of the Peanut Patrol, see Hqs USAFOX, Memo No. 5, SOP for Special Security Patrol (Peanut Patrol), 18 Nov 1962, and the map showing how, for example, the jeep positions changed to cover Meredith's attendance at Fulton Chapel -- both filed ibid.

30. Cong. Fact Paper, p. 5.4 (rev. 23 Apr 1963); and notes on (S) unpublished raw transcript of Report of Proceedings Held before Committee on Armed Services Briefing on Department of Defense Programs for Fiscal Year 1964, Feb. 27, 1963. Cf. Hqs USAFOX, Special Orders for the Oxford-University Area Patrol (Temporary), 21 Jan 1963, which were probably special instructions to cover end-of-semester contingencies.

31. See the following msgs, all from DA (by Powell for DCSOPS) to COUSAFOX: (C) 14/0613Z May 1963 (DA 928000), (C) 15/1847Z May 1963 (DA 928074), 10/1317Z June 1963 (DA 340730). For more detailed information on Oxford security arrangements, see docs, passim, in the file on Withdrawal of Troops from Oxford, 1963; and in Vanderburgh, op. cit., pp. 43-44, as well as the files containing msgs sent by the various CG's and CO's at Oxford. On the withdrawal of the Army from Oxford, see last chap, below.

32. See cy of "instructions . . . prepared by C/S personally and handed to DCSOPS at 011535Z Oct 1962," in gathering of docs marked "Copies of Memos for Record & Orders Reference Use of Colored Soldiers Oxford Area," Signed Rundquist, in file on Memoranda -- General (9 Oct).

33. Teleg, Williams to Vance, 01/4:35 p.m., EDT, Oct 1962 (DAIN 791207). Oxford objections to Negroes on the water detail are mentioned in DA SitRep No. 85-62 (as of 29/0800, EDT, Nov 1962).

34. (FOUO) White House Fact Sheet, Abrams to CSA Wheeler, sub: Utilization of Negro Military Personnel in Miss., 10 Oct 1962, par 3, w/7 incls, in Chron File, 10-11 Oct 1962, Tab 13.

35. Memo for rcd (by Abrams), 4 Oct 1962, with Abrams' initialed notations on the Secretary's and C/S's response, in file on Memoranda -- General (4 Oct); (C) msg, DA (by Abrams) to CG XVIII Abn Corps, 04/1948Z, yellow tissue cy of reply with dispatch time penciled in, Chron File, 4-6 Oct 1962, Tab 4.

36. Telecon?, AWR with Howze, 05/0100 Oct 1962, ibid., Tab 35; and memo for rcd (by Hall), 05/0755 Oct 1962, ibid., Tab 48.

37. (FOUO) White House Fact Sheet, Abrams to CSA Wheeler, 10 Oct 1962, pars 7-8 and Incls 3 (cy of msg, CG XVIII Abn Corps to Commanders All Units Participating in Operation RAPID ROAD, 06/1200, CST, Oct 1962) and 4 (memo on CBS motion picture/television films of Oxford).

38. "Meredith Statement," The New York Times, 10 Oct 1962, p. 32.
39. Memo for rcd (by Shive), sub: Numbers of Colored Troops Returned to Regular Duty (U), 9 Oct 1962, Chron File, 7-9 Oct 1962, Tab 101; and unsigned memo for rcd, 9 Oct 1962 in file on Memoranda -- General (9 Oct).
40. "Vance Statement," The New York Times, 10 Oct 1962, p. 32.
41. Msg, Howze to Wheeler, undated cy with memo, Abrams to Wheeler, 10 Oct 1962, Incl 7, Chron File, 10-11 Oct 1962, Tab 13. See also Howze's comment on his "becoming daily more impressed by the depth and strength" of the Mississippians' "convictions respecting the state's social order," in his msg to AWR, 10/0302Z 7 Oct 1962 7, cy in file ibid., Tab 2. According to Wheeler, Howze's response satisfied the President. Memo for rcd (by Abrams), sub: Integration of Negro Military Personnel in Units in the Oxford Area, 10 Oct 1962, ibid., Tab 15; and Notes -- General Wheeler's Visit to the War Room 11/0755 Oct 1962, p. 5, a transcript of a discussion, cy in file on Memoranda of Conversations 7 Sep 1962 - 7.
42. XVIII Abn Corps Command Report, 6 Dec 1962, p. 10.
43. 82d Abn Div After-Action Report, 2 Nov 1962, ibid., Incl 2, p. 4.
44. Commenting upon support activities, the 101st reported that "initially the laundry and bath facilities were inadequate. Improvised showers had to be installed to cope with the problem of showers for Negro personnel." See 101st Abn Div Command Report, 17 Nov 1962, ibid., Incl 3, pp. 4 and 5.
45. 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, pp. 6, 10.
46. 716th MP Bn Command Report, 9 Nov 1962, ibid., Tab I, p. 9. The Army evidently still referred to its Negro soldiers as "Category II personnel."
47. 720th MP Bn After-Action Report, 31 Dec 1962, ibid., Tab J, p. 3.
48. (C) Msg, Wheeler to Howze, 02/2327Z 7 Oct 1962 7, draft approved by Parker and bearing dispatch time penciled in Chron File, 1-4 Oct 1962, Tab 39.
49. (S) Summary sheet prepared by McDaniel and signed by Parker, ODCSOPS, sub: Material Presented to the President on 3 Oct 1962, incl (S) memo, Vance, Sec/A, to Sec/D 7 3 Oct 1962 7, w/3 incls, Chron File, 1-4 Oct 1962, Tab 49. An unclassified draft of Vance's memo is in the file on Memoranda -- General (3 Oct).

50. (C) 3d Army (Rear), Logistic Report No. 3 (03/2400Z - 04/2400Z Oct 1962), 05/2001 Oct 1962, cy in Chron File, 4-6 Oct 1962, Tab 40 (DAIN 273421); CG XVIII Abn Corps to AWR, 05/0810Z / Oct 1962 7, cy ibid., Tab 49; memo for rcd (McDaniel), 5 Oct 1962, Ibid., Tab 66; memo for rcd (by Schlotzhauer), sub: Inactivation of Tent Camp, 5 Oct 1962, ibid., Tab 69; and DA SitReps (C) No. 12-62 (05/1800 - 06/0500, EDT, Oct 1962) and (C) No. 15-62 (07/0500 - 07/1800 Oct 1962).

51. Memo for rcd (by Leonard), sub: Call from Col. Smith, XVIII Abn Corps, 07/2100 Oct 1962, in file on Memoranda -- General (8 Oct); Wheeler - Parker - Schlotzhauer conversation, / 7-8? Oct 1962 7, in file on Memoranda of Conversations (Sep 1962 -), and memo for rcd (by Abrams), sub: Telecon, / AWR? 7 with Col Smith, Acting Chief of Staff, XVIII Abn Corps, about 08/1055, EDT, Oct 1962, pp. 1, 2, 4, in file ibid.

52. (C) Msg, DA (by Abrams) for DCSOPS), 08/1438Z Oct 1962 (DA 919974), cy in Chron File, 7-9 Oct 1962, Tab 22; and Wheeler-Parker-Schlotzhauer conversation / 7-8? Oct 1962 7, in file on Memoranda of Conversations (Sep 1962 -).

53. (C) Msg, DA (by CSA) to CG XVIII Abn Corps, 09/2141Z (DA 920055).

54. See transcript of Wheeler-Abrams-Schlotzhauer conversation, 07/0920 Oct 1962, pp. 1 and 2, in file on Memoranda of Conversations (Sep 1962 -); DA SitRep No. 15-62 (as of 07/1800 Oct 1962); and msg, CGUSCONARC to CG XVIII Abn Corps and others, 08/0130Z Oct 1962 (DAIN 793418).

55. On redeployment in general, see / J. P. Welch 7, (C) Operation RAPID ROAD, a draft chapter from the USCONARC Annual Historical Summary for FY 1963, pp. 10-14, in file on General Accounts (Statistical Summaries, Etc.). For copies of some of the documents cited in Welch's account, together with some additional ones, including operational plans and orders, see Chron File, 4-6 Oct 1962, Tabs 42, (C) 55, (C) 56, and (S) 103; ibid., 7-9 Oct 1962, Tabs 37, 38, (C) 39 (CONARC OPORD 4-62), (C) 40 (CONARC OPLAN 4-62), 61, 62, 81 and 88 (Execution Order for R+1). See also DA SitReps. for the days concerned.

56. See (C) msg, CSA to CG XVIII Abn Corps, 9 Oct 1962 (DA 920055), cy in Chron File, 7-9 Oct 1962, Tab 98; and this chap at n. 52, above.

57. Teleg, Stennis to Wheeler, 5/3:24 PM, Oct 1962 (DAIN 792880); teleg, Winstead / Winstead 7 to Wheeler, 8/3:13 PM Oct 1962 (DAIN 793580); and Winstead to The President, 8/6:02 p.m. Oct 1962. See also, e.g., Morris Cunningham, "Interruption of Education of Guardsmen Stirrs Protest," The Commercial Appeal (Memphis), 9 Oct 1962.

58. Msg, DA to CG XVIII Abn Corps, 04/2334Z Oct 1962 (DA 318597); msg, NGB and others, to TAG, Miss., 04/2351Z Oct 1962 (DA 318600); White House Spot Report (by McGuire), sub: National Guard Status, 09/1815 Oct 1962, Chron File, 7-9 Oct 1962, Tab 91; ibid., 10-11 Oct 1962, Tabs 18 and 20; DA SitRep No. 19-62 (as of 09/1800 Oct 1962); (C) ibid., No. 22-62 (as of 11/0500 Oct 1962); and msg, DA (by CSA) to CG XVIII Abn Corps, 09/1715Z Oct 1962 (DA 318895). See also msg, CG XVIII Abn Corps to CG 2d Inf Div (Zen), 04/2207Z Oct 1962 7, cy in Chron File, 4-6 Oct 1962, Tab 34, re granting of travel passes to NG to take care of urgent personal business within certain limits. On the 30% limitation and the less than TOE strength of the 108th ACR, see msg, CG 2d Inf Div to AWR, 13/1655Z Oct 1962 (DAIN 795683).

59. For orders releasing the Guardsmen for the chlorine-barge salvage operation, see msg, DA (by CSA) to CG XVIII Abn Corps and others, 04/2334Z Oct 1962 (DA 318598); DA (by Sec/A) to Barnett, 04/1511Z Oct 1962 (DA 318501); and msg, DA (by CSA) to CGUSCONARC and others, 04/1748Z Oct 1962 (DA318513). Also see transcript of telecon, Parker-Billingslea, 2 Oct 1962, in file on Memoranda of Conversations (Sep 1962 -); "U.S. Reduces Mississippi's Active Guard," The Washington Post Times Herald, 5 Oct 1962, p. A10; the Chron File, 1-4 Oct 1962, Tabs 31, 34-35, 45, 53-54, 59, 64-66, 69; ibid., 4-6 Oct 1962, Tabs 8 and 11; and the various docs in file on Chlorine-Barge Salvage Operation. See additionally memo, Sec/A to CSA, 8 Oct 1962, cy in Chron File, 7-9 Oct 1962, Tab 20; msg, DA (by CSA) to CG XVIII Abn Corps, 08/1734Z Oct 1962 (DA 318794); msg, idem to idem, cy showing dispatch time as 08/1700Z, Chron File, 7-9 Oct 1962, Tab 21; msg, CGUSATHREE to RUCACX/TAG Army NG, Miss., and others, 09/1535Z Oct 1962 (DAIN 793904); msg, MATS, Scott AFB, to RUWHDL/WESTAF, Travis AFB and others, 09/2116Z Oct 1962 (DAIN 794051); and memo for rcd (by Rothwell), 9 Oct 1962, Chron File, 7-9 Oct 1962, Tab 73.

60. See Coakley, op. cit., pp. 89ff.

61. Msg, CGUSATHREE to CGUSCONARC, 11/0011Z Oct 1962 (DAIN 794556); and msg, CGUSCONARC to DA, 11/0044Z Oct 1962 (DAIN 794555). Physical examinations are dealt with along with other medical activities in the Oxford operation in sec on Third Army (Rear) and Logistics, this chap, above.

62. See msg, DA (Abrams for DCSOPS) to CG XVIII Abn Corps, 09/1422Z Oct 1962 (DA 318868); msg, idem to idem, 09/1759Z Oct 1962 (DA 318898); msg, CGUSATHREE to RUCBC/CG XVIII Abn Corps and others, 09/1535Z Oct 1962 (DAIN 794054); and memo for rcd (by Burke), sub: Oxford Strength Report, 10 Oct 1962, Chron File, 10-11 Oct 1962, Tab 9.

63. OCINFO After-Action Report, 8 Sep 1962 - 31 Mar 1963 (Working Copy), p. 3. That the field command had certain discretionary authority in the matter of local release of information is evident from (FOUO) memo for the rcd (by Dodge, CINFO), 1 Oct 1962, Chron File, 1-4 Oct, Tab 3.

64. Msg, GSA to Howze, CG, XVIII Abn Corps, 02/1114 EDT Oct 1962 7 (Draft), ibid., Tab 18a.

65. Telecon, Howze-Wheeler, 02/1055 [EDT] Oct 1962, in file on Memoranda of Conversations (Sep 1962 -).

66. See Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964 (Hearings before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Approp., H.R. 88th Cong, 1st Sess [2 pts? Washington, 1963]), Pt 2 (Chmn, JCS, Overall Financial Statements Service Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff), pp. 145-47; U.S. Senate, (S), Report of Proceedings. Hearing Held before Committee on Armed Services Briefing on Department of Defense Programs for Fiscal Year 1964, February 27, 1963 (6 vols; a Ward & Paul transcript, processed), VI, 1165; XVIII Abn Corps Command Report, 6 Dec 1962, p. 10; 101st Abn Div Command Report, 17 Nov 1962, ibid., Incl 3, p. 5; (C) msg, Abrams to CSA, 19/0018Z [May 1963], par 2, cy in file on CSA Representative, Birmingham, Records of the Alabama Operations, 1963; Congressional Record, XVII (8 Oct 1962), 21551-552; (C) msgs, CO USAFOX to AWR, [08/2030Z Nov 1962] (all) and 13/1435Z [Nov 1962], par 6; and (C) msg, DA (Abrams) to CO USAFOX (Keller), 13/2310Z Nov 1962.

67. Msg, CG XVIII Abn Corps to AWR, 10/1400Z [1402Z? Oct 1962], ibid., Tab 11.

68. Msg, idem to idem, 10/1400Z [Oct 1962], cy ibid., Tab 7. For preliminary discussion of the rationale for Billingslea's selection, see memo for recd (by Abrams), sub: Telecon with Colonel Smith, Acting Chief, of Staff, XVIII Abn Corps, about 08/1055, EDT, Oct 1962, p. 3, cy ibid. 7-9 Oct 1962, Tab 19. On the timing of Billingslea's assumption of command, see this same transcript, p. 2; and msg, CG XVIII Abn Corps to AWR, 09/0126Z [Oct 1962], cy ibid., Tab 53.

CHAPTER VI

U.S. ARMY FORCES OXFORD, OCTOBER 1962 - JANUARY 1963

General Billingslea's Resumption of Command. -- Upon resuming command of the Oxford forces, General Billingslea moved his command post to the National Guard Armory, where he had been previously and where General Howze had been. His basic directives were still those of 30 September, but it was laid down at this time that he had no control of those troops deploying under control of the XVIII Airborne Corps, which were on their way home, or of the support units under control of the Third Army (Rear). He would "be directly under command of the Chief of Staff . . . Wheeler," and would assure "continuous reliable, adequate communications between his command post and all operational elements immediately subordinate to his headquarters." There also would be "continuous reliable telephone and teletype communications" between General Billingslea's command post and the Department in Washington.

The transition from Howze to Billingslea went smoothly, probably because the outgoing staff worked with its successor during the night of 9-10 October, each member of the old staff briefing his counterpart on the new staff and providing him with copies of the documents he would need. ¹ Billingslea would now serve as the commander at Oxford for about as long as Howze had served, and, as such brevity suggests, his work would be essentially interim in character.

Contingency Plan and Incidents. --- As a precautionary measure for Meredith's first weekend in Jackson, Mississippi, 13-14 October 1962,

Billingslea planned a substantial standby force. Fortunately, however, Meredith's trip was without incident and troops did not have to be used. ²

On 15 October there was an anonymous telephone call to the University warning of a bomb planted in Baxter Hall. In this case, military policemen assisted the marshals and campus police in a search with negative results. This was but one of a number of bomb scares and one of eighty or more incidents of various kinds and degrees of seriousness that occurred at the University and in the Oxford area in the October 1962 to June 1963 period. ³

Major Accomplishments. -- General Billingslea's two major accomplishments at this time, aside from the contingency planning for the 13-14 October weekend and his selection of a successor, were the making of recommendations concerning the character of the "permanent" force that would remain in Oxford, which would be supported by earmarked troops that could reinforce it in case of an emergency, and the last major redeployments that pared the Oxford force down to approximately 500 soldiers. His recommendations concerning the composition of the force that would remain varied from the recommendation of a reinforced squadron of the 108th Armored Cavalry to one of a two-company force of Regular Army military policemen with various support elements, which after a week would be phased down to one reinforced company. It was the recommendation to use two companies of military policemen that the Department adopted, although General Wheeler was slow and cautious about going into the pared-down second phase. The headquarters General Billingslea recommended for such a force would be organized along normal staff lines and would include a staff judge

advocate, an information officer, and a provost marshal. The usual necessary technical service and logistical support units would also be provided for, including a helicopter company (there would always be some aviation capability at Oxford), a field hospital, a searchlight unit, a chemical detachment, and a Department of the Army signal team.

Concerning the matter of long-term housing, Billingslea thought the best solution would be to use the Armory or other enclosed buildings for administrative space with a winterized tent camp and the necessary latrine and bathing facilities. He thought an interim camp at the stadium or the Armory might be necessary while the facilities were under construction. ⁴ This recommendation was also adopted, in the main, for when the force was pared down for the long term the Armory served for administrative and command headquarters with a tent camp behind it and another tent camp at the University-Oxford Airport until a long-delayed consolidation of the headquarters and most of the force in a new camp ⁵ south of the campus in March 1963.

The final decision not to use the National Guard for the remaining security force at Oxford, as it had been used in Little Rock, was made by the President upon the advice of Secretary Vance and General Wheeler after weighing the advantages and disadvantages. Advantages of using the Guard were that the rest and recreation problem would be simplified by proximity of the troops to their homes, that possibly there would be increased acceptance by the local population even of the "integration problem," and that the Guard would have a "greater familiarity with local problems and personalities."

The advantages of using the Regular Army's Military Police, on the other hand, were that their training was superior; they were free of local political and social pressure; the "quality, quantity, and character of" their equipment made them better adapted to the mission to be performed; and with the Regulars there would be a wider choice of commanders and staff.

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On 11 October, the day following Billingslea's assumption of command, it became known that there was authority for the release of the parts of the 1st Battle Group, 155th Infantry Regiment, still in Federal service, and the 2d Battle Group, 155th Infantry. They would move to their home stations by the evening of 13 October. Also to be released after redeployment of these units and not later than 16 October, were Col. Marshall E. Bush and eleven other staff officers (including a chief warrant officer) and non-commissioned officers. Following redeployment, release of these two battle groups became effective at midnight, 16 October, local time. Now only the 108th Armored Cavalry remained in the Federal service.

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General Wheeler and Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach conferred on 17 October and agreed that circumstances were appropriate for another major scaling down of the Oxford forces, from about 4,000 men to less than 550, and that the command should be transferred to a senior Army colonel. The new force would include a headquarters group, two military police companies, an aviation detachment, and combat and logistical support elements.

When Washington authorities agreed upon the new scaled-down force, they also agreed that a further reduction could be considered sometime around the Christmas holidays. Now the remaining National Guard outfit, the 108th Armored Cavalry, would be released from Federal service, and Col. Keller's 2d Battle Group, 23d Infantry Regiment, the 31st Helicopter Company, and elements of headquarters and service support would be moved out and home. One military police battalion and a battle group would go on the alert. There would be a six-hour alert for the 503d Military Police Battalion and a five and one-half hour alert for a reinforced battle group (minus). As finally agreed upon, the latter would be the Division Ready Force of the 101st Airborne Division, whose alert status would be known as Condition X-RAY. These forces would be used to reinforce the Oxford forces if needed. Finally, as General Billingslea recommended, there would be rotation of individuals and units between Oxford and their home stations.⁸

General Wheeler decided that he wanted a colonel to command the forces that would finally remain at Oxford because he did not want to keep a division commander away from his command. Accordingly, he asked General Billingslea and the Commanding General, CONARC, for a recommendation. Billingslea's first choice, made on the second day after he succeeded Howze, was Col. Lucien F. Keller, the commanding officer of the 2d Battle Group, 23d Infantry Regiment, who was already in Oxford. His second choice was Col. Louis A. Kunzig, Jr., his Chief of Staff in the 2d Infantry Division. Secretary Vance and General Wheeler agreed upon Keller, and on 17 October⁹ recommended him to the White House, which evidently approved.

On 19 October the Department of the Army ordered the 108th moved to

its home stations by early evening, 20 October, and released effective midnight, local time, 23 October, except for a few men kept on clean-up details for up to five days. Of Troop E, Capt. Falkner and five men stayed on duty in Oxford. At about the same time orders went out to redeploy as soon as practicable General Billingslea's headquarters, Col. Keller's battle group, the 716th and 720th Military Police Battalions (the former minus Companies A and B, which would remain at Oxford), and various support elements. This was done on 20 October and at two-thirty that afternoon, Oxford time, General Billingslea passed command of the Oxford forces to Keller.

Subsequently, on 31 October, Wheeler wrote Maj. General William P. Wilson, The Adjutant General of Mississippi, to express his appreciation "for the competent and professional manner in which the entire Mississippi National Guard performed its duty during the recent disturbance."¹⁰

Colonel Keller's Assumption of Command. -- In anticipation of Col. Keller's assumption of command at Oxford on 20 October, General Wheeler sent him special instructions. Given "the significant reduction in forces," Wheeler thought Keller's command "should be especially alert in the continuance of its mission and particularly watchful for any changes in attitudes or trends," and he "encouraged" Keller "to report promptly . . . any changes of which you become aware along with your evaluation and recommendations as appropriate." Finally, Col. Keller would be "required" to continue "close personal liaison" with "the senior Justice Department representative." In addition the Department instructed him specifically that he would be under General Wheeler's direct command and about the

maintenance of signal communications with Washington and with his own command, using the same words with which General Billingslea had been instructed on 9 October. Then, after he had already assumed command, the Department instructed Col. Keller formally and retroactively, as probably it had done by telephone or through General Billingslea, that the responsibilities and authority that were Billingslea's under the 30 September orders, including the "fragmentary order," were now
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transferred to him.

In bringing Keller under Billingslea's original orders of 30 September, which provided basic policy guidance for the Army's entire operation in Oxford, the Department requested his comments regarding them. Promptly, even before he received the request formally, he responded with a proposal for a change in the "fragmentary order" to follow different weapon priorities in applying the principle of minimum force. He wanted to do away with the first priority, which provided for the use of unloaded rifles without bayonets, and move from second to first place provision for using unloaded rifles with fixed but scabbarded bayonets. He also wanted to move from fourth place in the old list to second place in a new list of only four priorities provision for using unloaded rifles with bare bayonets fixed. In justification he remarked that "experience in the Oxford area" during the riot "clearly demonstrated that the unloaded rifle without bayonet did not provide an adequate means to insure the first application of force necessary for crowd or riot control." Promptly the
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Department approved this proposal.

His message announcing to Washington his assumption of command at Oxford indicated in its heading that he was the "CO US Army Forces Oxford." Since in the body of the message he referred to the "forces pertaining to Rapid Road," which was not an authorized name for the operation, although widely used, it may be assumed, in the absence of any official designation of the forces remaining at Oxford, that "U.S. Army Forces Oxford" (or "Oxford Miss.") was quite unofficial. So it was, except that through usage it gained considerable currency and was widely used on official documents. Thus it was used on Keller's Situation Report No. 42 (his first one, since the reports in this particular series were numbered continuously from the first one General Billingslea issued on 10 October) and on Col. Lynch's last one, No. 508, 24 July 1963. It also gave rise to the acronymic abbreviation "USAFOX," which in turn led to the creation of an unofficial organizational device featuring a fox and to a mimeographed organizational paper published during Col. Lynch's tour, called The Usafox Tale. This term was not used exclusively, however; indeed, it appears that the other form of the name, "U.S. Army Oxford," or simply "USAOX," was also in common usage, as in the Oxford command reports, for example.

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USAFOX Headquarters Organization and Strength. -- In his command and support group Keller and his successors had a lieutenant colonel, who served as the executive officer and acted as the commander in the latter's absence; a conventional staff manned by officers designated S1-S4, with officers carrying out support roles in such specialities as communications, engineering, transportation, ordnance, and chemical

responsibilities; and with a special staff including a staff judge advocate, a medical officer, a public information officer, and an aviation officer.

The number of officers in the USAFOX organization varied, of course, with the enlisted strength. Thus, when Keller had two military police companies and a total of 502 men in November 1962, forty-four of the total were officers. Then, on 19 November, Keller recommended the reduction of his force from two military police companies to one company, and, with departmental approval, it became effective on 19 December, just before the Christmas holidays. It was based upon the belief that conditions had changed for the better in the University community. A natural consequence of this reduced strength was to cut the officer strength to thirty out of a total strength of 304 by 1 April 1963. Not long before the reduction to one company, Col. Keller, with departmental approval, reduced the guard force at Baxter Hall as "a major step toward campus normalcy while maintaining maximum security." Finally, at the end, when the Oxford forces withdrew in July 1963, after a still further cut, there were only sixteen officers out of a total strength of 151 men.

Troop Rotation. -- Under the circumstances of troop operations in Oxford, General Billingslea recommended troop rotation, and Col. Keller, too, thought it a good idea because of the "existing restrictions" and the fact that the troops were "in a continuous alert status." He therefore recommended a rotation plan under which the troops would be rotated every three weeks, an old company leaving twenty-four hours after the

closing of its replacement. Under this plan, which was adopted, the first replacement, the 66th Military Police Company, arrived on 12 November, replacing Company A of the 716th Military Police Battalion, which departed the following day. Later, the normal tour of duty for officer personnel, excepting the commander, came to be thirty days in order "to establish better continuity throughout the command," while the enlisted tour remained at twenty-one days. This rotation was, of course, a device to maintain morale, which remained high. Col. Keller and the commanders who followed him each served a tour of
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around three months.

Weekly Coordination and Planning Conference. -- On 21 October, the day after he assumed command at Oxford, Col. Keller met with Messrs. Sather and Martin, two Department of Justice representatives in Oxford, Vandergrift, the head marshal in Oxford, Haislip, another marshal, and operational and intelligence personnel of his own staff, for the purpose of effecting "close liaison" between his headquarters and Department of Justice personnel on the local scene. Slightly more than a week later Col. Keller held another meeting attended by representatives of the Department of Justice in Oxford, including the marshals and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and of the 111th Intelligence Detachment, which had agents in Oxford. The purpose of this meeting, as Keller reported it to Washington, "was to coordinate and evaluate the intelligence efforts of all agencies and to ascertain what additional military aid may be provided to each." He added that "a weekly meeting of this type is anticipated for mutual exchange of information, discussion of various projects, and

progress . . . evaluation. In addition, the attitude of the local populace . . . [will be] discussed with a view of better understanding the local situation." Thereafter, Col. Keller and his successors held regularly what they came to call the Weekly Coordination and Planning Conference and sent reports on it to departmental headquarters. 16

Incidents and Small Riot During Keller's Tour. -- Of the numerous incidents that occurred on the University campus in October after Col. Keller assumed command there, the most common were the throwing of firecrackers and cherry bombs (the latter of which had the explosive force of the Army's M-80 firecracker) at sentries on duty. At the same time, Meredith was subjected to numerous catcalls. Investigation and a report followed each incident. The most serious of these incidents, which actually was a small riot, occurred on the evening of 29 October.

This disturbance, of which Chief Tatum of the campus police forewarned the Army, began at the University cafeteria while Meredith was eating and drew a crowd of approximately 100 to 150 students, which was the largest crowd since 7 and 8 October, when crowds also had gathered at the cafeteria. 17 The military police security patrol, which remained outside, was the focus of the initial antagonism and had firecrackers and eggs thrown at it, together with what was thought to be a "coke" bottle, which struck the patrol vehicle. Additionally, a privately-owned car tried to run a military police vehicle off the road.

Later that evening, there was considerably more violence, which seems to have reached its peak during a forty-five-minute period following eight-fifteen. On that occasion "a great number of students" in the

dormitories adjacent to Baxter Hall -- particularly Powers, Hedelstrom, and Lester Halls -- filled the windows overlooking Baxter Hall and threw or propelled firecrackers and cherry bombs (sometimes dipped in glue and rolled in shot) at Baxter. They also threw "coke" bottles, at least one molotov cocktail, which burned alongside Baxter Hall, and many eggs. Using slingshots, as with firecrackers and cherry bombs, rioters also fired marbles at the sentries, who were issued armored vests for protection. In the early morning hours of 30 October one such marble struck the sergeant of the relief guard just below the eye. Large groups gathered on the street south and east of Baxter Hall and near the Laundry across Rebel Drive from Baxter. The principal action did not stop until Dean Love prevailed upon the campus police, who had not intervened, apparently, to move the students back to their rooms. Love also moved among the students and Col. Keller made arrangements to discuss with University officials means for preventing such troubles in the future and for disciplining student instigators. Throughout this incident Army sentries stood without reinforcements, although the rest of the force was on alert. No force other than that of the sentries was used because of "the disorganized, though massive, nature of the incident." Marshals and other Justice representatives were also on hand

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with the Army guards.

One of the guards the night of 29/30 October was Pvt. First Class Dominick A. Niglia of Company B, 716th Military Police Battalion, who had arrived in Oxford with his battalion on 1 October. His guard detail went off duty on 29 October before the disturbance that has been described,

but he was briefed on it when his detail came on duty again at five o'clock the next morning, 30 October. His post at that time was a walking post between Baxter and Lester Halls, one end of which was less than 100 feet from Mayes Hall across the street called Dormitory Row West.

Not long after Niglia assumed his post a cherry bomb exploded near him. A few minutes later an object was thrown at him from a window in Mayes Hall that was thought later to have been a coke bottle filled with powder, probably from firecrackers or cherry bombs. It exploded near him, but did not strike him. About five-thirty he thought he saw another fuse being lit in the window from which the bottle had been thrown and, having loaded his rifle, he fired toward the window. Fortunately, the bullet did not strike anyone, but went through the window, ricocheted off a corridor wall, and lodged in a door frame. Niglia, frightened, reported the shot, justifying it later on the grounds he feared for his life and therefore fired a warning shot in self-protection.

This shooting incident created a considerable stir, including consideration by a grand jury, and the Army transferred Niglia back to his home station and investigated the matter very carefully. Eventually, Secretary Vance sent Senator Stennis a copy of the report of this investigation. In his covering letter to Stennis on 31 January 1963, Vance said that Niglia, fearing for his life, concluded that the time had come to use his rifle. The Secretary did not find that a criminal act. For that reason and because Niglia had a good military record, the Army did not propose to file court-martial charges against him.

Another significant incident occurred in the early evening of 31 October when a military policeman walking his post at Baxter Hall (the same post Niglia had had) was struck in the corner of his left eye by fragments of a cherry bomb thrown from Lester Hall. Fortunately he sustained no serious injury, but because of the seriousness of the incident, Col. Keller reported it to the University authorities and suggested that the University search Lester Hall. At the same time, a report reached Keller's headquarters that there were seventeen sticks of dynamite in Baxter Hall. When he learned of this report Dean Love requested that the Army assist the campus police in a search of both Baxter and Lester Halls. In the search that followed, with military assistance, the searchers turned up firecrackers, knives, clubs, one CN gas grenade, a gasoline can with a small quantity of gasoline, and a .22-calibre rifle.

Period of Relative Calm but Also of Continued Harassment. -- After the incidents and disorders of 29-31 October "a relative calm" settled over Oxford. There continued to be bomb threats and incidents that kept Meredith's protectors on their toes, but there were no more incidents of a riotous nature. For November Col. Keller reported that the University's cooperation with his headquarters showed "considerable improvement, particularly with respect to taking more positive action to investigate student acts against Meredith and Security personnel on the campus." He thought the University was both impressed with the lethal character of such harassment as had been perpetrated and with the possible loss of accreditation if it did not keep its house in order. But, as he reported, this did not mean that things were easier for Meredith.

Colonel Keller's Replacement. -- By mid-December Washington gave thought to replacing Col. Keller with another colonel because General Wheeler thought Keller had had "this demanding job for a sufficient length of time." Indeed, he had been in Oxford continuously since 30 September, excepting for two days of leave for emergency dental care. The White House would have to clear any change of command, General Abrams told Maj. Gen. Philip F. Lindeman, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, but General Wheeler would take care of that. In asking Lindeman to nominate a possible replacement for Keller, Abrams described the position and the kind of officer desired. Col. Keller's successor would command about 325 troops, including 200 military policemen, with an adequate staff and support. In conjunction with twelve Federal marshals he would have to assure that the court order under which Meredith was attending the University was carried out "without interference." In performing such duties the officer would have "to conduct his affairs in collaboration with officials of the Justice Department and the University." He would also have to "deal effectively with officials in Oxford" and would need, everything considered, "maturity and sound judgment." Moreover, "coolness under pressure, good appearance and objectivity" were "essential," as were "staff experience and training." Finally, General Abrams said, the Chief of Staff had to feel that this assignment would "be carried on with the same high quality" with which it had been carried on thus far.

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Col. Keller's replacement being approved, the choice fell on Col. Warren Dudley Hodges of Fort Benning. Accordingly, Hodges arrived in Oxford on 2 January 1963 for a two-week period of orientation.

Col. Keller saw to it that Hodges met such persons as Love, Tatum, Mayor Elliott, Jones, the Oxford chief of police, and Sheriff Ford, and reported that Hodges appeared to be well received. Altogether, Col. Hodges impressed Col. Keller "as a willing and capable officer with a mind to do a best-possible job." His progress pleased Keller, who accordingly recommended that Hodges take over around 15 January. And so he did, the change of command taking place on the morning of 16 January.

The following month there went into Keller's personnel file a letter of commendation from General Wheeler. "You have accomplished this demanding assignment with rare good judgment, great patience, and exceptional thoroughness," Wheeler wrote. "Your outstanding qualities of leadership have been reflected in the exemplary performance of the troops under your command in the best traditions of the Army service."

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1. On the transition, see 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab B, p. 1; DA SitRep No. 21-62 (as of 10/1800, EDT), Oct 1962; msg, DA (Abrams for DCSOPS) to CG XVIII Abn Corps, 09/1759Z Oct 1962 (DA 318898); memo for rcd (by Abrams), sub: Integration of Negro Military Personnel in Units in the Oxford Area, 10 Oct 1962, Chron File, 10-11 Oct 1962, Tab 15.
2. 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab B, pp. 2 and 3.
3. Ibid.; and the list of "Incidents at Oxford, Sept. 1962 - June 1963" compiled by [Scheips and (Jung?)], in file of same title. Many if not most of these were unreported by the press.
4. 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab B, p. 3; Notes -- General Wheeler's Visit to the War Room, 11/0755 Oct 1962, cy in file on Memoranda of Conversations (Sep 1962 -); msg, DA (Schlotzhauer for Abrams of ODCSOPS) to CG 2d Inf Div, 10/1724Z Oct 1962 (DA 319049); (C) msg, CG 2d Inf Div to DA, 10/2315Z Oct 1962 (DAIN 275230); (C) msg, CGUSCONARC to RUEPA/DA DCSOPS, 11/0858Z Oct 1962 (DAIN 275280); and (C) msg, DA (Abrams for ODCSOPS), 19/1727Z Oct 1962 (DA 920432).
5. On the new camp, see relevant sec in following chap.
6. Memo, Abrams to The Military Aide to the President [Clifton], sub: Army Forces in Oxford, Mississippi, 17 Oct 1962, in file on Memoranda -- General (11 Oct - Dec 1962); and (C) msg, CG 2d Inf Div to AWR, 15/0435Z Oct 1962.
7. (C) Msg, DA (Hall for Abrams of ODCSOPS) to CGUSCONARC, 11/1842Z Oct 1962 (DA 920129); msg, NGB, DA and DAF, to TAG, Miss., 11/2245Z Oct 1962 (DA 319262); and msg, CGUSATHREE to RUCACX/TAG, Army Nat Gd, Miss., and others, 12/2245Z Oct 1962 (DAIN 795410).
8. Memo, Abrams to The Military Aide to the President [Clifton], sub: Army Forces in Oxford, Mississippi, 17 Oct 1962, cy in file on Memoranda -- General (11 Oct - Dec 1962). On plans for reinforcing the Oxford forces (Operations Plan READY RETURN), see (C) msg, DA (Abrams for DCSOPS) to CGUSCONARC, 11/1620Z Oct 1962 (DA 920125); (C) msg, CGUSCONARC to RUEPDA/DCSOPS, 14/0102Z Oct 1962 (DAIN 276254); (C) msg, DA (Abrams for ODCSOPS) to CGUSCONARC, 19/1850Z Oct 1962 (DA 920435), approving reinforcement plan; and [Welch], op. cit., pp. 17-19. This plan provided two additional conditions -- YOKE, with the battle group prepared to depart in two hours, and ZULU, with Air Force planes prepositioned and the 503d MP Bn ready to begin outloading in one hour. Ibid., p. 19. On the desire of the MP's for a leading role in civil-disturbance operations, see OPMG After-Action Report, 20 Nov 1962, pp. 1, 3; and ibid., 10 Dec 1962, p. 2. See Coakley, op. cit., p. 104, on the White House's veto of using the 720th MP Bn at Little Rock during the school integration crisis of 1957.

9. On Keller and his appointment, see "Info for White House visit," a penciled memo, undated and unsigned, on yellow legal paper, in file on Commanding Generals & Other Key Personnel; (C) msg, DA (Hall for Abrams of ODCSOPS) to CGUSCONARC, 11/1917Z Oct 1962 (DA 920137); memo for rcd (by Abrams), sub: Colonel Commander for Oxford Forces, 12 Oct 1962; memo, Abrams to The Military Aide to the President, sub: Army Forces in Oxford, Mississippi, 17 Oct 1962, in file on Memoranda -- General 11 Oct 1962); and (C) msg, CG 2d Inf Div to DCSOPS, for Abrams, 23/1830Z / Oct 1962 /, cy filed ibid. For a biographical sketch, see Official Biography of Colonel Lucien F. Keller / Ft. Benning, Ga., 1963 /, cy in file on Commanding Generals & Other Key Personnel.

10. Msg, DA to CG 2d Inf Div, 19/1709Z 1962 (DA 320069); Falkner Statement, p. 12; (C) msg, DA (Abrams for ODCSOPS) to CG 2d Inf Div, 19/1727Z Oct 1962 (DA 920432); msg, CGUSCONARC to ZEN/CG 2d Inf Div CP, Oxford, Miss., and others, 20/0710Z Oct 1962 (DAIN 797828); msg, CG 2d Inf Div to AWR, 20/2040Z Oct 1962; msg, COUSAFOX to AWR, 20/2045Z Oct 1962; and ltr, Wheeler to Wilson, 31 Oct 1962, cy in file on Commanding Generals & Other Key Personnel. The clean-up details of the 108th apparently were released as of midnight 28 Oct 1962 at which time the only Mississippi Guardsmen still on active Federal service were six who were under hospital care. DA SitRep No. 55-62 (as of 30/0800, EDT, Oct 1962).

11. (C) msg, CSA to CG 2d Inf Div (for Keller), 20/1630Z / Oct 1962 /; (C) msg, DA (Abrams for ODCSOPS) to CG 2d Inf Div and CGUSCONARC, 19/1727Z Oct 1962 (DA 920432); and msg, DA (McCrary for DCSOPS), 22/0014Z Oct 1962 (DA 920510). Latter msg downgraded to UNCLAS by DA 941540, 18/2050Z Oct 1963 by reason of publication.

12. (FOUO) Msg, COUSAFOX to AWR, 21/2210Z / Oct 1962 /; and msg, DA to COUSAFOX, 22/2242Z Oct 1962 (DA 320296).

13. Since neither USAOX nor USAFOX was official, except through usage, and since, though both were used, USAFOX comes off the tongue more easily, the latter is used herein.

14. USAFOX SitRep No. 195 (28/0100Z - 0700Z Nov 1962); Cong. Fact Paper, p. 3. 1a (rev 23 Apr 1963); USAFOX SitRep No. 394, 02/0025Z / Apr 1963 /; and USAFOX SitRep 508, 24/1800Z Jul 1963. Misc Memoranda on USAFOX administrative policies and procedures are in file on Administrative & Other Directives & Orders, Hqs, USAFOX, and two hqs manning charts are among the USAFOX Field Records. On the reduction to two MP companies and the reduction of the guard at Baxter Hall, see (C) USAFOX Command Report for 01000/S November, Thru 30/2400S November 1962, 9 Dec 1962, p. 5; (C) ibid. (01/0001S - 31/2400S Dec 1962), 4 Jan 1963, p. 3; (C) msg, DA (Abrams, ADCSOPS) to CGUSCONARC, 04/1442Z Dec 1962 (DA 922387); msg, Abrams / for ODCSOPS / for Clifford / Clifton /, 02/1938Z Nov 1962 (DA 320967); and (C) msg, idem to idem, 10/1650Z Nov 1962 (DA 921518). Each of the latter two msgs was a "Special Report" to the White House.

15. (C) USAFOX Command Report, 14 Nov 1962, p. 3; ibid., 9 Dec 1962, p. 5; ibid. (01/0001S - 31/2400S Jan 1963), 9 Feb 1963, pp. 2 and 4; ibid. (01/0001S - 31/2400S Mar 1963), 1 April 1963, p. 4; and (C) msg, COUSAFOX to CGUSCONARC, 27/0225Z /Oct 1962 /.
16. (C) Msg, COUSAFOX to AWR, 22/1805Z /Oct 1962 /; (C) msg, idem to DA (attn: Abrams), 30/0150Z Oct 1962 (DAIN 282887); (C) msg, idem to AWR, 05/2330Z /Oct 1962 /; and (C) msg, idem to idem, 13/1435Z /Oct 1962 /. "Weekly Coordination Meeting" was another name given the weekly meeting.
17. See (FOUO) DA SitRep No. 16-62 (as of 07/1800, EDT, Oct 1962); ibid., (C) No. 18-62 (as of 09/0500 Oct 1962); (U) Par. 2; and ibid., No. 19-62 (as of 09/1800 Oct 1962).
18. See ibid., No. 55-62 (as of 30/0800, EDT, Oct 1962); USAFOX Command Report, 14 Nov 1962, p. 2, and the Statement of Facts in the Niglia case, cited below.
19. See ltr, Vance to Stennis, 31 Jan 1963, incl Statement of Facts concerning the Firing of a Shot by a Soldier on Duty at the University of Mississippi on 30 October 1962, in file on Investigations. Also see the Investigation File of Dominick Niglia in the Oxford Field Records; and (C) msg, DA (Carey for TJAG) to CGUSCONARC and others, 23/2315Z Nov 1962 (DA 922011). Dean Love offered to testify in Niglia's behalf if the soldier should be court-martialed. (C) Msg, Keller to AWR, 06/1845Z /Oct 1962 /. Also see memo for rcd, sub: Telecon -- Mr. Conrad Philos, JAG/Lt Col Gordon Jung, 14/1425 Nov 62, 14 Nov 1962, in file on Memoranda of Conversations (Sep 1962 -).
20. USAFOX Command Report, 14 Nov 1962, p. 3; ibid., 9 Dec 1962, p. 2; USAFOX SitRep No. 86, 01/0100Z /Oct 1962 /; (C) msg, COUSAFOX to Wheeler, 01/1036Z /Oct 1962 /; and (C) msg, DA (Abrams, ADCSOPS), a special report, 01/1801Z Nov 1962 (DA 921046).
21. Cong. Fact Paper, p. 5.4 (rev 23 Apr 1963); USAFOX Command Report, 9 Dec 1962, pp. 1, 2, 3, 4; and ibid., (C) 4 Jan 1963, p. 2.
22. Memo, Abrams to Lindeman, 17 Dec 1962, cy in file on Commanding Generals & Other Key Personnel.
23. (FOUO) Memo, Lindeman to Abrams, sub: Replacement for CO, Army Forces in Oxford, Mississippi, n.d., in file ibid.; memo for rcd (by Jablonsky), sub: CO of Troops, Oxford, Mississippi, 31 Dec 1962, cy in file ibid.; (C) msg, COUSAFOX to AWR, 12/0510Z /Jan 1963 /; and msg, COUSAFOX to AWR, 16/1520Z Jan 1963, indicating the effective time of the changeover as 16/0845S Jan 1963. All Keller's responsibilities and authority passed

to Hodges when Hodges assumed command, according to msg, DA (Abrams for DCSOPS) to CGUSCONARC (for Hodges), 02/2321Z Jan 1963 / DA 923204 7, cy in files with penciled marks indicating later use, mutatis mutandis, in designating Lynch to replace Hodges. (Regraded FOUO; then regraded UNCLAS by DA 941560, 18/2109Z Oct 1963 because of publication.) Cf. msg, DA 927515. See also the "Biographical Sketch" of Hodges in file on Commanding Generals & Other Key Personnel.

24. Ltr, Wheeler to Keller (through CG 2d Inf Div), 14 Feb 1963, cy ibid.

CHAPTER VII

U.S. ARMY FORCES OXFORD, JANUARY -- JULY 1963

Colonel Hodges and the Opening of the New Semester. --- On 7 January, before Col. Hodges relieved Col. Keller, Meredith issued a statement that he would not register for the second semester, which would begin in February, unless there were "very definite and positive changes to make my situation more conducive to learning." This statement set off some criticism of the University by the Attorney General in Washington and seems also to have set off a new wave of harassment and disorder at the University, where the Chancellor called a meeting on 11 January to discuss the situation. ¹

It was this general situation into which Hodges stepped. There was continuous harassment of Meredith throughout January -- insulting language, fireworks, and stamping of feet, rapping on glasses, and the use of crowding tactics in the cafeteria. The only physical violence in that month, however, were the slashing of a tire and the breaking of the radio antenna on Meredith's car. ²

Meredith's departure at the end of the semester was "quiet and orderly," Col. Hodges reported, and upon Meredith's return for the second semester, for which he decided to register, ³ the students received him with "complete indifference." Col. Hodges concluded that that was further evidence that the University had taken "effective measures" to maintain discipline on the campus.

Not knowing what to expect upon Meredith's return, however, the University on the one hand and Col. Hodges and the marshals on the other made plans in anticipation of possible trouble, taking advantage

of some lessons learned in the September/October Oxford riot. Col. Hodges gave his command "intensified training in riot control and use of chemical munitions and equipment." He also planned the use of the water hoses of two decontamination vehicles that could generate considerable water pressure. Planned and maintained during registration were roof-top security and surveillance on the campus. Procured for use were shotguns and also on hand were battery-powered portable loud speakers and diaphragm-type gas masks. Hodges wanted to replace, and apparently later did replace, all CN gas with CS in the conviction that CS gas was better than CN, burning grenades of which some rioters had thrown back during the September/October riot. Thus his troops would have the most effective gas without being confused about which to use. In planning for possible trouble at the beginning of the new semester, however, Washington wanted the troops to have both kinds, although Secretary Vance wanted CS used first. In addition, Army planners had earmarked troops that could reinforce Hodges and the marshals if necessary, ⁴ and Lt. Col. Thomas J. McGuire, of the General Staff, went to Oxford as a representative of the Chief of Staff and the Department. Fortunately, there was no trouble.

A notable development as the new semester got under way at The University of Mississippi was that a second Negro student sought admission to the University. He was Dewey Roosevelt Green, Jr., a twenty-two-year-old former student at the Mississippi Vocational College for Negroes. Although he was not admitted because of his grades, his case, while it was pending, received attention from Col. Hodges and ⁵ the Army.

After the trouble-free beginning of the new semester, Col. Hodges concluded that the probability of a recurrence "of mass demonstrations protesting the presence of Mr. Meredith" at the University was "negligible in view of the positive stand taken by the University" during the recent registration period. Nevertheless, there remained "the possibility of an overt act of protest by individuals or small groups." What Hodges actually had in mind, Col. Jung explained, was someone shooting Meredith. For such an eventuality Hodges sought approval of a plan to cordon off the campus to prevent egress and to detain any person attempting to leave the campus until marshals could take custody. This plan received prompt interim approval.

Administration and Public Relations under Hodges. -- Although there were no serious disturbances as Col. Hodges' tour of duty ran on, incidents persisted -- insulting remarks, firecrackers, the dropping of two bags of water, one of which struck Meredith, at least one threat on Meredith's life, the hurling of rocks at military vehicles, the finding of a molotov cocktail in the alert platoon area and another in a military vehicle, and bomb threats. In his command reports for January and February, issued in early February and March, respectively, Hodges recommended "that close-in surveillance . . . and guard operations be gradually withdrawn, giving local enforcement agencies more and more opportunity to take over their responsibilities for maintaining law and order." As time went by, however, without the local law enforcement agencies coming forward, Col. Hodges must have become somewhat pessimistic. In any case, in his last two command reports, issued in April and May, he recommended "that

close-in surveillance and guard operations be maintained until local . . . agencies indicate they are prepared and willing to take over their responsibilities for . . . law and order."⁷

Claims against Federal Government. -- Among the significant matters that came up during Col. Hodges' tour of duty in Oxford were some claims made against the Government. One of these, a claim for \$2,475, grew out of an Army helicopter crash on 8 January 1963 and the complaint of Mrs. Herman D. Webster of Oxford that on the morning of 31 January (the day of registration at the University) an Army helicopter missed her house on Lamar Street by only a foot and frightened her so that she fell and broke her shoulder. The Army's side of it was that this helicopter was making a reconnaissance following a report that 1,000-2,000 persons were camped approximately ten miles south of Oxford, and that it had followed Lamar Street but never at an altitude of less than 1,500 feet.⁸

Another claim of that same period was Mississippi's claim that the planes that landed at the University-Oxford Airport at the time of the riot and afterwards damaged the single runway to the extent of \$256,000. Col. Hodges reported after accompanying Justice officials on an inspection trip at the Airport that it appeared to him, a layman in airport construction and "somewhat prejudiced," that "with the exception of one area approximately 100 yards in length, all repairs on the runway appear to be needed as a result of normal usage and weather."⁹

Removal to a New Campsite. -- The most frustrating of the problems Col. Hodges faced during almost his first two months in command at Oxford,

aside from those that could be described as largely routine, was the problem of getting his command into its own quarters. This problem went back to Col. Keller's first days in command in October 1962 and its solution was thought desirable, for one thing, in order to get the troops into some kind of a temporary camp that would be suitable for winter living. Finally, Col. Hodges succeeded as March 1963 brought delightful spring weather to the Magnolia State. What by itself was hardly a problem at all got caught up inevitably in Mississippi's harassment of the Federal Government. Consequently, Mississippi critics always read "permanent" for "temporary" and professed to see in "permanent" quarters an indication that the Army would be fastened upon the state for nobody knew how long. While a legal roadblock went up to prevent access to an Airport site, Capt. Falkner did what he could to get the Regulars out of the Armory and off its grounds, because their presence there naturally interfered with the Guard's use of the building.¹⁰

Meanwhile, since removal of troops from the practice field during Col. Keller's tour, the Oxford forces had been using several different locations. Part of them were in a tent camp adjacent to the Armory, where both Cols. Keller and Hodges had their headquarters. Most of them, however, were in a tent camp at the University-Oxford Airport, which in January became Camp Mosely as a tribute to the sense of humor of Lieutenant
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Mosely of the 716th Military Police Battalion. In addition, there was an alert platoon in The Hole near Baxter Hall, as there had been from the beginning, and a portable shower unit occupied an area near the U.S. Agricultural Sedimentation Laboratory, about a mile east of the Airport.

At the outset, the Army considered four possible sites for its Oxford camp — the Airport, the Armory, a farm area on Route 314, and the Holly Springs National Forest. The Adjutant General of Mississippi would not agree to the use of the Armory and distance or access bottlenecks ruled out the Route 314 and the National Forest sites, leaving only the Airport, which the Government reasoned it had a clear legal right to use under the President's Executive Order 11053 of 30 September 1962 without a "lease or other written document for land use." Meanwhile, it continued to use the Airport, the Armory, and the shower area near the Sedimentation Laboratory, as well as the Alert Platoon area on the campus. The plan was to build a temporary camp in an area of about ten acres in the southwestern part of the Airport, move the approximately 100 men from the Armory, and consolidate the command, except for the Alert Platoon, in this camp. As proposed, this camp would be "minimal and temporary, consisting of twenty-five winterized tents . . . with wooden floors and frames and with stoves for billeting the troops." There would also be thirteen temporary quonset huts for logistical purposes. Heating and cooking facilities would be field-type. Electrical work was to be "austere." All construction was "to avoid any appearance of long tenure."

Finally, on 30 November 1962 Secretary Vance approved these plans, as a minor construction project to cost an estimated \$118,000, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense gave its approval on 3 December. A private contractor, Inscho's Mechanical Contractors of Birmingham, Alabama, would perform the construction, which would cost \$89,000 of the total amount. It was to begin on 7 January and be completed about 28 February 1963.¹²

On 5 December Keller learned from Mayor Elliott of Oxford that part of his camp was on a Little League ball park that belonged to the city, which had not consented to its use by the Army. Consequently, to maintain reasonably amicable relations, the Oxford forces moved within the Armory property limits when they found out what they were. The National Guard, of course wanted the Armory back, and on 1 January 1963 the Mississippi Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning demanded that the Army vacate University property and not "proceed with construction plans for permanent troop support facilities" on University property.

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In early January 1963, Secretary Vance had a letter concerning the billeting plans from Ralph E. Ramsey, Associate General Counsel, United States General Accounting Office, in response to which Vance described the minimal construction that was necessary. He regretted that troops had to be kept near the campus, but had to say that "their continued presence" would be "necessary" until there was "adequate assurance of full compliance with the orders of the Federal courts pertaining to the attendance of Meredith at the University."

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Under existing plans the construction that had been contracted for would hardly be completed before spring weather came to Mississippi, but now even it was denied the Army, for on 15 January a Mississippi state court enjoined the contractor, and directed him to stop the work of which he had completed six percent. The Army then negotiated a termination of the contract and sought some other solution of the problem.

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Meanwhile, living conditions were bad for the troops at Oxford, especially for those in the now more-than-ever restricted space of the Armory grounds, where general-purpose tents housed about one-third of the command. The Armory itself housed the headquarters officers and the staff offices, but was also about one-third given over to the National Guard, which wanted it all back.

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In the course of investigating the possibility of a camp at the Sedimentation Laboratory, Col. Hodges learned that the Forest Service held an option on slightly more than fifteen acres of land adjacent to the Chambers Manufacturing Company about a mile south of the University campus. Hodges found that about twelve acres of the total would be usable for a camp and "far better" for such purposes than the Airport. If this land could be used work could be started quite soon. The deed to it had apparently been prepared and all that was lacking to take up the option was a check for \$15,000, the purchase price. No time was lost in making this sum available after Col. Hodges' report and recommendation reached Washington early on 22 January, and the land was quickly purchased. The tentative plan was for the Army to use the land under an inter-departmental usage agreement, but although Secretary Vance approved the use of this new site, nothing was to be done until at least 30 January, and perhaps not then. Meanwhile, Vance turned down the Sedimentation Laboratory site and the Army located and apparently considered two possible sites in the Holly Springs National Forest. When, finally, authorization for the new camp on the land adjacent to the Chambers Company was given and construction was about to begin, it began to rain.

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Rain and mud on 1 March and mud on the following day prevented advance work on the campsite. On 3 March an advance party from the 70th Engineer Battalion, which had built the tent city for the marshals, closed in Oxford, and Kristoferson, still the battalion commander, although now a lieutenant colonel, also arrived. This was a consequence of a decision to have the new camp built by the Army Engineers, with the help of the troops in Oxford, instead of by a private contractor. Maj. Jimmy Sutton of the U. S. Army Strategic Communications Command, also arrived in Oxford to arrange for "continuous and adequate communication" while the troops moved to the new camp. Meanwhile, rain continued to hamper construction, and it rained on 4, 5, 9, 10, and 11 March. The rain was especially troublesome because of the nature of the soil and the fact of a very high water table. Consequently the construction took perhaps twice as long as planned. The rain also hampered restoration work at the Airport and the Armory.

Despite the rain the work went ahead and by midday of 13 March over two-thirds of the Oxford troops were billeted at the new site, and on 16 March Col. Hodges could report that although the camp was not yet entirely finished all of his troops (excepting, presumably, the Alert Platoon and a small security guard at the Airport) were quartered and taking their meals there. Following consolidation of the two principal campsites into one, new standard operating procedures went into effect for what somebody among the enlisted men called "Camp Paradise." It is worth noting that final construction and restoration costs totalled only \$51,000, which was \$67,000 less than the original amount approved by the Secretary of Defense for the Airport camp on which construction was stopped.¹⁸

Replacement of Colonel Hodges. -- When Col. Jung was in Oxford while the new camp construction was under way, Col. Hodges, who had been stationed there for over two months, brought up the matter of his replacement. On 19 March, after Hodges had moved his troops into Camp Paradise, Jung prepared a memorandum for Col. John W. Paddock of the ODCSOPS recommending transfer of the command to a new man on 1 May. General Wheeler approving, Col. Paddock thereupon requested Personnel to nominate a replacement for Col. Hodges.

Acting promptly, the Office of Personnel Operations selected Col. William R. Lynch, Jr., an infantry officer, who was at that time chairman of the Company Tactics Committee of the Command and Staff Department in The Infantry School at Fort Benning. On 13 April the Secretary of the Army approved Lynch's nomination. Presumably it was then approved by the President. Col. Hodges would be required to assure General Wheeler, as Col. Keller had had to do, that his successor was "fully indoctrinated and conversant with operations and local people" before the change of command could take place.¹⁹

Col. Lynch arrived in Oxford on 19 April and Col. Hodges set about reading him into the operation and permitting him gradually to take over the reins, just as Col. Keller had done when Hodges had first arrived. He introduced Lynch to Chancellor Williams and various other University and United States officials, and gave him, in less than a week, "a thorough orientation of the city of Oxford, the University. . . campus and the Oxford area in general." He briefed Lynch on the assigned mission and on priorities in the use of force, which remained the same,

and he briefed him on the past operations and experiences of the command and on "all contingency plans." Finally, Col. Lynch's briefing included the organization and operations of the staff sections of his headquarters. In Col. Hodges' opinion, Lynch was an apt pupil and soon exhibited "a good understanding of the problems involved, the modus operandi of the command and the concept of operations conducted to date." Finally, well satisfied, Col. Hodges informed the Department on 29 April that Lynch was now ready
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"to assume complete command."

As Col. Hodges' tour approached its end things had largely settled down to a routine in Oxford, although incidents still continued to occur and it appeared that troops could not be withdrawn until sometime in the future. Elsewhere, however, situations were developing that would assume ominous proportions and tend to push Oxford into the background. In early April, for example, the Army learned that marshals backed by troops might be called upon to intervene in less than two weeks in troubles stemming from a voter registration drive in Greenwood, Mississippi, while in Alabama troubles over segregation were developing in April that would lead to difficulties of the first magnitude in Birmingham and to the use of troops at both Tuscaloosa and Huntsville in June when The University of Alabama would have to admit two Negro students to its Tuscaloosa campus and one Negro student to its Huntsville branch. Justice-Army planning that grew out of the Greenwood troubles would mark Greenwood, although there would be no Justice/Army intervention there at that time, as an historic turning point in the recent history of the Federal Government's role in civil disturbances,
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and, from the Army's point of view, its new planning would make its Alabama operations in June proceed very smoothly indeed.

Col. Hodges turned over command of the Oxford forces to Lynch, in the midst of such a developing situation, as of one minute past midnight, Oxford time, 1 May 1963.

Colonel Lynch and Approaching End of School Year. -- The end of the University's second semester was approaching as Col. Lynch assumed command on 1 May. In May student attitudes toward Meredith seemed largely unchanged and incidents continued to occur -- catcalls, insulting remarks, the splattering of his Thunderbird with eggs, firecrackers at one of the fraternity houses, and the "kidding" remark of a student named M. H. Pitman, III, that he had "come to kill Meredith." An unfortunate and potentially serious incident occurred in downtown Oxford on 18 May, when three unidentified Negroes assaulted a University freshman from Laurel, Mississippi, and a small crowd gathered. The city and campus police stepped in, however, and dispersed the crowd without further trouble. Despite these incidents, Col. Lynch thought in May that "student reaction against Mr. Meredith lessened." In that same month, Col. Lynch worked hard at promoting good relations with the University and Oxford communities.

Questions Concerning the Army's Visibility and Presence. -- At the very beginning of Col. Lynch's command, Washington secured his opinion on several possible courses of action -- the possibility of reducing the number of troops on the campus on or about 1 June, of putting troops in civilian dress, or of replacing them with marshals. This whole question of the appearance or visibility of the Army on the campus related to a summer program that would bring to the University campus from over the nation 2,000 or more girls ranging in age from nine to twenty-two.

The prospect of the Army's presence on the campus, where it would be noticed by all these girls, disturbed some persons in Mississippi who thought the Army would mar the University's image for these young visitors.

In Col. Lynch's view the existing troop strength at the beginning of May, 300 men (thirty-one officers and 269 enlisted men), was the "minimum required" for performing his mission, although he thought that with the reduced enrolment of a summer session he might modify his operations so as to make the Army's presence less conspicuous. One proposal that he made and carried out was the substitution of three sedans for the three jeeps in the Peanut Patrol. The Alert Platoon in The Hole was not visible from the campus, but he expected to be able to reduce it to a squad if Meredith got family housing (which he did not), because Meredith would then be relatively close to the Army's main camp. Meanwhile the guards inside Baxter Hall were not visible from the street, and he thought it might be possible after the summer session began to dispense during daylight hours with the walking guard post outside Baxter which had been established to protect Baxter's "blind side." He found the possibility of camouflaging the Army's presence by putting troops in civilian dress objectionable on several grounds and he did not think that the marshals could take over in place of the soldiers without "a greater number of marshals and more depth in their present communications system." He added that the local marshals doubted that Justice "could produce a sustained capability from a personnel standpoint," but he said that such a plan might work. He thought such an idea was the "product of an optimistic outlook," however, for the situation in Oxford was "still a bitter pill" that all the sugar coating possible could not make palatable.

It was interesting and revealing that in talking with Dean Love about possible steps to make the Army less conspicuous on the campus, Love asserted that as things stood he really had to search for evidence of the Army's presence. Concerning the use of sedans in place of jeeps in the Peanut Patrol, Love said that it would be "nice" if the change were made, but that it should be made only if Lynch thought it proper, for "he had no requests to make in this regard whatsoever." Indeed, in response to a direct question from Col. Lynch, Love said that neither he nor the Chancellor was concerned about the effect of the Army's presence on the girls who would be on the campus. He added that both he and the Chancellor agreed upon the necessity for having the Army present. Lynch therefore doubted seriously that the desire to make the Army less
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conspicuous because of the girls originated with the University.

About three weeks earlier General Abrams had approached the Office of the Judge Advocate General "for an opinion concerning the possible allegation" that the Army had stayed in Oxford longer than circumstances required. In reply, Maj. Rouilliard, chief of the General Law Branch, Military Affairs Division, stated that under the existing executive order of 30 September 1962 the Army would have to remain in Oxford until there was no more danger of obstructions to the court orders in the Meredith case -- "as a practical matter until the President decides that they should be withdrawn." Under the executive order referred to, the Secretary of the Army had full delegated authority to terminate the Army's operations in Mississippi, but of course he would not do it without Presidential approval, which, he gathered from a recent statement of the Attorney General, would not be forthcoming until there were "adequate assurances from the Governor of
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Mississippi."

The Army having so much of the responsibility, of course, would be expected to advise on the matter, and General Wheeler, as Chief of Staff, was naturally concerned. As a consequence, on Saturday, 4 May, he went over a draft memorandum that outlined the Army's minimum requirements for assuring that Meredith's attendance at the University would not be interfered with. These were the Baxter Hall guard, the Alert Platoon, the Peanut Patrol, the aviation detachment of one fixed-wing aircraft and four helicopters, and the main body of troops at the base camp. It listed the incidents that had occurred since 3 April, most of which were "unknown to the general public." Included were at least six bomb threats and the explosion of a homemade device at Sam Hall that blew out six windows. In view of these incidents the Army could foresee "no immediate substantive change in its current operations."

The memorandum then outlined, in the first place, the conditions that would have to be met before the Army would remove its soldiers from the campus (but not from the base camp). These included a guard at Baxter Hall, a mobile security guard, and a ready alert force -- all "composed of recognized law enforcement personnel . . . equal in strength to the replaced Army elements." Also, the court order directing Meredith's attendance would have to be enforced, Meredith would have to "be protected from bodily harm" "at all times," and the University would have to deal strictly with students interfering with Meredith's education. The Chancellor would have to make these commitments in writing endorsed by the Board of Trustees, to the Secretary of the Army in support of a formal Mississippi request for the removal of the troops from the campus proper. It would also have to be understood that the present strength of Federal marshals would not be decreased.

In the second place, the draft memorandum laid down the conditions under which the Army would withdraw all its forces from Oxford, Mississippi. These would include all the force provisions that would have to be guaranteed for withdrawal from the campus proper, and they would have to be guaranteed by the Governor in a written communication to the President in which he would endorse the commitments of the Chancellor and the Board. In addition, he would have to " earmark a back-up force of no less than 150 law enforcement personnel" that would respond "to any request by the Chancellor of the University. . . ."

General Wheeler, in a short, informal memo remarked that the Army's mission in Oxford, "to remove obstructions to the Court order," meant to him "to secure Meredith from bodily harm or harassment. Broadly speaking," he said, "if the Mississippi officials take on this chore, we can be relieved of it. If they don't, we can't." With that in mind, he was bothered by the Army's Oxford organization for protecting Meredith, for as he saw it, "the Feds are still providing close-in protection, the University the outer cordon, the Army the strategic reserve. With this division of responsibilities and tasks, the Army cannot guarantee Meredith's security but we are still on the hook." Therefore, he thought that there should be but "one set of preconditions," which "should be such that, if met, the Federal Government would relinquish "the task of protecting Meredith to appropriate state authorities."

27

Presumably rewritten to conform to Wheeler's views and approved up the line, the final draft of this memorandum, prepared by Col. Jung, bore the date 7 May 1963, and read as follows:

The policy of the Army has been to perform its mission with the minimum number of troops necessary and to vacate the campus and the city of Oxford as soon as it is unnecessary to employ troops to enforce the Federal court orders. It would be possible to remove all Army troops from Oxford . . . if the necessary assurances are given by appropriate University and State officials that they are capable of assuming the responsibilities now fulfilled by the Army. To determine whether its troops could be removed, the Army would require information about the precautions that would be taken to assure the physical safety of Meredith. . . .

Finally, the Army would require adequate written assurances from appropriate University and State officials that the orders of the Federal Courts concerning Meredith would be enforced, that every reasonable precaution would be taken to protect Meredith from bodily harm, and that sufficient funds and law enforcement personnel and equipment would be made available to accomplish the foregoing. 28

Secretary McNamara transmitted the substance of this memoranda to Senator John Stennis. On 14 May Brig. General Beverley E. Powell, Director of Operations, ODCSOPS, who for some time had been handling Oxford matters instead of General Abrams, also sent the text, in extenso, to Col. Lynch so that if he needed to know the "Army position regarding withdrawal of Army forces from the Oxford area," he would have this
29
memorandum to guide him.

General Powell followed up his 14 May message to Col. Lynch concerning the Army's position on troop withdrawal with a message drafted by Col. Jung the next day giving Lynch, for his information, the Department's recommendations to Secretary Vance on the three possible courses of action on which Justice had asked the Army to comment and upon which Lynch had reported about two weeks before -- the possibility of reducing the number of troops on the campus, of putting soldiers in mufti, or of replacing them with marshals.

These recommendations essentially followed those that Col. Lynch had made; indeed they declared that Lynch could foresee no "substantive reduction of Army troops at Oxford short of a total pullout from the Oxford area." The regular summer enrolment of 2000-2200 students was "still a formidable body and when considered in conjunction with" the existing atmosphere at the University, the Army had "no tangible cause for relaxing." They vetoed mufti for the soldiers, and they thought it unlikely that Justice could provide enough marshals to replace the soldiers, but even if Justice could provide enough marshals, "the Army should not withdraw all its soldiers on campus so long as it retains its present responsibilities. Rather, any replacement should be on a select basis and be jointly agreed upon by [the] Departments of the Army and Justice at the Washington level." If Meredith should move to family quarters, of course, the guard at Baxter Hall could be eliminated and the Alert Platoon could be reduced to a squad. Lynch's idea for replacing the three jeeps in the Peanut Patrol with sedans "would make the patrol less conspicuous without having any adverse operational implications." 30

Such were the preliminaries regarding a possible pullback or a withdrawal of troops with which Lynch and his Washington superiors were concerned in the forepart of May.

Miscellaneous Oxford Events in Latter Part of May. -- On 17 May Company B, 720th Military Police Battalion, arrived at Oxford to relieve Company A of the 716th in a regular rotational change. Two days later Joseph A. Califano, Jr., of the Office of the Secretary of the Army, and John Doar, an attorney of the Department of Justice, arrived at Lynch's headquarters for a visit and a

discussion of troop reduction. On 21 May, the day of his last scheduled examination, Meredith left Oxford to be gone two weeks. Beginning on 26 May and continuing until Meredith's return, Baxter Hall would be locked, although a military guard would be maintained over Meredith's room and elsewhere in the building around the clock. The marshals would "shut down operations in Oxford completely" from 22 May until 1 June, when fifteen marshals would be assigned there. ³¹

As early as 11 May the papers, carrying news of Mississippi politics, mentioned the possibility of a Mississippi state suit to remove the troops from Oxford. Then, on 23 May, Mississippi Attorney General Patterson asked the Federal District Court in Oxford to order removal of the troops of Col. Lynch's command. ³² On the same day that he received the summons resulting from Patterson's suit, Col. Lynch also received an invitation to attend a faculty luncheon on 31 May at which Chancellor Williams, Dean Love, and other key faculty members proposed to discuss "the summer session under the worst possible conditions."

Second Known Negro Student to Enter University. -- The "worst possible conditions" were feared because of the possible reaction to the probable admission during registration for the summer session of a second known Negro to the University. He was twenty-one-year-old Cleve McDowell of Drew, Mississippi, who was described as an honor graduate of Jackson State College. He had applied months before for admission to the University's law school. On 3 June a court order forbid the University to deny him admission. ³³ Although in November 1962 the Chancellor had expressed the hope that a second Negro student might enter the University

while Meredith was still there, the University was now troubled at the prospect that a second Negro was about to enter alongside Meredith. The University's fears of trouble were very real because of the Governor's opposition to the continued integration of the University, as Col. Lynch learned rather dramatically when Dean Love called him late on the afternoon of 29 May to come immediately to Chancellor Williams' office. In the event of difficulty with the Barnett Administration over McDowell's registration, Chancellor Williams said that he had "no one to turn to but the Army," and again asked Lynch to keep the information confidential.

Col. Lynch's own sources of information were rather inadequate just then, he said, since the local FBI agent and the marshals were out of town, and he could not find out anything from the marshal in Jackson, other than that things were "touchy," because the marshal said his hotel switchboard had been tapped. Army intelligence sources in Jackson, however, reported in the negative as to the "Governor's gyrations."

Not until after this meeting in the Chancellor's office did Lynch know officially that he would have the same responsibility for McDowell that he had for Meredith. After learning this, however, he recommended "as a minimum" that an additional military police company should be moved into Oxford by 4 or 5 June, that a standby force be earmarked, and that "close surveillance be maintained over Mississippi National Guard authorities."

On 31 May, Col. Lynch attended the faculty luncheon to which he had been invited to discuss registration plans for 4-5 June. His executive officer and provost marshal accompanied him. Williams, Clegg,

Tatum, and Love, together with other University officials, were there, as were two FBI agents, but no marshals. He found that the University's plans were "basically the same as . . . during the initial registration last fall and the re-registration in January." There would be two additional photographers to augment the three regular campus photographers who would photograph for identification purposes students participating in any demonstrations. Little reliance would be placed on local or state police for assistance on the campus even though liaison with them had been effected. Col. Lynch thought that the plan, in general, appeared "sound and within the limited capabilities of the University and should work smoothly with the Army keeping in the background." As for his forces, he would operate the Peanut Patrol and Baxter Hall guard as usual, keeping the rest of his force ready for commitment. Col. Lynch did not commit his command to any action, but said that the contingency of the Governor's personal appearance on the campus was under study. 37

Plans for Summer Registration. -- Col. Lynch now prepared some contingency plans based upon the appearance of the Governor at the coming registration. He proposed to maintain his troops in a full alert status from Monday, 3 June, through Thursday, 6 June, and then presented alternative Plans RED, WHITE, and BLUE. He especially liked Plan RED, under which he would separate the Governor from his police escort (who would "be served coffee on the spot") and carry him off to Jackson in a helicopter. This, he thought, was "the Army way," but he also liked Plan Blue, under which he would "out fox the Governor." Washington nonconcurred in most of this RED, WHITE, and BLUE planning, but apparently agreed to a simpler two-part

plan in keeping with an Army-Justice memorandum of agreement, which was not based primarily upon the assumption that Barnett would appear.

38

Under this memorandum of agreement, of which General Abrams sent Col. Lynch a copy for his guidance on 4 June, the Peanut Patrol would be enlarged and the other elements of his force would be on the alert. Justice would increase the number of marshals at Oxford from twelve to twenty and would undertake the same escort and surveillance of McDowell on the campus as was customary in the case of Meredith. If a few state troopers arrived to read a statement for McDowell from the Governor they should be permitted to read it and depart. If state troopers, with or without Barnett, should try to prevent McDowell from registering, the marshals would be authorized to overcome such resistance if they could do it safely. Unless the situation were too critical for such decision, both Col. Lynch and Doar, who would be the senior Justice representative on the scene, should refer the matter to Washington. If University or state officials should request assistance from the Army, Col. Lynch would provide it, but would retain command and control of his own troops. Lynch could employ his force at any time that a clear threat to either McDowell or Meredith developed, but if the menace were not so clear and there was no immediate threat to McDowell and Meredith, he should report the circumstances and his recommendation.

39

General Abrams clarified a part of the memorandum of agreement for Col. Lynch by telephone. At the same time he also approved Lynch's request to use a Third Army photographer to provide a documentary record of any employment of troops on the campus. The following day, however, in a telephone conference to complete security plans for the registration, in

which Col. Lynch, Doar, Katzenbach, and General Abrams participated, Abrams made a special point of telling Lynch that "the Secretary does not want any Army photographer used under any circumstances."⁴⁰

Meanwhile, on the evening of 2 June Dean Love called Col. Lynch to tell him "some good news." It was that Clegg had spent two hours with Governor Barnett, who proposed to save face by having Birdsong, the state safety director, come to Oxford with a contingent of some thirty state troopers and during registration read a statement from the Governor to McDowell. It would be a statement in which the Governor would say he wished McDowell would not attend the University. Love could not be sure that there would be such a performance, but it would save face for the Governor and would not cause any trouble.⁴¹

Registration. -- Late Tuesday evening, 4 June, Col. Lynch met at his headquarters with representatives of the Department of Justice, including those of the FBI and the marshals, and of Army Intelligence to complete and coordinate plans for protecting McDowell during registration on the morrow. Force would not be used to secure his admission to the University but only to protect him. The approach would be one of caution. The "appearance of the military would be minimized as much as possible" on the campus.

The Oxford forces went on full alert at eight-fifteen, Oxford time, Wednesday morning, 5 June, and "remained ready for any contingency" during McDowell's registration. McDowell himself "was under continuous observation by Army aircraft from the time he left Jackson until his arrival at" the University, to which he traveled with four Federal marshals in two cars.

Reports were accurate and gave early warning of his approach. "Excellent radio and telephone communications insured control and coordination of all units at all times." During McDowell's actual registration, which he completed shortly after three o'clock Wednesday afternoon, the Peanut Patrol, the marshals, the FBI, and Army Intelligence all had him in sight as planned. There were no crowds at any time. Indeed, there were present only some members of the press and, apparently, a few state officials. There were no state police cars on the campus, although eight were reported in the Oxford vicinity. Governor Barnett did not appear at the University, and nobody even read a statement for him. Meredith did not appear for registration until the following day.

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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VII

1. See various newspaper accounts of 8 Jan 1963; (C) msg, COUSAFOX to AWR, 08/0310Z /Jan 1963 7; (C) msg, idem to idem, 08/2220Z /Jan 1963 7; (C) msg, idem to idem, 09/2025Z /Jan 1963 7. For a cy of Meredith's statement and his explanation of it, see memo for rcd, sub: Meredith's Decision Not to Register for Classes the Second Semester, 07/1100 Jan 1963, in file on Memoranda -- General (Jan - 1963); and (C) msg, COUSAFOX to RUEPCR/AWR (for Abrams -- EYES ONLY), 01/2150Z /Feb 1963 7. On the Chancellor's meeting, which both Hodges and Keller attended, see (C) msg., idem to idem, 11/2400Z /Jan 1963 7.

2. See USAFOX Command Report, 9 Feb 1963, p. 1; penciled request for views, cwa /Abrams 7 to Decker, n. d.; unheaded and unsigned opinion, presumably of TJAG /4 Dec 1962 7, in file on Memoranda -- General (11 Oct - Dec 1962); and msg, COUSAFOX to RUEPCR/AWR, 06/0010Z /Mar 1963 7.

3. Memo, Hammond to Abrams, sub: Reduction of Troops in Oxford, 29 Jan 1963, cy in file on Memoranda -- General (Jan - 1963); and (C) msg, COUSAFOX to RUEPCR/AWR, 02/2130Z /Feb 1963 7.

4. USAFOX Command Report, 9 Feb 1963, pp. 1, 3-4; (C) msg, COUSAFOX to RUEPCR/AWR, 29/0545Z /Jan 1963 7; (C) msg, idem to idem (for Abrams), 30/0420Z /Jan 1963 - closing time 7; (C) msg, idem to idem (for Abrams), 31/0520Z /Jan 1963 7; memo for rcd (by Jung), sub: Telecon -- Oxford/Army War Room, 30/1415 Jan 1963, cy in file on Memoranda -- General (Jan 1963). On Army contingency planning for possible trouble at the beginning of the new semester, see (C) memo for rcd (by Abrams), sub: Oxford, Mississippi, 24 Jan 1963; and the following docs, all ibid.: memo for rcd (Hammond), sub: Oxford Actions, 30 Jan 1963, 30/1000-2000 Jan 1963; memo for rcd (McDaniel), sub: Oxford . . . Chancellor's Proposed Plan, 30 Jan 1963 (several cys, some with notations); memo for rcd (unsigned), sub: Oxford Actions, 31 Jan 1963, 0730 - , 31 Jan 1963; and (C) memo, Powell for CSA, sub: Reinforcement/Reaction Times, 31 Jan 1963. Additionally, see (C) memo (prepared by Rollier), Abrams to CSA, sub: Reinforcement/Reaction Times, 1 Feb 1963 (processed) cys in file on Strength & Status of Forces.

5. See Dewey R. Greene, Jr., v. Charles D. Fair, et. al. (1963) in 8 Race Rel L Rep, III-15 (1963); memo for rcd (by Hammond), sub: Telephone Conversation from Department of Justice, 29 Jan 1963, cy in file on Memoranda -- General (Jan - 1963); memo for rcd (unsigned), sub: Oxford Mississippi, 30 Jan 1963, cy ibid.; msg, COUSAFOX to AWR (for Abrams), 02/0330Z /Feb 1963 7; msg, idem (Hodges) to idem (for Powell), 19/2030Z /Feb 1963 7; msg, idem to idem, 16/2250Z /Feb 1963 7; and idem to idem (for Abrams), 05/1230Z /Feb 1963 7.

6. (C) Msg, idem to idem (for Abrams -- EYES ONLY), 03/1540Z /Feb 1963 7, with penciled notations by gcj /Jung 7.

7. USAFOX Command Report, 9 Feb 1963, p. 4; ibid., 5 Mar 1963, pp. 1-2, 5; ibid., 1 Apr 1963, pp. 2, 6; ibid., 1 May 1963, pp. 2, 3, 5; and memo, Jung to Paddock, sub: Oxford, Mississippi /, 7 Incident, 15 Mar 1963, in file on Memoranda -- General (Jan - 1963). On Vandergrift and the marshals' protection of Meredith, see msg, COUSAFOX to AWR (for Powell), 09/2205Z /Apr 1963 /.

8. USAFOX Command Report, 5 Mar 1963, p. 4; ibid., 1 Apr 1963, p. 5; docs in file on Webster Injury Case; and the following msgs: COUSAFOX to AWR, 14/0408Z /Feb 1963 /, and idem to idem, 17/2300Z /Feb 1963 /.

9. Msgs as follows: idem to idem (for Powell), 17/1735Z /Feb 1963 /; and idem to idem (for Powell), 19/2030Z /Feb 1963 /, the writer correcting an obvious typographical error in the passage quoted from the latter msg.

10. On Keller's October proposal to move his troops from the practice field, see memo for rcd (by Jung), sub: Telecon -- Oxford/Army War Room /Orr /, 25/1845 Oct 1962, 26 Oct 1962, and memo for rcd (by Jung), sub: Telecon -- Oxford/Army War Room (Jung), 26/1100 Oct 1962, 26 Oct 1962 -- both in file on Memoranda -- General (Jan - 1963); and (C) msg, COUSAFOX to AWR, 04/0330Z /Jan 1963? /. See also (FOUO) msg, DA (McDonald for DCSLOG) to CGUSCONARC, 26/2137Z Oct 1962.

On Capt. Falkner, the Guard, and the Armory, see Falkner's Statement, pp. 12-13; msg, COUSAFOX to AWR (for Powell), 18/1855Z /Feb 1963 /, reproducing ltr, Falkner to Att Gen of the U.S. (rcvd 18 Feb), with penciled notation; msg, USAFOX to RUEPCR/TJAG and Powell, 25/1715Z Feb 1963 (DAIN 833493); msg, idem to AWR, 27/0035Z /Feb 1963 /; Press Release, DOD, OPA, 26 Feb 1963, in file on Congressional Opinion & Inquiries (II); ltr, Vance to Stennis, 6 Mar 1963, ibid.; USAFOX SitRep No. 360, 27/0050Z /Feb 1963 /, with notation by Jung; (C) msg, DA (Powell for DCSOPS) to CGUSCONARC and others, 27/0026Z Feb 1963 (DA 925131); and USAFOX Command Report, 1 Apr 1963, p. 5. Also see file on Occupancy of Armory, Oxford.

11. On "Camp Mosely," see msg, COUSAFOX to RUEPCR/AWR, 23/0330Z /Jan 1963 /; and Background Information, sub: Camp Mosely, /5 Feb 1963 /, cy in file on Memoranda -- General (Jan 1963).

12. (FOUO) Msg, DA (Foster for DCSLOG) to CGUSATHREE and others, 03/2225Z Dec 1962 (DA 323006); (C) memo, Weyand (CLL) to Dep Asst to the Sec/D, sub: Back-up Material for Secretary McNamara -- Use of Troops at the University of Mississippi, 16 Jan 1963, cy in file on General Accounts (Statistical Summaries, Etc.); and USAFOX Command Report, 4 Jan 1963, p. 4.

13. Ibid., p. 1; ibid., 9 Feb 1963, p. 2; and (C) msg, USAFOX to AWR, 01/1706Z /Jan 1963 /, quoting from an article in The Commercial Appeal (Memphis), 1 Jan 1963.

14. Ltr, Vance to Ramsey, 14 Jan 1963, as reproduced in Cong. Fact Paper, pp. A-1.1-1.2 (18 Jan 1963).

15. USAFOX Command Report, 9 Feb 1963, p. 2; and msg, DA to ZEN/CoFENGRS, 01/1808Z /Feb 1963 7.

16. On conditions under which the troops had to live, see msgs as follows: (C) USAFOX to AWR (for Abrams), 20/0525Z /Jan 1963 7; and idem to idem, 22/2125Z /Jan 1963 7.

17. (C) msg, idem to idem, 22/0235G /Jan 1963 7; msg, idem to idem, 27/0035Z /Feb 1963 7; Background Information, /25 Jan 1963? 7, cy in file on Memoranda -- General (Jan - 1963); USAFOX Command Report, 9 Feb 1963, p. 2; ibid., 5 Mar 1963, p. 2; and ibid., 1 Apr 1963, pp. 2-3.

18. Memo, Jung to Powell, 11 Mar 1963, cy with pen-and-ink revisions in file on Memoranda -- General (Jan - 1963); msg, COUSAFOX to AWR, 16/2200Z /Mar 1963 7; and (S) Annual Historical Summary, ODCSLOG, 1 July 1962 to 30 June 1963, p. 135. In addition, see USAFOX Command Report, 1 Apr 1963, pp. 3, 5; ibid., 1 May 1963, pp. 4-5; and the three files on Troop Quarters, Oxford, two of them containing a number of photographs.

19. On Lynch's selection, see Jung's informal, penciled memo to Paddock, 19 Mar 1963; memo, Paddock to Lindeman, sub: Replacement for Col. Hodges, /5 Apr 1963 7; memo, Hammer to Lindeman, sub: Replacement for Col. Hodges . . . , 9 Apr 1963, w/incls, including Lynch's photograph and a brief service record; DF, ODCSPER (by Lindeman) to Actg Dir/Ops, ODCSOPS, sub: Replacement for Col Hodges, 9 Apr 1963, w/incls; and memo, Paddock to CSA, sub: Replacement for Commanding Officer, Oxford, Mississippi, 12 Apr 1963, bearing stamp of Actg CSA (signed by Newman), 13 Apr 1963, recommending approval, and stamp of approval by Sec/A (signed by Baldwin, Mil Asst to Sec/A), 13 Apr 1963. These docs are all in the file on Commanding Generals & Other Key Personnel.

20. See msg, USAFOX /Hodges 7 to DCSOPS (for Powell), 24/1500Z Apr 1963 (DAIN 853727); and (C) msg, COUSAFOX to AWR (for Powell), 29/1745Z /Apr 1963 7.

21. On the Army's activities during the Greenwood troubles, see the Army action officer's Greenwood Chron File (1 Apr 1963 -) and other related materials held temporarily in the OCMH. The developing Alabama troubles in the spring of 1963 can be followed in the newspapers of that period. See also the Army's action-officer files of the operations in Birmingham, Tuscaloosa, and Huntsville, 1963, now temporarily in the OCMH.

22. (C) Msg, COUSAFOX (Hodges) to AWR (for Powell), 01/0610Z /May 1963 7 (DE RUEPJO 309); (C) msg, idem (Lynch) to idem, 01/0610Z /May 1963 7 (DE RUEPJO 308); and the immed. preceding chap, n. 23. On Lynch, see his biographical sketch and The USAFOX Tale, I (3 Jul 1963), 1, both in file on Commanding Generals & Other Key Personnel.

23. USAFOX SitRep No. 442, 20/0115Z /May 1963 7; USAFOX Command Report, 1 Jun 1963, pp. 5, 8; ibid., 1 Jul 1963, p. 2; and USAFOX SitRep No. 443, 21/0215 /Z? May 1963 7.

24. See USAFOX photographs in file marked Student Visitors to USAFOX; USAFOX Command Report, 1 Jun 1963, pp. 5-10; USAFOX SitRep No. 443, 21/0215Z [May 1963]; the file on Little's Green Falcon, Oxford Field Records (temporarily in the OCMH); and USAFOX SitRep No. 445, 23/0130Z [May 1963].

25. USAFOX Command Report, 1 Jun 1963, p. 12; (C) msg, COUSAFOX to AWR (for Powell), 02/0610Z [May 1963]; (C) msg, idem to idem, 02/2225Z [May 1963], bearing in red pencil the notation "Info requested from Col. Lynch 2 Apr [May 1963]"; strength figures in USAFOX SitRep No. 283, 20/0700Z, [Dec 1962], and ibid., No. 424, 02/0020Z [May 1963]; and (C) msg, DA (Powell for DCSOPS) to COUSAFOX, 15/1847Z May 1963 (DA 928074).

26. Memo, Rouilliard to Abrams, sub: Duration of Army's Presence in Oxford, Mississippi, 12 Apr 1963 (JAGA 1963/3981).

27. See memo stamped "DRAFT" (ribbon cy corrected in pencil), n.d., and filed with [memo], Bus [Wheeler] to Cy [Vance], 4 May 1963, cy in file on Withdrawal of Troops from Oxford, 1963. There are also, ibid., two other drafts of this memo, one dated 5/4/63 (also marked "DRAFT") and one 5/6/63 (marked "Second Draft").

28. A cy of this memo of 7 May is filed ibid. and quoted in extenso in (C) msg, DA (Powell for DCSOPS) to COUSAFOX, 14/0613Z May 1963 (DA 928000).

29. Ibid. Earlier in the year Gen. Powell, as part of his normal duties, had taken over very largely the special responsibilities for Oxford matters that Gen. Abrams had been handling since before the September/October 1962 riot. Telecon with Jung, 13 Jan 1965.

30. (C) Msg, DA (Powell for DCSOPS) to COUSAFOX, 15/1847Z May 1963 (DA 928074), which quoted memo, Wheeler to Sec/A [Vance], sub: Army Troops at Oxford, Mississippi, 14 May 1963 (cy in file on Withdrawal of Troops from Oxford, 1963).

31. USAFOX Command Report, 1 Jun 1963, p. 10; USAFOX SitReps No. 443, 21/0215Z [May 1963], No. 444, 22/0110Z [May 1963]; and No. 445, 23/0130Z [May 1963].

32. See memo, Rouilliard to Lawrence, sub: Reported Suit for Removal of Federal Troops from "Ole Miss" Campus, 13 May 1963, in file on Withdrawal of Troops from Oxford, 1963; USAFOX SitRep No. 446, 24/0145Z [May 1963]; USAFOX Command Report, 1 Jun 1963, p. 10; USAFOX SitRep No. 461, 08/0001Z Jun 1963 (DAIN 870560); msg, COUSAFOX to AWR (for Powell), 25/2015Z Jun 1963 (DAIN 877107); USAFOX SitRep No. 502, 19/0100Z Jul 1963; and ltr Lynch to Jung, 23 Sep 1963, w/incls, in file on Withdrawal of Troops from Oxford, 1963.

33. USAFOX SitRep No. 447, 24/2355Z [May 1963]; USAFOX Command Report, 1 Jun 1963, pp. 5, 9; and various newspapers of the period.

34. See fragmentary msg, /COUSAFOX? 7 to Abrams, 2 Nov 1962; msg, idem to AWR (attn: Jung), 05/1000Z /Nov 1962 7; and msg, idem to idem, 01/2150Z /Feb 1963 7. See also ltr, Barrett to Att Gen Robert Kennedy, 11 Jan 1963, cy in file on Withdrawal of Troops from Oxford, 1963.

35. While informing him that his responsibilities were the same in both cases, Washington also specifically directed Lynch to Billingslea's "fragmentary order" of 30/1322Z Sep 1962 (DA 919746), "which still remains as part of your guidance for situations such as the current one." See memo, Hodson, AJAG, to Powell, sub: Authority of Oxford Commander in Relation to Law School Applicant, 31 May 1963; and (C) msg, DA (Powell for ODCSOPS) to COUSAFOX, 01/1919Z Jun 1963 (DA 928758).

36. On the meeting referred to, see unsigned memo of telecon, sub: Admission of Mr. McDowell to University of Mississippi Law School, 29/1930 May 1963, cys in file on Registration of Meredith & McDowell, Jun 1963; and (C) msg, USAFOX to DA (for Powell), 30/1810Z May 1963 (DAIN 52685).

37. Memo for rcd (by Parker), sub: Conversations with Civilians in Oxford, 31 May 1963, cy in file on Registration of Meredith & McDowell, June 1963; and (C) msg, COUSAFOX to AWR (for Powell), 01/0300Z Jun 1963 (DAIN 53055).

38. (C) Msg, idem to DA (for Abrams), 01/0935Z Jun 1963 (DAIN 53056); (C) unsigned and undated memo for Abrams, sub: Staff Recommendations /concerning DAIN 53056 7, cy in file on Registration of Meredith & McDowell, Jun 1963; and (C) memo, /Rundquist? 7 to Abrams, sub: USAFOX Plan --- Registration of Mr. Meredith and Mr. McDowell at the University of Mississippi, 5 Jun 1963, a summary of Lynch's two-part plan, which he telephoned to Rundquist in the AWR.

39. See (C) Memorandum of Understanding, sub: Registration of Mr. Meredith and Mr. McDowell at the University of Mississippi 5 Jun 1963, cy bearing penciled notation "Approved by Katzenbach & Sec/re 7tary /Vance 7," in file on Registration of Meredith & McDowell, Jun 1963; and (C) msg, DA (Abrams) to COUSAFOX, 04/1734Z Jun 1963 (DA 928807), w/memo for rcd (by Abrams), sub: Telecon with Colonel Lynch Reference Memorandum of Understanding, 4 Jun 1963, in file ibid.

40. Rough transcript of teleconf, sub: McDowell's Registration 5 Jun 1963, initialed gcj(Jung), p. 6, in file ibid.

41. (C) Msg, COUSAFOX to Powell, 02/2300Z Jun 1963 (DAIN 53280).

42. USAFOX Command Report, 1 Jul 1963, p. /1 7; and msg, COUSAFOX to RUEPCR/AWR, 06/0430Z Jun 1963 (DAIN 869664).

CHAPTER VIII

WITHDRAWAL

Early Planning for Withdrawal. -- Col. Lynch viewed the very routine character of McDowell's registration and the efforts that had brought it about as a "favorable turn of events" that strongly indicated "the desirability of an immediate but planned withdrawal of Army elements from Oxford." The University's plans for the registration, he said, "were carried out . . . with great determination." He concluded that their success, even with the marshals and troops in the background, had restored to some degree the confidence of "responsible University officials." He thought it was "imperative," however, that this confidence be bolstered by "an immediate pronouncement" in Washington "by non-military sources."

Meredith's return to the campus "was uneventful." Bodyguards for Meredith and McDowell, as provided by the marshals, might be required for a short time, "perhaps for the remainder of the summer for Meredith." This was a "necessary reassurance for these two students" and for "the still shaky college officials" as well.

Col. Lynch did not think the Governor could afford "to continue the threat of closing the University or keep pressure on" the city, county, and University officials. The Governor's contention that the Federal Government was now responsible for McDowell might have little meaning, Lynch thought, if the local officials were given an opportunity to act while there was present a smaller student body of older summer students. Considering all these things, Col. Lynch believed that the

state, by using this same line of reasoning, might very well press successfully the suit it had filed already against himself and the Army in an effort to remove the latter. He concluded, therefore, that the Oxford forces should be phased out completely.

Col. Lynch proposed that in the first phase of a proposed three-phase withdrawal all Army elements be pulled back from the campus on Monday, 10 June, excepting one squad of the Alert Platoon which would remain in The Hole for one week. The Peanut Patrol would operate only on call from the base camp. In Phase II fifty percent of his headquarters and Company B of the 720th Military Police Battalion would move to home stations on 17 June. That would mean that the current military police company would stay until about 1 July instead of rotating out on 20 June and also that certain key staff officers would be frozen in place until about 1 July. In Phase III there would be a complete withdrawal on Monday, 1 July. Lynch added that he had not discussed this proposal "outside of military channels or with local civilians."¹

Probably Col. Lynch suggested this plan by telephone before putting it in message form early on 7 June, because on 6 June a memorandum practically recommending his plan in detail went to General Wheeler. Lynch's plan underwent slight modification before Wheeler received it. As modified, probably in the ODCSOES, all Army troops would be withdrawn from the campus on 10 June (Lynch had suggested leaving a squad in The Hole for a week), which would "allow time for the marshals and campus police to make plans for the protection of Meredith and McDowell." Then, effective 17 June, troop strength would be reduced fifty percent (to 100 military policemen and fifty overhead personnel), which would provide time for the marshals

and campus police to adjust to the absence of troops "and develop confidence in their ability to handle the mission." It would also allow "time to judge the campus reaction to two Negro students, especially to Meredith, who is, according to Colonel Lynch, 'despised.'" Lynch also believed, the memorandum continued, "that to order this reduction and the withdrawal of troops from the campus at the same time would 'shake the University officials up too much.'" Finally, the recommendation to General Wheeler was, as Lynch had recommended, that there be a final withdrawal of the remaining troops on 1 July.²

Secretary Vance for the Army and Geoghegan for Justice agreed upon the pullback on 10 June, when marshals would assume responsibility for protecting Meredith and McDowell, "relying upon the Army for reinforcements from the Department of Agriculture land in the event they are needed." The effective time of the pullback, which would include the guards at Baxter Hall, the Peanut Patrol, and the Alert Platoon, would be six o'clock, 10 June. The matter of the troop reduction on 17 June would be taken up in a few days. As for a final withdrawal on 1 July, it was not agreed to.³

In accordance with the decision reached, General Powell advised Lynch that on the time stated he and his command would be relieved of responsibility for the "security of Meredith and McDowell on the campus" and that at the same time those of his troops performing duties on the campus would return to their base camp. Lynch, however, would "continue to maintain responsive forces" at the base camp and the University-Oxford Airport, with which he could "quickly reinforce" the Federal marshals should they require such assistance. To this latter end he would "establish

continuous and alternate means of communications" with the marshals
4
on the campus.

At the appointed time Lynch passed the keys to Baxter Hall to Smith, the senior Federal marshal in Oxford, the Alert Platoon closed out its operation in The Hole, and the Peanut Patrol retired from the scene. The Army security system now devised for Meredith and McDowell, whose code names had been changed from MAGNET I and MAGNET II to MAGNET and LAWYER, respectively, provided two sedans with two men each ready for immediate deployment, two sedans with three men each to follow if needed, a military squad of twelve men on a fifteen-minute alert, and one primary and one
5
alternate means of radio communication with the marshals.

Troop Reduction, 17 June. -- Despite fears for the forthcoming troop reduction, they did not prevent its being put into effect on 17 June, when seven officers and 124 enlisted men departed. The new authorized strength does not appear to have been reached, however, until
6
the next month.

A Local Guarantee of Peace and Order. -- In mid-June Dean Love, claiming to speak also for the Chancellor and faculty division heads, but emphasizing that he did not want his views disclosed by the Army "under any circumstances," wanted the Army to remain in Oxford until the Governor made some kind of a commitment guaranteeing peace and order. He said he would not advise the Governor as to how he should implement any such commitment, but he did think the state police should be able to assemble a large number of officers in Oxford in a short time. Love did not think that additional campus police were needed, the present force of

eleven men being sufficient for routine purposes. As a non-military man, he thought Lynch's force might be cut more or less in half (he was speaking four days before the 17 June reduction), although what was needed essentially was "the U.S. Flag and two soldiers." He based his views concerning the continued need for the military in Oxford, as he saw it, on the fact that while responsible Mississippians now realized the inevitability of school integration, there were not yet enough of these, and on the strong probability that the summer's political campaigns would keep the racial issue stirred up.

Meanwhile, a guarantee of security for the University had come from a surprising source and would soon be accepted as meeting the needs of the hour. It was in the form of a letter from Sheriff Ford of Lafayette County, of which Oxford was the seat. On 10 May, either in response to a much earlier request for assistance or to one framed for this occasion, Sheriff Ford wrote a letter that was supposed to reassure the University concerning its security to the point at which it could feel reasonably safe in requesting the Federal Government to withdraw its troops, or at which, in the knowledge of such a guarantee, the Government would have reasonable grounds for taking the initiative. In this letter, however, Ford's commitment was only to continue to provide the protection he had provided in the past. Since he had been uncooperative in the past, he was asked to try again, this time with legal counsel.

Ford's second letter, addressed to Chancellor Williams on 24 May 1963, was shorter than his earlier letter and considerably more to the point:

In response to your request that I advise you what I will do, should you call on me for help in connection with preserving peace, property, and life on the campus, I beg to advise you as follows:

I, as Sheriff of Lafayette County, will exert and use all of the force and power that I can lawfully command to keep and preserve the peace, to quell disturbances and riots and to save and preserve property and life, on the campus of the University, upon your call to me for such help and assistance.

I trust there will be no need for my services; but, if needed, they are at your command. ⁸

Col. Lynch had no knowledge of the Ford letters until Monday, 17 June, when he had a private conference with Clegg, the Chancellor's assistant, who told him of the letters (and provided him with copies of them the next day) in response to Lynch's seeking Clegg's opinion on "the long range requirement for . . . troops in Oxford." Clegg found the Sheriff's assurances "most gratifying." Ford had told him, Clegg said, that he did not think anyone would shoot at Meredith in Lafayette County. Clegg agreed, but said that from his own experience he had concluded that it was "almost impossible to safeguard a public official's life against the John Wilkes Booth type attack." Col. Lynch told Clegg that he had found Sheriff Ford very cooperative. He transmitted copies of Ford's letters to Washington, although Secretary Vance had already received a ⁹ copy of the second letter through another channel.

Planning for the Final Withdrawal. -- In mid-July, Col. Lynch reported that "the several headquarters" providing men and equipment for his command had been after him about the "early release of certain personnel, vehicles and equipment." He had replied to such inquiries that the operational mission of his forces was unchanged and that none

could be released until the operation was closed out. Besides, only Army headquarters in Washington held the authority for any release. Some headquarters, Lynch said, were understandably not satisfied with such an answer and were "insisting on a detailed justification for further retention by USAFOX of the personnel and items in question." He found "justification from a strictly military" viewpoint "increasingly difficult to explain to the staffs of these headquarters," yet the fact was that the strength reduction of 17 June "was, in fact, a calculated risk and brought this force to an irreducible minimum. As long as the army is located here with its present mission, this force in its entirety should not be tampered with, even in the face of a now remote threat." He hoped, he said, that there would be no more of these inquiries until the Department decided upon the future of his command.

It was now 17 July and he thought a closeout plan should be developed, for "once the decision is reached as to termination date, the close out should be done quickly, orderly and quietly, without
10
publicity."

Dean Love had told Lynch on 5 July, in response to an inquiry from the latter, that University authorities were agreed that the Army should not withdraw from Oxford before the beginning of the second summer term on 13 July. Love's reason was that Meredith had just made a new application for family housing. Meredith registered for the second term of the summer session, and for his last courses at the University, on Monday, 15 July, without pushing his housing application and without incident. McDowell did not have to register since the courses he had registered for at the beginning
11
of the first term simply continued through the second.

On 15 July, Col. Jung, the action officer who had been occupied with the Oxford operation almost without a break since before the riot of the preceding year, prepared a memorandum for the Army's General Counsel, Joseph A. Califano, Jr., describing developments since the first of June, the existing situation, and the prospect if the Army were to stay at Oxford indefinitely. Using Jung's memorandum and talking, mostly by telephone, with a number of key persons, Califano drafted a memorandum for Secretary Vance on 19 July that presented the views of a number of persons, summed up the situation, and contained his recommendation that all troops be withdrawn from Oxford immediately. Secretary Vance probably saw a draft of this memorandum on Saturday, 20 July.

In concluding his memorandum, Califano recommended that either he or Secretary Vance should call Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach for his approval, since it had been agreed under an exchange of memoranda "that we would make no further reduction without consulting Justice." Evidently he persuaded Secretary Vance immediately for General Powell called Col. Lynch early Saturday evening, 20 July, to advise him that Vance, with clearance from Justice, approved closing out the Oxford forces beginning Monday, 22 July. Powell went on to explain, however, that after Vance approved the closeout to begin on Monday, he said to wait until Wednesday, 24 July, because Katzenbach wanted to think it over. Powell thought it rather certain that Katzenbach would give his approval and that Lynch could be informed on Monday; meanwhile, Lynch should make his plans and be ready to begin the closing out on Monday, but not do anything until he heard from Powell again. He was not to mention it to anyone, which included

persons in the intermediate headquarters. When Powell informed Lynch to go ahead he would at the same time inform those responsible for moving Lynch's materiel and men.

13

Califano called General Powell at five-thirty in the afternoon, Washington time, Monday, 22 July, to say that Secretary Vance had just received Katzenbach's concurrence on withdrawing all Army forces from Oxford. The withdrawal should be accomplished by Thursday, 25 July. (To meet the earlier deadline of 24 July, Col. Lynch would have had to know by early Monday morning.) There was to be no publicity on the withdrawal, no press releases but only answers to queries. Katzenbach asked about plans to evacuate the Negro students from Oxford in case of need, and it was agreed that the marshals would have a plan either for evacuating them or for securing them pending relief.

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Withdrawal. -- General Powell telephoned Col. Lynch, after first arranging for guidance for answering inquiries, to tell him that he would be relieved of his mission at a specified time to be agreed upon on Wednesday, 24 July 1963. He would evacuate all troop elements from Oxford by midnight, Thursday, 25 July. Until he received the requested guidance he would refer all inquiries to the Chief of Information in Washington. Finally, Powell told Lynch "that without arousing the fears of the . . . marshals, he should ascertain that they do have plans for the security of the Negro students in the event of an emergency. . . ." Confirmation of these verbal instructions followed immediately.

The instructions for answering queries, when they went out the next day, simply provided for saying that the troops would be withdrawn on 25 July 1963 because "present conditions at the University . . . and in Oxford indicate that Army forces can be removed at this time," and that the troops would rejoin their parent unit, the 716th Military Police Battalion, at Fort Dix.

Lynch's schedule for closing out the Oxford operation provided for dismantling his camp on 23 July and closing Army communications and operations at twelve o'clock, Oxford time, on 24 July. Company A of the 716th would leave for the Millington Naval Air Station by bus Wednesday afternoon, 24 July, and would remain there until the aircraft arrived to lift them to Fort Dix. The remainder of the personnel, excepting a small cleanup detail, would also depart for their home stations on Wednesday afternoon. Final cleanup would be on 25 July, as would the loading of remaining equipment in the event the trucks could not take it all on Wednesday.

Following instructions, Col. Lynch notified Mr. E. F. Yerby, Acting Chancellor, and Dean Love on Tuesday morning, 23 July, that Army operations would terminate at noon the following day, 24 July. At eleven-fifteen the same day, Lynch, with Marshal Haislip present, told Meredith of the forthcoming termination. Meredith's reaction was that the Army and the marshals should have departed a long time ago, a remark that could have had several meanings.

As planned, all Army operations at Oxford terminated at noon, Oxford time, 24 July 1963, according to the final situation report from

Oxford, No. 508. It required twenty two-and-one-half-ton trucks and six large vans, which came from Fort McClellan, to move the material and equipment from the dismantled camp. At that time operational control of the Oxford forces passed to the Commanding General, Third Army, as Lynch's mission, his responsibility in the cases of Meredith and McDowell, came to an end. According to plan, he now had only to participate on Thursday, 25 July, in a final inspection of the campsite and in its release to the Forest Service, along with lumber, pipe, and plumbing equipment he had been authorized to leave. Finally, persisting until the end in the use of an unauthorized code name that would not die, the Continental Army Command put it out in an operations summary of 26 July that the status of "RAPID ROAD" "forces on duty at Oxford" was "terminated by DA," and that the 716th Military Police Battalion (Minus) had been redeployed to its home station by a Military Transport Service airlift.

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Meredith received his Bachelor of Arts degree with about 440 other students at exercises on 18 August in The Grove, hard by the Lyceum, through which riders had coursed eleven months before, and it could be said that the Army had played an important role in making his graduation possible.

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Monetary Costs. -- Obviously the human costs in any such affair as that of Oxford are incalculable and not measured solely by the casualty figures that can be, and that have been herein, compiled. Even an accurate monetary costing is probably beyond practicality, given the complexity of the operation. Be that as it may, the Army's official

figures reveal that for the period through 31 March 1963 the cost of the Oxford operation to the Army was as follows:

<u>Fund</u>	<u>National Guard in Federal Service</u>	<u>Active Army</u>	<u>Total</u>
Operational & Maintenance, Army	\$ 104,300	\$ 1,108,000	\$ 1,212,300
Military Personnel, Army	\$ <u>1,120,004</u>	<u>0</u>	\$ <u>1,120,004</u>
	\$ 1,224,304	\$ 1,108,000	\$ 2,332,304

The total official cost to the Army for the period through 30 June 1963, was \$2,507,200. Army field commands absorbed this entire amount by reprogramming their activities. When the troops departed from Oxford the Pentagon put "the cost of maintaining Army troops" for Meredith's protection at "about \$4,364,000." Presumably this covered the costs for all the military services, including the cost of transportation provided by the Military Air Transport Service.

For the same period the cost of the Oxford operation to the Department of Justice was probably about \$559,000, the largest items of which were for travel expenses and overtime and premium pay. This figure was based upon a cost of \$406,508 through October 1962, monthly costs of \$15,000 from October 1962 through January 1963, and estimated costs for the period from January through June.

The total cost to the Federal Government, Defense and Justice combined, approximated \$5,000,000.

Lessons. -- For the Army, of course, the Oxford operation was an unusual experience, similar to Little Rock but also quite different. Probably the overriding lesson learned by both the Department of Justice and the Army was the necessity for the closest possible liaison in the face of possibly serious disturbances over civil rights, a lesson that the experiences of 30 September 1962 taught very well indeed. There were, of course, various other lessons for the Army in its experiences at Oxford, as the reader will have noted. Of these the Army was aware as it followed its own operations and noted the recommendations of its commanders. Even while the Oxford operation was still in progress, the Army and Justice put their experiences to work in their concurrent intervention in Alabama and in planning for possible civil rights troubles in the future.

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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

1. (C) Msg, COUSAFOX to AWR (for Powell), 07/0900Z Jun 1963 (DAIN 54865). Cf. (C) msg, idem to idem (for Powell), 07/0800Z / May 1963 7. Also cf. msg, idem to idem, 24/1930Z / May 1963 7.
2. (C) Unsigned memo for CSA, sub: Reduction and Phase-out of U.S. Army Troops at Oxford, Mississippi, 6 Jun 1963, cys in file on Withdrawal of Troops from Oxford, 1963. See also (C) msg, COUSAFOX to DA (for Powell), 07/1650Z Jun 1963 (DAIN 54932).
3. Memo, Califano to Abrams, sub: Reduction and Phase-out of U.S. Army Troops at Oxford, Mississippi, 8 Jun 1963, w/2 incls, including ribbon cy of memo to CSA, cited in preceding note, in file on Withdrawal of Troops from Oxford, 1963.
4. Msg, DA (Powell for DCSOPS/OD) to COUSAFOX and others, 10/1317Z Jun 1963 (DA 340470).
5. USAFOX Command Report, 1 Jul 1963, pp. 1-2; and USAFOX SitRep No. 460, 07/0305Z Jun 1963.
6. See and cf. the following: USAFOX Command Report, 1 Jul 1963, p. 3; msg, DA (Powell for DCSOPS/OD) to CGUSCONARC and COUSAFOX, 11/2127Z Jun 1963 (DA 340730); msg, COUSAFOX to RUEPCR/AWR and RUCRC/CGUSCONARC, 12/0230Z Jun 1963 (DAIN 871901); USAFOX SitRep No. 471, 18/0100Z / Jun 1963 7; ibid., No. 473, 20/0004Z Jun 1963 (DAIN 875040); ibid., No. 483, 30/0010Z Jun 1963 (DAIN 879035); and ibid., No. 496, 13/0045Z Jul 1963 (DAIN 883711).
7. (C) Msg, COUSAFOX to AWR (for Powell), 14/0729Z / June 1963 7 (DAIN 57274), with penciled notation; and (C) msg, idem to idem (for Powell), 18/1815Z Jun 1963.
8. Cys of both letters, as supplied Lynch by Clegg, are in (C) msg, COUSAFOX to AWR (for Powell), 18/1815Z Jun 1963; and a cy of the letter of 24 May is attached to ltr, Vance to Stennis, 11 Jun 1963, in file on Withdrawal of Troops from Oxford, 1963.
9. (C) Msg, COUSAFOX to AWR (for Powell), 18/1815Z Jun 1963.
10. USAFOX SitRep, No. 501, 18/0300Z Jul 1963 (DAIN 885579).
11. Ibid., No. 489, 06/0030Z Jul 1963 (DAIN 881080); ibid., No. 493(1), 10/2200Z / Jul 1963 7; USAFOX SitRep No. 499, 16/0015Z Jul 1963 (DAIN 884437); and the Califano memo, p. 3, which is cited in the immediately following n.

12. See memo, Jung to General Counsel /Califano 7, sub: Oxford, Mississippi, 15 Jul 1963, cys in file on Withdrawal of Troops from Oxford, 1963; note, Califano to Powell, 19 Jul 1963, incl draft memo for Sec/A, sub: The Oxford Situation, 19 Jul 1963, cy in file ibid. For Lynch's estimate of the cost of winterizing his camp, see USAFOX SitRep No. 499, 16/0015Z Jul 1963 (DAIN 884437).

13. MRS, Brinnon to Powell, 21 Jul 1963, incl memo for red (by Brinnon), sub: Closing of USAFOX Operations, Oxford, Mississippi, 21 Jul 1963, a summary of Powell-Lynch telecon, 20/1925 Jul 1963; and verbatim transcript of taped Powell-Lynch telecon cited -- all in file on Withdrawal of Troops from Oxford, 1963.

14. Memo for red (by Powell), sub: Withdrawal of U.S. Forces, Oxford, Mississippi, 23 Jul 1963, in file ibid.

15. Ibid.; undated and unsigned memo, /sub: 7 For Use in Answering Queries, 23 Jul 1963, in file ibid.; and (C) msg, DA (by Mills for DCSOPS) to CGUSCONARC, CGUSATHREE, and COUSAFOX, 23/0041Z Jul 1963 (DA 930530).

16. USAFOX SitReps No. 506, 23/0030Z Jul 1963 (DAIN 887341), and No. 507, 23/0115Z Jul 1963 (DAIN 887871). On the closing out of all military communications in Oxford, excepting the SCAN circuit left for the marshals, see (FOUO) OCSigO After-Action Report . . . for . . . Period 9 Jul through 24 Jul 1963, 19 Aug 1963.

17. (C) Msg, COUSAFOX to RUEPCR/AWR (for Powell), 23/2040Z Jul 1963.

18. See USAFOX SitRep No. 508, 24/1800Z Jul 1963; (C) msg, CGUSCONARC to RUCAC/CGUSATHREE and others, 24/1810Z Jul 1963 (DAIN 69884); /Welch 7, op. cit., pp. 23-26; and USAFOX Daily Journal, 24/0001 - 1200 Jul 1963, p. 1, the last entry in which reads: "All USAFOX terminated. Journal Closed" (filed with Oxford Field Records). It appears that Lynch never prepared a command report to cover the period from the end of June through the closeout in Jul 1963. For the CONARC operations summary referred to, see msg, CGUSCONARC/CINCARSTRIKE to RUCQHKB/CINCSTRIKE and RUCTDC/USSTRCOM ADV, Spartanburg, S.C., 26/2050Z Jul 1963 (DAIN 889167).

19. Fred Powledge, "Meredith Received Mississippi Degree with 440 Whites," The New York Times, 18 Aug 1963, pp. 1, 13 (with photo).

20. The table is adapted from Cong. Fact Paper, ^(FOUO) p. 2 (rev 23 Apr 1963). Jung of ODCSOPS provided the Army's figure as of 30 Jun 1963 in a telecon, 20 May 1964; and discussed the "Pentagon" figure in a telecon of 16 Jun 1963. On the final Pentagon figure, see "Ole Miss Troop Cost \$4 Million," The New York Post, 25 Jul 1963, p. 4, and "The Cost at Oxford" (an editorial), The St. Louis Post Dispatch, 1 Aug 1963, as quoted in the Army Editorial Digest, 7 Aug 1963. The cost figures given here are for costs that normally would not have occurred. Thus, there is an MPA cost figure for the National Guard but none for the Active Army.

21. "U.S. Figures Ole Miss Tab at \$406,508," The Evening Star (Washington), 11 Dec 1962, p. A10; "Ole Miss Cost U.S. \$406,508," The Washington Post Times Herald, 12 Dec 1962, p. A4; "Marshals May Leave in June -- RFK Asks No More 'Meredith Money,'" Jackson Daily News (Mississippi), 5 Apr 1963, p. 1; and "2d Negro Wins Entry to University Today. . .," The Clarion-Ledger (Jackson, Miss.), 5 Jun 1963, p. 7. On the cost of alleged damage to the University because of the riot and troop occupancy, see "House Requests Army Get Out of Ole Miss -- Solons Seek \$344,000 for Damage to the Campus," ibid., 15 Nov 1962, pp. 1A, 12A; and "Cost of Riot Is Estimated -- Ole Miss Says Damage Totals \$344,101 at Oxford," The Commercial Appeal (Memphis), 15 Nov 1962.

22. For "Oxford Lessons and Recommendations" abstracted from various Oxford after-action and command reports and arranged organizationally, see Appendix A, below. These have been edited for style and readability only and are presented here as a convenient reference source despite the fact that some of the same material appears at different places in the text, above. Additionally, see (C) "Abrams on the Army's Role in Supporting the Department of Justice in Civil Rights Troubles," Appendix B, below. This is a May 1963 recommendation by Abrams, which, sent from Birmingham, deals in general with the Army's role in civil disturbances and urges a course of action for the future based upon the Army's recent and continuing experiences. It merits a careful reading because of Abrams' key role in those experiences as the personal representative of the Chief of Staff. See also the text, p. 221, above, and the references there.

APPENDIX A

OXFORD LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following lessons (or in some cases problems from which lessons can be inferred) and recommendations are from staff after-action reports and from command reports from General Billingslea, General Howze, and Colonel Keller. The staff reports are mainly concerned with the period from planning before the riot to about the end of the year 1962, with, however, some reports covering the period through March 1963. The command reports represented here cover the period through November 1962. There were some lessons and recommendations recorded in reports for 1963, but none of any great importance.

Staff Lessons and Recommendations

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (OACSI). —

The OACSI found that there was a lack of coordination in the collection and dissemination of information on the part of representatives of interested agencies in the area of the disturbance. As an example, the OACSI had no prior knowledge of the marshals' plan to take Mr. Meredith to the University campus on 30 September 1962. Consequently, Intelligence Corps personnel were not present to observe and report on the incident that resulted.*

There was a lack of direct contact with Intelligence Corps personnel in the vicinity of the disturbance during the initial stages of the planning and mobilization. During this critical period the OACSI encountered difficulty in expediting requests for pertinent information until it

* Cf. the Intelligence Log, as cited above, passim.

established direct contact with Intelligence Corps personnel in the area. The necessity for concealing the Army's interest in the unrest during the planning phase greatly restricted the collection effort during the critical period. In view of these difficulties the OACSI recommended that it be included in the planning phases of future operations in which the Department of the Army exercised operational control; and that in future operations directed by the Department it be empowered in advance of troop commitment to coordinate intelligence collection in the areas concerned with troop units to be employed and at the national level. Furthermore, it recommended that the ODCSOPS concur in efforts looking toward the publication of a formal agreement between the ODCSOPS, OACSI, OPMG, and the Department of Justice in which the mission, functions, and responsibilities of each in the collection and dissemination of intelligence information in civil disturbances would be clearly defined. *

Office of the Chief of Information (OCINFO). -- The OCINFO concluded that various limitations (for example, secretive planning) would always be characteristic of operations similar to the Oxford operation and that lessons learned that did not accept such limitations would be nonsensical. A restrictive news policy could always be expected in order to avoid stirring up opposition that in itself could be a major factor in making intervention necessary. Accordingly, planning should be based upon the assumption that a restrictive news policy could be expected during the initial phase of any operation. In reporting on the Oxford operation for

* (FOUO) OACSI After-Action Report, 7 Jan 1963, p. 2.

the period covering the riot and extending through March 1963, the OCINFO concluded that the Army's public-information policy had, on balance, a remarkably favorable impact. The primary factor was the conduct and description of the men and units in the field. Initially, no criticism seems to have been directed specifically at the Army or its personnel except by Meredith himself.

In consequence of these considerations, the OCINFO recommended that planning restrictions be accepted as a part of the problem in all operations of the Oxford type, that OCINFO plans be general in nature and in the form of check lists of specific actions to be taken as information became available, and that the USCONARC develop and maintain an information task force that always would be ready for dispatch on short notice to assist with informational problems that might arise in various situations. *

Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison (OCLL). -- The OCLL recommended no changes in doctrine, technique, or procedure, reasoning that the kind of legislative inquiries received during the month or so following the Oxford riot were normal given the nature of the operation. The fact that Congressmen asked similar questions of a number of Army agencies separately and more or less simultaneously sometimes complicated the work of Legislative Liaison. Fast teamwork in providing accurate data upon which to provide replies was mandatory, Legislative Liaison thought, and happily found such teamwork outstanding during the reporting period. **

* (FOUO) OCINFO After-Action Report -- Mississippi, 8 Sep - 31 Mar 1963 (Working Copy), pp. 4-5.

** OCLL, After-Action Report -- Mississippi (Initial Report), 4 Dec 1962, p. 3.

National Guard Bureau (NGB). -- During the Oxford crisis the NGB confirmed that its staff could function with an additional, unpredicted work load. The Bureau recommended, however, that in future operations of the Oxford type one of its officers should be assigned to work with the duty officers in the Army War Room and keep the chief of the Bureau continually informed and advised. Actions requiring Bureau participation could then be initiated immediately without recourse to the telephone or a messenger.*

Office of the Chief Signal Officer (OCSigO). -- The OCSigO learned, according to its Oxford project officer, Lt. Col. Albert Redman, Jr., that at the beginning of the Oxford operation the Army War Room communications facilities were inadequate to support an operation of Oxford's magnitude. Besides that, field commanders failed to keep signal officers informed of their plans, particularly concerning the selection of new command posts. Again, field commanders and their staffs placed too much reliance upon the Department of the Army to supply internal headquarters communications requirements. In addition, they misused the available communications by passing classified information and reports over the telephone circuits while permitting the secure teletypewriter circuits to remain idle. There was also a failure in the initial planning to recognize the size and scope of the military participation required. The transportable communications equipment failed to provide responsive and reliable communications [] in the early stages of the operation because there was a frequency incompatibility between the Army's and Justice's

* NGB After-Action Reports -- Mississippi, 17 Dec 1962, p. 3.

equipment. 7 Finally, the operation indicated a need for the Signal Corps to have a stand-by capability for providing communications personnel and equipment for an operation of the Oxford type.

In view of these lessons, Redman, the project officer, recommended that the Army War Room staff include, on a permanent basis, a signal officer responsible for all signal coordination and planning; and that a study be conducted to determine what actions could be taken to improve the responsiveness of existing communications equipment, particularly the teletypewriter and the transportable equipment. He recommended further that instructional material be prepared for use in the combat arms schools and the senior staff colleges on the importance of including signal and communications officers in operational planning. He recommended also that the Signal Corps continue to assist in Army War Room communications planning; and that the Signal Corps continue to develop plans, concepts, and doctrine for the utilization of a strategic communications unit, capable of reacting immediately to any type of emergency operation. *

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (ODCSLOG). --

Because of the limited nature of the operation, it did not generate any significant, high-level, logistic deficiencies. If anything, the ODCSLOG thought, it was probably over-supported. **

* (FOUO) OCSigO After-Action Report on the Oxford . . . Operation Initial Report 7, p. 2. Cf. (FOUO) OCSigO After-Action Report, 14 Sep - 31 Oct 1962, pp. 2-3. It ought to be pointed out that at the time of Oxford the SigC was very much on the defensive as a result of the recent reorganization of the D/A aimed at eliminating some technical services and substantially reducing others, including the SigC, which before long would disappear as a separate bureau.

** (S) DCSLOG After-Action Report on Mississippi, 28 Dec 1962, p. 3.

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER). --

The provisions of AR 135-300 [concerning the Army National Guard] were not followed. Paragraph 24d, on the responsibilities of area commanders, listed medical examinations as of the first priority. Apparently there was no action to accomplish such examinations until on or after 2 October 1962. Calling and releasing Guard units within a matter of days would always cause commanders extreme difficulty in trying to complete medical examinations. In the Oxford operation the Army reduced to the barest minimum the statutory requirement (laid down in U.S. Code, Title 10, Sec. 3205) that all personnel be examined as to physical fitness. The Army made decisions and took action without official coordination with the ODCSPER to determine personnel implications. For one thing, there was no coordination with the ODCSPER of the message calling Guard units to duty, and the ODCSPER did not learn of the action until twelve-thirty-five, 30 September. Similarly, the ODCSPER knew nothing about the release of certain units until 5 October; indeed, it apparently learned from the National Guard Bureau of their forthcoming release after the decision to release them had been made. Again, the ODCSPER had no information regarding a change in the release. The ODCSPER learned about some subsequent releases from the National Guard Bureau; indeed information on planned actions or actions actually taken came informally from the National Guard Bureau, which knew that the ODCSPER had a major interest in such actions.

Throughout the critical period to the end of October 1962 the ODCSPER actions were mainly reactions to decisions already decided or

taken. Consequently it recommended that in future operations of this kind the ODCSOPS should make early arrangements for coordination. *

Office of The Judge Advocate General (OTJAG). -- The first part of the Oxford operation affirmed the inestimable value of prior planning, the OTJAG concluded in January 1963. The continuing guidance and close liaison between Lt. Col. Jung, a representative of the ODCSOPS, and the OTJAG by which, among other things, drafts of the orders of the Secretaries of Defense and of the Army were prepared, had a material effect upon the rapidity with which the Army responded to the President's executive order as implemented by the orders of the Secretary of Defense. Another proven asset of the operation was the presence on the ground of a senior legal advisor to the personal representative of the Chief of Staff. This arrangement made a personal representative of The Judge Advocate General not only available to the Departmental representative [Abrams], but also, in a liaison capacity, to the representatives of the Department of Justice and the office of the local United States Attorney.

In another area, the OTJAG learned, the acquisition of real estate to accommodate varying numbers of troops should be treated as a continuing part of the operation. Initially, teams (including real estate experts from the United States District Engineer's Office) should survey the area for available sites. The command Judge Advocate advised that a priority of acquisition should be established to run in a descending order from federal to state to city/county and to private property; and that in every case consent should be sought from a responsible individual, if possible.

* (C) DCSPER After-Action Report, 29 Sep - 31 Oct 1962, pp. 4, 5.

Thereafter, as recommended, the survey of available sites should continue, specifically, in later phases, with a view to the possible presence of troops in the area for an indefinite period.

Future military aid to the civil power could be provided more expeditiously by the preparation of a standard operating procedure that would contain not only tested drafts of relevant documents but also brief digests of legal opinions relevant to such operations.

The service of subpoenas upon military personnel involved so many legal, political, and operational factors that the OTJAG thought that no general guidance should be given, but instead that it would be preferable to:

a. Give general guidance on procedures to be followed with instructions that a case should not be disposed of without referring the matter to the Department of the Army.

b. Give specific guidance to all witnesses on possible lines of interrogation and on instructions for handling any inquiries directed at safeguarded matters.

c. Advise Departmental personnel in those cases in which they could be subjected to criminal action arising out of the performance of their duty concerning the possible consequences of making statements that might be prejudicial to their own interests or those of the Government.

It was the opinion of the OTJAG that it could perform its best service in the Army's interest when fully informed concerning situations presenting a direct legal problem or possessing latent legal implications (for example, the shooting incident of 30 October and the acquisition of

a site for a winterized camp). In short, the full and free flow of information throughout the Army staff, including the OTJAG, during the period through November 1962 materially aided it in fulfilling its mission at that time.

In the construction of facilities for the Army in a situation like that of Oxford, a private contractor would always be vulnerable to delaying actions through local courts. Although the outcome of such litigation would doubtlessly be favorable to the Federal Government, such delays should be avoided.

When planning in the future any such operation as Oxford, it would be desirable to know against whom certain costs should be charged. For example, in an operation for which the Army had primary responsibility, who should get the charges for damages by support aircraft operated by Air Force or Marine personnel?

The Oxford operation led the OTJAG to make several recommendations. For one thing, it thought that all staff agencies should be encouraged to prepare standard operating procedures based upon their experiences in that operation. Also, the OTJAG urged that the staff of the senior Departmental representative in future operations such as Oxford should include an officer of The Judge Advocate General's Corps, who would serve as his personal legal advisor on all phases of military aid to the civil power. The OTJAG also recommended the preparation of a standard operating procedure that would include, in general terms, a determination of which agency would assume the predictable costs of the operation. There should be, for example, an avoidance of the "MATS label" so that air transportation

of troops as "mission flights" would not be charged against Army funds. In constructing necessary Army facilities the employment of private contractors should be avoided because of their vulnerability in local courts. Consequently, Engineer and other troops should be used for construction and maintenance of camp and command post facilities to the greatest extent possible. Finally, the OTJAG recommended that in future operations of the Oxford kind it should continue to be fully advised and included in both the planning and execution of the operation. *

Office of The Provost Marshal General (OPMG). -- In future operations of the Oxford type, the OPMG recommended that infra-red night photography be exploited, that M-14 rifles with bayonets be considered the standard riot weapon rather than carbines and night sticks, that a study of the use of colored dyes [for purposes of later identification] be pursued, and that Field Manual 19-15 continue in use as doctrine and in the current training program. The OPMG recommended further that as a matter of policy during domestic emergency operations military police battalions be employed under a centralized command and not subordinated to battle groups, that consideration be given to the proposal to activate and position a military police battalion in each army area in the Continental United States, and that in future operations of the Oxford type, an OPMG officer be on duty in the Army War Room to advise on matters pertaining to discipline, law, and order. **

* OTJAG Initial After-Action Report -- Mississippi, 9 Jan 1963 (JAGA 1962/5052), pp. 5-6; OTJAG After-Action Report -- Mississippi (1-30 Nov 1962), 9 Jan 1963 (JAGA 1963/3350), pp. 4-5; *ibid.* (1-31 Jan 1963), 15 Apr 1963 (JAGA 1963/3681), p. 3; and *ibid.* (1-28 Feb 1963), 12 July 1963 (JAGA 1963/3797), p. 3.

** OPMG Initial After-Action Report -- Mississippi, 20 Nov 1962, pp. 2-3; and (FOUO) OPMG First Subsequent Report -- Mississippi, 10 Dec 1962, p. 5.

Office of The Inspector General (OTIG). -- The OTIG conducted an inquiry at the direction of the Chief of Staff, but whether or not it revealed any important lessons cannot be said because of the privileged nature of the report. The OTIG did reveal, however, that the Army War Room needed a more accurate system for recording orders and information, for it found many inaccuracies in the recording of time, while some of the information recorded was either inaccurate or incomplete in essential detail. It also learned that the Dictionary of United States Army Terms (AR 320-5) did not define the term "alert" as applying to the status of Army forces -- its most common usage.

Command Lessons and Recommendations

2d Infantry Division (19 September - 1 October 1962). -- A major problem experienced on Sunday, 30 September 1962, was the lack of any single directing agency for all Federal plans and operations designed to enforce the Federal court order to admit James Meredith to The University of Mississippi. General Billingslea was under the direct control of the Chief of Staff with instructions to aid Justice Department operations. Major General Creighton Abrams, personal representative of the Chief of Staff, informed Billingslea that the Attorney General had responsibility for directing over-all Federal policy. It was apparent, however, that Justice Department planning and Army planning had proceeded somewhat independently. When the need for close coordination in the Memphis and Oxford areas arose the separate instructions of the two departments made

* OTIG After-Action Report (Final), 7 Dec 1962.

unified direction and close coordination difficult to accomplish. In the matter of communications, for example, Justice personnel in Oxford had a SCAN line to Washington, but Army forces, specifically denied any advance communications in Oxford, had none at all, not even under cover of Justice's preparations. Another example occurred shortly after noon on 30 September when, for the first time, Billingslea learned from Abrams that he would command the United States marshals moving to Oxford to place Mr. Meredith on the University campus. His superiors later removed this responsibility when it became apparent that he could not command the marshals and at the same time prepare his forces, including the Mississippi National Guard, for employment. Consequently, it seemed clear that during operations of the Oxford type, command, control, and liaison among all agencies of the Federal Government should be established early in the planning.

In operations involving racial issues there should be an early determination concerning the introduction of Negro personnel into the area. Consideration should be given to issuing armored vests to all personnel directly involved in riot-control operations, and National Guard units should be authorized to maintain a basic load of small arms and chemical riot-control munitions. This should be in addition to the very limited amount of security ammunition now held by Guard units. When sudden mobilization is planned ahead of time, as in this case, earmarked units should be provided with adequate emergency rations and supplies
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before mobilization.

* (FOUO) 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab A, pp. 6-7, 10.

2d Infantry Division (1-10 Oct 1962). -- During the period of its subordination to Howze's Airborne Corps, Billingslea's 2d Infantry Division came to some conclusions regarding the equipping of the National Guard and concerning local purchasing. When federalized in an emergency, National Guard units should be equipped by the most expeditious means without regard to Guard or Regular Army channels. There should also be attached to the senior Regular Army unit in the area a representative of the National Guard's Purchasing and Finance Officer in order to expedite supply for the Guard units. A purchasing and contracting officer should also be appointed immediately upon committing a military force in an area widely separated from an active military installation, for this would expedite completion of local purchase contracts for essential items and services.
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XVIII Airborne Corps (1-10 October 1962). -- Higher headquarters apparently decided to move the entire 2d Signal Group to Oxford. This decision, later rescinded when the signal units were either in the air stream or being loaded, caused confusion that brought about stopping all movement of signal equipment. As a result, the signal equipment that arrived in the Oxford area was either of the wrong type or of limited quantity and made accomplishment of the signal mission dependent almost entirely on commercial resources.

* Ibid., Tab C, p. 5. A better copy, however, is to be found as Incl 1 with the XVIII Airborne Corps report cited immediately below. In his report for 1-10 Oct, when he was again in command in Oxford, Billingslea remarked that because of limited recreational facilities and the sensitive nature of the duty in operations such as Oxford, towns in the area of operations had to be off limits to the troops. Because of the impact of such a situation on morale, he recommended that troops should be rotated "at least every thirty days." (FOUO) 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab B, p. 6.

There appears to have been an excessive number of troops deployed in this operation even though the principle of applying ample force for the job was a good one. A more economical use of STRAC forces would have been deployment of the proper number of troops to accomplish restoration of law and order while maintaining sufficient forces on increased alert with a stand-down of troop carrier aircraft sufficient to transport them directly to the objective area. In the case of Oxford, this would have afforded a far greater flexibility in the deployment or employment of STRAC forces in support of other contingencies should they have arisen.

Information on aircraft arriving at deployment bases was late and in many cases not provided to the commanders of departure airfield control groups until aircraft were on the ground. The commander of the departure airfield control group must have, in order to execute a timely and efficient outloading operation, information on the allowable cargo load (ACL), the interior configuration of aircraft (troop or cargo), and the types of aircraft to be used, as well as a sufficient lead time prior to aircraft arrival for manifesting cargo and personnel. This is particularly true when MATS aircraft are used since they sometimes utilize commercial seating which does not readily facilitate a rapid change from troop carrier to cargo needs.

There was, in the Oxford operation, an insufficient coordination between higher headquarters and the Army field commander prior to the introduction of units into the area of operations. In several cases units arrived in the objective area without the field command having any prior knowledge of their arrival; and some units arrived in the area after action was taken to limit the strength ceiling to 10,000. This not only

precluded timely issuance of missions and assignment of bivouacs, but necessitated additional movement to either Columbus or Memphis in order to stay within the prescribed strength ceiling of 10,000.

The "across the board" segregation of units in the Oxford/University of Mississippi area had a disruptive effect on units involved. Approximately twenty percent of the strength of the Regular Army units was Negro, which, of course, included company commanders and other key leaders in the chain of command. For certain guard posts and patrols where close contact with students was necessary, selected segregation was indeed desirable in order to protect the individual Negro soldier and reduce the possibility of violence. The proper solution would allow the field commander all latitude in this respect.

Photographers should be utilized extensively in operations of this nature as an aid to subsequent investigation and identification. In an incident at the University cafeteria, the crowd began to disperse rapidly after photographing began. There was a general reluctance by personnel participating in the demonstration to be photographed.

When National Guard forces are federalized and included as part of a Regular Army force, National Guard staff officers should be provided the field commander to assist in administration. Judge advocates general and inspectors general should be phased into the objective area early to handle the many problems in their areas of interest.

An essential element in an operation of the Oxford type would be to create quickly a spirit of cooperation and mutual respect between the military and the civilian community. The degree of professionalism displayed by the

military would play a significant part, and the appearance of the troops would be very important in projecting this image of professionalism. For this reason laundry and bath facilities should be established early and augmented as necessary, authority to use civilian laundry facilities at no expense to the individual should be granted early, and purchasing and contracting authority should be granted promptly. *

82d Airborne Division (1-10 October 1962). -- The 82d Airborne Division concluded that there should be a divisional plan for operations of the Oxford type, that a judge advocate should accompany the senior commander of any unit involved in such an operation, that once a civil disturbance appears imminent all units under consideration for deployment should be notified immediately in order to permit planning, and that requests for information, and information provided the division, should follow the normal chain of command. **

101st Airborne Division (1-10 October 1962). -- The Oxford operation, in the opinion of the 101st Airborne Division, provided an excellent test of STRAC readiness mobility, and as such provided a basis for revision of current plans and procedures. Segregation of troops being highly undesirable, Negro soldiers should perform their normal functions with their units. Surveillance and security measures under conditions such as those at Oxford should be the minimum necessary. The Army employed this principle with the result that the best of relationships existed between the troops and civilians in the Oxford area.

* (FOUO) XVIII Abn Command Report, 6 Dec 1962, pp. 8, 10-11.

** 82d Abn Div After Action Report, 2 Nov 1962, ibid., Incl 2, p. 57.

In the light of the existing situation, the size of the affected area, and the mission, it appears that there were far too many troops in the Oxford area. This proved a drain on existing facilities and created problems of control and administration above those required for the accomplishment of the mission. Troops, excepting those absolutely necessary to the mission, should be billeted at a distance from the objective area or should be kept on alert at their home stations for possible deployment.

In an inclosure dealing with "Information Activities," the 101st Airborne recommended that in future incidents of this kind there should be no thought given to the race of troops to be used on public duty. It also recommended that the size and composition of the information staff be specified with the original mission unless its composition was to be at the commander's discretion, that other government departments have information personnel available to Army personnel once forces are designated or committed, and that the texts of all releases concerning a particular operation be furnished to installation and units concerned simultaneously or prior to their release by the Department of Defense or of the Army.

The 101st also recommended that communications be installed in advance at locations where troops would be situated, for in an explosive situation such as Oxford, SCAN, "hot," and local lines are all essential. Finally, the 101st recommended that sufficient motion and still photographic equipment and personnel be included in the force composition to permit

recording of both historic events and such activities as riots and
*
disturbances.

2d Battle Group, 23d Infantry Regiment (19 September - 21 October 1962). -- The 2d Battle Group recommended that all Class V (ordnance and chemical) supplies should be issued to units of a task force before deployment from home stations, so that the items would be under unit control and immediately available. Night sticks should be taken by a task force for use as needed. Large amounts of barbed wire, wood of various sizes, and commonly used pioneer tools should be taken also for possible use. Canvas should be left on vehicles for protection. The 5,000-gallon gasoline tanker should be attached for all long and hurried motor moves. A spare chemical solution feeder assembly unit should be taken with the water purification equipment, and consideration should be given to the authorization of additional lengths of hose for water purification equipment and in bath units to allow more latitude in selecting areas for operation. PCS property (ice chests) should be taken to assist units in preserving perishable foods.

Air relay should be provided for more effective convoy control, especially during the initial move when march units are spread out over many miles. At least two to four dial telephones should be taken on missions such as Oxford in order to better utilize existing civilian communications when needed. Ropes or cords should be obtained by a task force for use as tiedowns and for lining off areas so that WD-1 wire would

* (FOUO) 101st Abn Div Command Report, 1-10 Oct 1962, 17 Nov 1962, ibid., Incl 3, p. 5; and Incl 5, p. 5, to ibid., Incl 3.

not have to be used for such purposes. A task force should take enough signal publications, supply references, and supply specialists to meet the needs of the task force. For effective dispersal of rioters, each company-size rifle force should have three chemical gas dispensers, and they should be issued prior to departure for an objective area so that personnel could become familiar with them. Finally, as a further aid in the dispersal of rioters, cameras (whether they work or not) should be issued to each committed unit.

1st Battle Group, 155th Infantry Regiment (30 September - 16 October 1962). -- The 1st Battle Group, 155th Infantry Regiment, thought there should be a definite and early determination of administrative control headquarters. Applicable Army Regulations concerning mobilization should be implemented as written. A course of study in the applicable mobilization regulations should be conducted at all levels for all officers and key personnel in both the Active Army and the National Guard. Furthermore, all Army Regulations should be distributed to Guard units on the same basis as to Active Army units. A prescribed load of blank forms for mobilization processing should be established, issued, and maintained.

The OEG for headquarters and headquarters company should be changed to allow the communication platoon and the supply and maintenance platoon to be manned at full strength at the expense of the engineer platoon if necessary to compensate for the increased strength. There should be an

* (FOUO) 2d BG, 23 Inf, Command Report, 19 Nov 1962, 2d Inf Div Command Report, 3 Dec 1962, Tab D, pp. 4-5.

immediate issuance of all TOE and TA equipment presently authorized by the TOE, TA, and Equipment Guide. A prescribed load for oil and lubricants should be established, and consideration should be given to the establishment of a prescribed load for special munitions to be held at the unit level. Finally, the 155th thought that the stocks of spare parts should be doubled to insure a ten-day level.*

2d Battle Group, 155th Infantry Regiment (30 September - 16 October 1962). -- The 2d Battle Group, 155th Infantry Regiment, recommended that a further study should be made of induction procedures with a view toward further reducing the processing requirements. Thinking of supply deficiencies, it recommended further that all National Guard units be authorized two pairs of combat boots for each enlisted man.**

108th Armored Cavalry Regiment (30 September - 23 October 1962). -- Army Regulations 135-300 were a fine document when preceded by a thirty-day alert, but were of little help during an accelerated mobilization; hence, the 108th Armored Cavalry recommended that the Regulations be rewritten to give more detailed and specific instructions in the event of accelerated mobilization in the future.

The units of the 108th eliminated most of their supply deficiencies in a very short time, but to eliminate the necessity for crash measures, human discomfort, and loss of unit effectiveness in the future, the 108th

* (FOUO) 1st BG, 155th Inf, Command Report, 29 Oct 1962, ibid., Tab E, p. 6.

** 2d BG, 155th Inf, Command Report, 30 Oct 1962, ibid., Tab F, p. [3].

recommended that each soldier be authorized two pairs of boots, three sets of fatigue uniforms, and a sleeping bag and air mattress. It recommended further that units should be allowed to increase the amount of their security ammunition and to carry a specified amount of chemical ammunition. The increase in security ammunition recommended included twenty-four rounds for each M-1 rifle, thirty rounds for each carbine, twenty-one rounds for each .45-calibre pistol, forty rounds for each sub-machine gun, and 100 CN gas grenades per unit. *

503d Military Police Battalion (19 September - 9 October 1962). --

The 503d Military Police Battalion believed that military police units were peculiarly adapted to and effective in an operation like that at Oxford. Alert, aggressive patrolling would prevent the forming of crowds and would greatly assist in the restoration of order. The Battalion found that 12-gauge shotguns, chemical grenades, and gas dispensers were sufficient for close contact. It also believed that harmless colored dyes sprayed on riot participants would have aided in identifying them later. Grenade adapters should be utilized on the M-1 rifle for long-range use of chemicals under unfavorable wind conditions and should be available to the Battalion for future use. The range of chemicals, fire bombs, and brickbats thrown by the mob equalled or exceeded the present range of both hand-thrown grenades and tear gas dispensers. The Battalion therefore recommended that M-1 rifles with bayonets be considered the standard riot-control weapon rather than the carbine or night stick. Chemical dispensers or flame throwers should be modified to permit spraying of

* (FOUO) 108th ACR Command Report, 29 Oct 1962, ibid., Tab G, p. 87.

rioters with colored dyes.

Another recommendation made by the Battalion was that small vehicle fire extinguishers should be carried by selected members of the formation to protect members from serious injury from fire bombs, such as the rioters' home-made Molotov cocktails. Hand-carried, portable, battery-operated amplifiers should be furnished for control of formations and for addressing rioters. Floodlights should be available from the Engineers for night operations, for in Oxford they proved highly effective in securing critical areas previously screened by darkness. New-type protective masks should be issued at least to commanders and squad leaders so that they could communicate and control their troops in areas heavily contaminated by the CN, CS, or DM chemical. Additional AN/VRC-10 radios would allow more effective utilization of organic vehicles in patrolling areas initially secured but not cleared of rioters.

The Battalion concluded that company-size wedge formations using M-1 rifles and sheathed or unsheathed bayonets were effective. Carbines with bayonets would offer only a severely reduced capability. At Oxford night sticks and side arms proved futile. Over 400 Federal marshals so equipped failed to control any part of the situation. A maneuver force is needed under such circumstances to protect flanks and the rear and for effective action. The Battalion recommended further that the decision as to types of chemicals to be used should be delegated to the commander.

Reconnaissance of the Memphis area took place before the operation, but as a matter of policy there was no reconnaissance of the Oxford area. If undercover investigators could have been placed in the Oxford area ahead

of time, much damage to equipment and injury to personnel could have been avoided by knowing which route to use upon entering the area of turbulence. Most intelligence information secured came from the organic criminal investigators of the 503d after its arrival in Oxford. The Battalion recommended that local intelligence sources be established early in the planning phase.

The military policemen secured prisoners in one wing of the U.S. Department of Agriculture Sedimentation Plant in Oxford. Here there was a particular need for the Army to insure the prisoners' welfare and improve sanitary conditions and treatment of prisoners. Accordingly, the Battalion recommended that for closer control in future operations prisoners should be routed through a military police desk to the other responsible federal agencies.

As a result of the Oxford operation the Battalion recommended that task force communications be set up in two nets, command and operations, using AN/VRC-10's. There was a need for additional radios to utilize more fully the unit's motor-patrol capabilities. The Battalion also learned that the AN/PRC-6 was essential for close contact.

716th Military Police Battalion (28 September - 2 October 1962). --

As the 716th Military Police Battalion viewed the Oxford operation, it was essentially a military-police operation and therefore not too dissimilar to normal Battalion operations. The lessons it learned were

* (FOUO) 503d MP Bn Command Report, 1 Nov 1962, ibid., Tab H, pp. 8-11.7.

mainly in the air movement of the unit and in liaison and coordination with other arms and governmental agencies. It recommended that in any future operation of this type, alert orders should be explicit enough to permit the unit to load properly and prepare for operations against civil disturbances. The Battalion's personnel section and personnel records should not accompany the unit on operations of relatively short duration. There should be changes in the table of organization and equipment (TO/E 19-36E and 37E) to make the unit 100 percent mobile and to allow additional AN/VRC-10 radios, including thirty per company. *

720th Military Police Battalion (29 September - 21 October 1962). --

As the 720th Military Police Battalion had learned previously, and as the 716th had discovered, the communications equipment provided by the table of organization and equipment for a military police battalion was woefully inadequate. It recommended that the AN/VRC-34 be discarded and AN/VRQ-3's be issued in their stead. Furthermore, sixteen AN/VRC-10 radios per military police company were inadequate. What was needed was radio equipment for each operational quarter-ton vehicle of the Military Police. Concerning personnel, the Battalion commander thought that taking "negro" soldiers to Oxford was ill-advised. Their presence created a morale problem for him because he could not use them as military policemen. Therefore he recommended that in any future operation of this type "negro" personnel be held at their home station. **

* (FOUO) 716th MP Bn Command Report, 9 Nov 1962, ibid., Tab I, p. 12.

** (FOUO) 720th MP Bn After Action Report, 31 Oct 1962, ibid., Tab J, p. 3.

U.S. Army Forces Oxford (20 October - 30 November 1962). -- In the first two of his three monthly command reports from 20 October to the end of 1962, Col. Keller recommended continued provision of strong special service support as a means of assisting the command maintain the necessary high degree of troop morale, which he viewed as necessary for the best possible execution of his assigned mission. *

* (C) USAFOX Command Report, 14 Nov 1962, p. 47; and (C) ibid., 9 Dec 1962, p. 7.

APPENDIX B

ABRAMS ON THE ARMY'S ROLE IN SUPPORTING
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN CIVIL RIGHTS TROUBLES

1. Scope. This memorandum is limited to a discussion of the Army's possible future mission of providing support for Department of Justice efforts to obtain equal rights and opportunities for Negro citizens and how the Army can best organize and function to accomplish that mission.

2. Past Experience. The Army has been called upon several times in the past six years to intervene or to prepare to intervene in a Negro civil rights situation. Each situation was different, and each time the Army met the requirements laid upon it with an ad hoc organization, hastily improvised. This manner of response was not of the Army's choosing, but was due in major part to the inhibiting effect of a policy of permitting little or no overt prior preparation for use of federal troops in civil rights situations, presumably because of the possible adverse political repercussion such preparation, with all its implications, would have.

* This was an Operational Immediate message composed as a memorandum and sent by Maj Gen Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., from Birmingham, Alabama, during the difficulties there in May 1963, while the Army was still in Oxford, Mississippi, to the Chief of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler, in Washington, 19/0018Z / May 1963 /. Obvious minor errors in transmission have been corrected and words provided where the message was garbled or the addition of an article made the text read more smoothly. Obviously, General Abrams needed no help in writing the English language. It should be added that Abrams pointed out at the beginning of this message that he had not coordinated this memorandum with either the Department of Justice or Maj Gen / Charles / Billingslea, whose 2d Infantry Division had become involved in the Alabama troubles.

As far as I know, this was the wisest possible policy to be followed under the varying circumstances with which we were confronted on these occasions. However, it forced the Army to plan and make decisions without adequate intelligence, and to communicate and deploy without adequate preparation. As a result, the Army has not performed with optimum precision and finesse in these special operations. In each instance, to be sure of coping with a situation obscure because of inadequate intelligence, we employed troops and equipment wastefully, far in excess of actual requirements. Also, in the initial stages of each operation, both communications and troop reaction times were inadequate to a potentially dangerous degree.

3. Discussion. I believe it essential that we discard the ad hoc method of responding to Department of Justice support requirements. We must, on the contrary, devise the modus operandi, develop the organization, and acquire the equipment that will enable us to respond in optimum fashion to our requirements. We have been called upon for "instant troops"; we will never optimize that with crash planning and hastily organized, provisional task forces.

a. Modus operandi. With regard to a modus operandi, there are obvious policy reasons, with ringing political overtones, why the Army should continue in a support role in these civil rights actions, with the Department of Justice bearing the responsibility for mediation, enforcement of court orders, arrest and processing of offenders, and otherwise representing the Federal Government in its intervention in the situation.

In discharging this support function, experience in past operations, particularly in Birmingham, has proved that close coordination between Department of Justice and the Army, from the very outset of an operation, both at the Washington and the field levels, is essential to maximum efficiency. With such coordination, the Department of Justice can know at all times exactly which support the Army can provide. This should obviate, to a maximum extent, the imposition of unreasonable requirements on the Army. It will also simplify command control and promote unified planning and operations.

An abundance of hard intelligence is indispensable as the basis for the many difficult and fateful decisions that must be made during a civil rights operation. Yet, we have been trying to function with only informal and patchwork arrangements for the collection of intelligence, and virtually no provision for its collation and evaluation. Both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Intelligence Corps have been utilized and have cooperated well, but at present they apparently are not able to assign many agents to the job and do not seem to have a clear directive to produce much raw intelligence, but this is done without planning and no organized effort is made to collate and evaluate such facts as are gathered.

In situations of increasing racial tension, with emotions building to the explosive point and a riot a definite possibility, there comes a time when someone must make a decision whether to employ Federal troops and exert control. This decision is easy if the policy is to wait until the lid blows off. However, in a race conscious city such as Birmingham, with some 136,000 Negro citizens out of a total population of 600,000,

adherence to such a policy would seem to many an act of criminal irresponsibility: the potentialities for loss of life and property would be enormous. The troops ideally should be employed as soon as there is an apparent inability of the local law enforcement authorities to maintain order and before violence has erupted. It will always be difficult to decide just when this fateful moment has come; the decision-maker without adequate intelligence can only make an agonized guess, with disaster possibly the price of a wrong judgement. Thus far we have been operating in this manner, gambling without the fail-safe protection of hard intelligence.

We in the Army should launch a major intelligence project without delay, to identify personalities, both black and white, develop analyses of the various civil rights situations in which they may become involved, and establish a civil rights intelligence center to operate on a continuing basis and keep abreast of the current situation throughout the United States, directing collecting activities and collating and evaluating the product. Based upon this Army intelligence effort, the Army can more precisely determine the organization and forces and operation techniques ideal for each.

We should also recommend designation of an intelligence collecting agency (logically, the FBI) to work in the field, and give it the direct responsibility of digging out reliable and timely information as to what is taking place in civil rights operations in which the Federal Government may need to intervene. This will give us the eyes we do not have now.

Early and exhaustive reconnaissance of prospective area of operations, to determine its tactical and logistical implications, should also be standard procedure. This could profitably include aerial photographs in certain situations, such as a school integration operation on a university campus. Early reconnaissance was authorized for the first time in the Birmingham operation and contributed substantially to faster and more effective planning.

Also important is the early establishment of our own telephone communication system. This involves the installation of SCAN lines and direct lines to key centers such as those in the Army War Room in The Pentagon and at CONARC and Third Army. Commercial lines are needed to supplement the SCAN and direct lines, but cannot be relied upon as a primary channel of communication.

One of the oddities of civil rights operations is that when troops are committed the Army operates within a domestic area in which civil rights usually will not be suspended, although they may be interfered with temporarily by emergency measures necessary to put down a riot. We are required to respect property rights, and therefore the influx of a large body of troops may pose special problems as to authority to use such real estate as is needed for aviation support, troops bivouac or housing, motor pools, headquarters office space, and the like. While this is to some extent a legal matter requiring the advice of a Judge Advocate, it is primarily an engineer function to make available such real estate as will be needed by a civil rights task force. The formula used successfully at both Oxford and Birmingham was to call in resident

experts from the District Office of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to locate and arrange for authority to use the real estate required. The sooner this can be done the better, as early acquisition of troop sites will both facilitate operations and lessen the impact of troop entry on the civilian community.

For reasons already indicated the Army's advance party should include a Signal Officer to handle communications problems. Also, as troops are authorized to be employed in civil rights situations only within narrow legal limits often difficult to define, a Judge Advocate should likewise be a member of the party. An experienced Information officer should likewise be a member of the party, to coordinate with the Department of Justice public relations man and otherwise cope with the difficult information problems that frequently arise.

Finally, as regards modus operandi, I recommend that we consider adoption of a policy of placing troop units on the scene of incipient trouble, on appropriate occasions, in order to prevent violence from breaking out. I realize that there may be legal and political obstacles to employment of this tactic, but I urge that we exploit the stabilizing and restraining influence of the presence of disciplined troops of the United States Army on a scene of civil disturbance.

b. Organization. Whenever the Department of Justice sends representatives into the field to mediate or otherwise assist in a civil rights operation which may require the use of troops, they should be accompanied by a small coordination and liaison group of Army representatives. This was done at Birmingham with good results. The Officer in

Charge should be the representative of the Chief of Staff and authorized to speak for him. He will require a sufficient staff to permit him to maintain 24-hour liaison with the Department of Justice element and other agencies (FBI, CIC [IC], etc) as required, contribute to the operational planning, establish effective communications at an early time, handle any legal problems that arise, coordinate information activities with the Department of Justice, and determine the real estate situation, as a minimum. Special circumstances may require temporary augmentation of the staff, as for example, to permit tactical reconnaissance of the area. However, this Army element normally should be kept at minimum strength and function as anonymously as possible, wearing civilian clothing, using civilian vehicles, etc., as it may frequently be called upon to function before legal authority to employ troops exists and its presence may be misinterpreted locally as troop intervention.

Officers assigned such duty should if possible be drawn from persons who have previously been working with and have established rapport with the Department of Justice representatives who handle civil rights operations in the field, viz., Civil Rights Division attorneys, as augmented by other Department of Justice officials.

Troop units as now constituted are sufficiently flexible to permit organization of task forces suited to each operation as it develops, in my opinion. With sufficient advance notice of an impending operation, we can avoid wasteful over-employment of forces.

For the future, I would stress initial employment of the finest military police outfit we can put together, to achieve maximum impact on

assembled crowds of potential trouble-makers. The numbers employed, and the strength of the infantry back-up, would of course depend upon the situation.

This elite group of military police should be given proper logistic support so that its appearance can be maintained. For example, they should be kept out of pup tents, provided facilities for keeping their uniforms and other gear in top shape, and provided the best available vehicles.

c. Equipment. Existing equipment can be adapted to the requirement of a civil rights operation with one possible exception. With regard to troop reaction time, we can optimize movement to a locality by use of fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Ground transportation from the final landing area to the site of a disturbance, however, will often present difficult problems. For example, in Birmingham few trucks are available from local army units. For political reasons, it has been considered unwise to bring in additional trucks, as this gives the appearance of troop intervention. Some thought was given to the possibility of using local civilian vehicles such as buses or taxis, as an emergency measure, although this did not pass beyond the idea stage. The reliability of such transportation is, in any event, highly doubtful. I recommend that a study be made as to the best method of providing fast and reliable ground transportation between landing areas and the scene of civil rights disturbance with the objective of further reducing troop reaction times.

4. Conclusions. On the basis of the foregoing, I have reached the following conclusions:

a. The Army should adhere to a support role in civil rights matters. Department of Justice representatives should be responsible

for all operational contacts with civil authorities, except those involving military operations.

b. The Army should maintain close liaison with the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division. In every civil rights matter in which the Army may be called upon for support, there should be close continuous coordination between the Department of Justice and the Army, both in Washington and in the field. Whenever the Department of Justice sends representatives to the scene of a civil rights disturbance, the Army should send a representative if the situation reasonably portends troop intervention.

c. We must improve our intelligence operations, so that we in the Army will know all the personalities we may have to deal with, keep abreast of each civil rights situation as it develops, and be able to supply the Chief of Staff and subordinate commanders with hard intelligence on each current operation as it progresses. Currently, we are faced with making decisions on the basis of inadequate intelligence. I realize that the collection of intelligence in the Zone of Interior is primarily an FBI responsibility and intend no criticism.

d. Early reconnaissance of the site of a prospective civil rights operation to determine the tactical and logistical situation is essential to optimum functioning by the Army. This should be accomplished covertly, to reduce the political impact of such activity.

e. Our own telephone communications facilities, employing SCAN and direct lines to supplement commercial lines, should be installed as early as practicable after a decision that troops may be employed, preferably even before Department of the Army coordination and liaison

personnel arrive on the scene (see par f below). Again, this should be accomplished as covertly as possible.

f. A coordination and liaison group of Army personnel should accompany Department of Justice representatives to the field in any civil rights operation which may require the use of troops. The Officer in Charge should be authorized to speak for the Chief of Staff. His staff should be kept at a minimum, but permit him to maintain 24-hour liaison with the Department of Justice element and other agencies (FBI, CIC [IC], etc.), and contribute to operational planning. He should have a Signal Officer, Information Officer, and Judge Advocate to handle communications, information, and legal problems, and an Engineer Officer to determine the real estate situation and coordinate with the District Engineer Office (see par g below). Coordination and liaison groups should be organized and trained and kept available to be sent into the field on short notice, prepared with civilian clothing, credit cards, etc., so that they can operate inconspicuously.

g. As soon as possible after arrival of the coordination and liaison group on the scene, personnel from the District Engineer Office should be brought in to locate and make available all real estate facilities needed by the Army (troop sites, office space, aircraft landing areas, etc.).

h. Consideration should be given to adoption of a policy of placing troops on the scene of incipient trouble, on appropriate occasions and as legally and politically feasible, in order to prevent violence from breaking out. This would seem a logical escalation of the

tactic of positioning troops near Birmingham, which apparently has had a restraining effect.

i. Use of an elite group of military police for initial deployment at the scene of a civil rights disturbance would in many instances have a strong stabilizing effect on a crowd of potential trouble makers. Such a group should have sufficient logistic support to maintain their appearance.

j. Existing equipment is adaptable to the support of civil rights operations, but a study should be made as to whether additional equipment is needed to move troops from aircraft landing areas to the site of a civil disturbance in order to reduce troop reaction times.

5. Recommendation. It is recommended that the foregoing conclusions be considered in planning the future role of the Army in supporting Department of Justice civil rights activities.